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1.Introduction 
Innovation is currently a vital part of the contemporary production process, and is 
increasingly seen as integral to economic competitiveness and success (Porter, 1998).  
With increasing globalisation of product markets, alongside fragmentation of consumer 
demands, the ability to differentiate products through innovation, and flexibly respond to 
new market demands is central to the competitive success of modern businesses.  
Although there is considerable debate over the broader implications of these economic 
changes, there is a consensus that “the major source of added value is knowledge” (Stehr, 
1994, p. 62), leading to a general acceptance of the idea of a ‘knowledge economy’ in 
which knowledge as much as capital and labour drive productivity, wealth and ultimately, 
standards of living. 
One issue which arises in the knowledge economy is identifying how less successful 
regions can participate in this new knowledge economy; these less successful regions 
face both an absolute shortage of knowledge capital, and barriers to building that capital, 
because of the importance of agglomeration and critical mass in knowledge work. 
Innovation potential and capacity is unevenly distributed over space, and this regional 
dimension broadly matches the regional distribution of economic problems, meaning that 
poor regions tend to be characterised by low levels of knowledge capital.  Knowledge 
capital is distinct from other forms of capital in that there are no diseconomies of scale 
(Romer, 1994; Solow, 1994), which means that less successful regions are at a 
competitive disadvantage to build the necessary critical mass of knowledge activities 
which can create positive overspills for firms located there.  There has been much interest 
in recent years in trying to promote knowledge activity in less successful regions, because 
globalisation/ internationalisation has meant that these regions no longer have the option 
to compete on low costs in the face of extreme cost competition from newly 
industrialised areas, in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Far East (Milward, 2003). 
This seems to pose a real problem for identifying the place of less successful regions in 
the new knowledge economy, where they are at a competitive disadvantage to both 
knowledge rich and low cost locations.  A consensus has emerged that the only rational 
course for these places to pursue is the ‘high road’ approach, to attempt knowledge 
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accumulation and competition.  However, they face two barriers to building a critical 
mass of knowledge capital, firstly that their regional environments discourage innovation 
by offering low levels of return to knowledge investments, and secondly, through the 
outflow of knowledge capital that has been witnessed from peripheral regions in recent 
years.  In this paper, we ask the question “how can university spin-off companies 
contribute to the accumulation of knowledge capital as an initiator for knowledge-based 
region development in the periphery?”. 
In this working paper, we explore whether USOs do materially improve the environment 
for other high-technology small firms through three mechanisms, by opening up the 
university to outside influences, by actively transferring technology into other firms, and 
by helping to improve the ‘thickness’ of the regional innovation support infrastructure.  
Our model is that USOs help with the creation of a ‘territorial knowledge pool’ that firms 
can draw upon in their own innovation processes, and helps them to achieve more in 
innovation than would otherwise be possible.  We focus on three mechanisms by which 
USOs support the creation and maintenance of a territorial knowledge pool.  From this, 
we reflect on whether this improvement in regional economic environment is sufficient in 
magnitude to be considered an economic development. 
In this report, we focus on one particular such peripheral region; we use the concept of 
‘peripherality’ to refer to a place within a broader political-economy, that is to say a 
region which is dominated by externally controlled activities, rather than geographical or 
cartographic remoteness.  The region we focus on is the North East of England, a region 
which has been experiencing industrial decline for most of the last century.  Despite this 
industrial decline, the university has a strong tradition of links with industry (Potts, 1997) 
and has been in the vanguard of universities developing interactions with industry.  The 
university also has a good record of spinning off companies in the last 10-15 years, albeit 
– as well will see in Chapter 5 – somewhat sporadically.  This research is part of a larger 
comparative study also involving the region of Twente, in the Netherlands, another 
peripheral region with another active university.  That report has been published in 
parallel with this first working paper, and there will be a series of comparative working 
papers published in the course of 2005-07.  This report sets out research undertaken in the 
North East of England from March to June 2004 as well as work undertaken early in 
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2005 for Newcastle University’s senior management in support of the Newcastle Science 
City proposal (cf. Chapter 9). This research was funded by the UK’s Economic and 
Social Research Council, under grant RES-000-22-0659, and we are extremely grateful 
for ESRC for their support in this regard.  We would also like to acknowledge to 
contributions of time and support from the participants in the research, as well as the 
institutional support from Newcastle University in producing this work.  Any errors or 
omissions remain of course the responsibility of the authors. 
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2 Spin-outs in the knowledge economy: building a 
denser innovation and entrepreneurship environment  
2.1 Introduction 
Although it has long been recognised that human capital is critical to economic 
development, central to notions such as the Schumpeterian entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 
1934), the notion that knowledge capital differs from other factors of production has 
emerged only comparatively recently.  At a macro-economic scale, Romer (1994) and 
Solow (1994) both identified that knowledge, at least in the sense of intangible forms if 
investment, could account for potentially half the productivity growth in the long post-
war growth period.  Temple (1998) terms the theories subsequently developed as the 
“new growth theory”, and notes that it is predicated on the notion that productivity 
growth is driven by investments in knowledge capital which differs from other forms of 
capital in not suffering from diseconomies of scale.  Consequently, further investment in 
knowledge always brings marginal improvements in productivity.  Coupled with 
increasingly globalised production systems where advanced producer economies no 
longer have the capability to complete purely on cost, this produces a neat conceptual 
framework for the idea of the ‘knowledge economy’ as one driven by investments in 
innovation, research and design activities. 
Consequently, there is a clear geographical dimension to the new economy:  knowledge 
capital stocks are extremely unevenly distributed, with competitiveness, productivity and 
ultimately wealth dependent on those unevenly distributed stocks.  This unevenness 
seems to be a barrier for less successful places to develop economically. Consequently, 
knowledge production has become increasingly centralised and we have seen the 
emergence in recent years of a knowledge production hierarchy.  This creates significant 
problems for those less successful places which lie at the bottom of this global 
‘command-and-control’ networks (Yeung et al., 2002).  The macro-economic knowledge 
economy, or the new growth theory, emerged at a time when there was also interest in a 
number of very successful regions, such as Emilia-Romagna who appeared to have 
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succeeded precisely because they had territorial production systems well-organised to 
deal with a competitive global environment. 
Although many argue that the case of the Italian industrial districts are so specific to their 
context that more general lessons cannot be derived from them, a number of case studies 
were developed in other regions which began to support the theorisation of those 
successful places in terms removed from their more general context.  As Hassink & 
Lagendijk argued (2001), theories were developed in ways that allowed them to be easily 
transferred between places, without necessarily considering whether the contextual 
factors were sufficiently similar between those places to justify that transfer.  Massey et 
al. (1992) noted that this led to perverse policy outcomes, where knowledge economy 
economic development policies brought the greatest benefits to those most successful 
regions.  More generally, this all comes together to suggest that as a consequence of this, 
less successful regions have difficulties in ‘finding a place’ in this new knowledge 
economy.  They have difficulties in accumulating sufficient knowledge capital to create 
economies of scale which offer a sufficiently favourable environment for regional 
economic development, and appear to suffer from perpetually being ‘held’ in subaltern 
positions in the knowledge production hierarchy.  This raises a problem in understanding 
how knowledge activities can promote economic development in less successful places.  
To explore this more general conceptual issue, we focus on one such new economy 
activity, university spin-outs, which have been an important part of the stories that people 
tell about this new economy. 
2.2 Spin-offs outside core knowledge agglomerations 
In this paper, we focus on one element of the knowledge economy, University Spin-Offs 
(USOs).  By USOs, we begin from Pirnay et al.’s (2003) generic definition as “[n]ew 
firms created to exploit commercially some knowledge, technology or research results 
developed within a university” (p. 356). USOs therefore embody knowledge capital in a 
relatively pure form, and there has been increasing interest in policy-makers in promoting 
spin-off companies to generate stocks of knowledge capital in less successful regions.  
The policy promotion of USOs has certainly produced results in terms of numbers of new 
firms created (AUTM, 2001; HEFCE, 2002; ARC, 2003).  Association of University 
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Technology Managers (AUTM) figures suggest that US universities created around 500 
new firms in 2001 (AUTM, 2003). Other countries have also followed American practise; 
in 2000, 199 spin-offs were formed in the UK whilst 47 spin-offs were formed in 
Australia (HEFCE, 2002; ARC, 2002). 
However, it has not been established that USOs are ubiquitously beneficial, and 
frequently valuations of USOs rely more on faith than fact.  The past experience of 
science parks (cf. Massey et al., 1992) suggests the success of knowledge-based 
economic development policies are much more dependent on the underlying strength of 
the regional economy rather than an intrinsic quality of the policy.  Given that knowledge 
capital has a tendency to accumulate in successful places, this suggests that USOs might 
have fewer benefits for less successful places than the discourse of the new economy 
intuitively suggests.  The general problems with the knowledge economy paradigm take 
on a particular form with regard to spin-off companies. 
Firstly, in less successful regions, where economic conditions are less prosperous, and 
entrepreneurial environments tend to be less munificent (Dubini, 1989), one would expect 
USOs to more difficult to generate, and require greater effort, government support and 
subsidy to produce a lesser effect.  This assumes that a USO in a less successful region 
will be less profitable and hence less competitive/ productive than had the same resources 
been deployed in a more successful region which has an agglomeration of knowledge 
capital.  Because knowledge-based firms access local networks and spill-over effects to 
cut the costs of innovating, in less successful environments those firms perform less well 
than firms which have easy and regular access to knowledge resources which exist in 
knowledge agglomerations.  Indeed, there is much disagreement in the role and 
significant of USOs in the Cambridge phenomenon, between those who regard them as a 
by-product of an already strong R&D base against those who argue that they have 
become an integral part of the science base driving the economic success.   
“In a developed environment there is already an entrepreneurial community with 
the capability to select the best projects and allocate resources to them … In 
contrast, in environments with less demand for innovation, characterised by a 
weak entrepreneurial community and a lack of other resources, [research 
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institutions] may need to play a more pro-active incubation role” (Claryss et al., 
2004, p. 1-2).   
The second issue is that as USOs emerge in less successful regions, it would be expected 
that they would move away from those regions, either through direct relocation or 
through take-over and rationalisation by more competitive businesses in more successful 
places.  Lycos is a famous example of a spin-off company which formed in Boston 
despite being a spin-off from – and partly owned by – Carnegie Mellon University in the 
rustbelt city of Pittsburgh.  More generally, Elgen et al. (2004) have highlighted the fact 
that many university spin-outs – particularly knowledge-intensive business services 
(KIBS) – have a tendency to relocate to larger cities in core areas rather than making a 
positive contribution to the area around their parent institution.  This is particularly 
worrisome given that these KIBS firms are seen as being an important constituent of 
those knowledge economies which USOs are supposed to build. 
These two issues together might reduce any capacity that USOs had to improve the 
economic performance of less successful regions, much less to reduce the agglomeration 
advantages that core regions have over LFRs.  The archetypal places where USOs have 
succeeded (e.g. Route 128, Silicon Valley, and Silicon Fen) already have agglomerations 
of knowledge capital; further knowledge activity adds to the concentration of knowledge, 
a ‘win-win’ situation.  However, the economic development benefits of USOs depends on 
existing stocks of capital meaning that USOs in those regions benefit from the multiplier 
effect of the USOs. Although USOs might appear to be beneficial to less successful 
regions, this seems to imply what those regions really need is to begin to accumulate 
knowledge capital stocks to drive regional economic growth.  However, this particular 
analysis is based on an over-socialised reading of peripheral places as lacking any kind of 
capacity to challenge the relationships by which they are held in their subaltern positions.  
In this research project, and this report, we are interested in identifying mechanisms by 
which regions can tangibly improve their position within a broader political-economy.  
Consequently, we not turn to develop a model for considering how spin-offs can make 
such a contribution to their regional economies. 
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2.3 Towards a model for USOs contribution to regional peripheral 
development  
Deducing that there is no role for university spin-off firms in supporting economic 
development in less successful places is intuitively problematic, because it does seem to 
run counter to broad swathes of recent analyses which have demonstrated that USOs do 
act as drivers of economic development in ‘ordinary’ places (Asheim & Coenen, 2003).  
This is a fundamental tension in conceptualising the territorial economic development of 
less successful places, what Cooke (2004) calls the ‘scalar envelope’.  The issue is the 
mutual irreconcilability between perspectives which focus on the apparent value of local 
activities and initiatives, and analyses which look at the subaltern ‘place’ of less 
successful regions in the global knowledge hierarchy.  As Cooke notes… 
“As a consequence … economic geography tends to be dominated by 
(ideographic) case studies, broad (and untestable) stylised statements on what 
propels regional economic development, or, even less productive, high-level 
theory discussions that remain uncoupled to real-world experience.” (p. 8). 
This idea of a scalar envelope leads directly to the main research question we explore 
within our research, namely  
“how can university spin-offs rework political-economic relationships in ways 
that improve the situation of their host regions in wider knowledge-based 
economies”? 
Our approach is rooted one step back from the political-economic model, noting that as a 
consequence of peripherality, less successful regions have fewer resources available for 
innovation, which in turn makes them less attractive places for external actors.  We 
assume that improving the position in the political economy will take place if the regional 
environment becomes more attractive for external actors, which gives local actors more 
leverage in their relationships with external agents, which increases the stickiness of 
particular forms of knowledge, and also contributes to placing the region more centrally 
within the spatial imaginaries of policy makers allocating state resources which play a 
significant role in shaping regional innovation systems (Saxenian, 1999; Charles & 
Benneworth, 2001). 
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To operationalise these ideas, we consequently begin from a resource-based model to the 
geographies of innovation.  If an innovative firm has a problem, and it does not have the 
internal resources to solve that problem fully, then external resources can be accessed if 
they are locally situated and do spill-over. Munificent environments like Cambridge have 
these in abundance, whilst in less successful regions, there is not ready access to these 
assets (Johannisson, 1993), and consequently there is a correlation between the 
geographies of innovation, and the geographies of economic success.  A simple 
resource-based model of the innovation process might be that USOs work with 
universities and other innovative firms in creating collective innovation assets (cf. Klein 
Woolthuis, 1999).  The heuristic model is that the environment is improved if a USO 
creates an asset which spills over, and that those collective innovation assets are what 
improve the environment.  This means they create resources which other actors are able 
to access more easily, at a lower direct cost.  Although this is a pleasing heuristic, it 
requires a degree of rationalisation to explain what precisely is regionalised in this 
process. 
Muller & Zenker (2001) have developed a model  of the mutual interdependence of 
high-technology consultancy activities which they conceptualise in terms of a 
co-evolution process, in which consultants and high technology firms both innovate 
together, but build a shared knowledge pool between them.  This shared knowledge pool 
facilitates future collaboration, but also gives each of them an advantage in the wider 
KIBS process, which they can exploit in working with other firms.  Wood (2002) gives 
examples of how these activities have been territorialised into the kinds of arrangements 
that Lundvall (1998) sees as being national ‘styles’ of innovation.  Our argument is that 
one overspill mechanism that such a shared knowledge pool builds up between university 
and USO, and that other firms are able to draw on this as an asset in solving their 
innovation problems.  Thus, although a peripheral region may lack many free-floating 
innovation assets, this knowledge pool – between university and USO - is available to 
other firms to augment their resources.  This allows those firms to achieve better 
innovation outcomes than their internal resources alone would permit, in the absence of 
other external innovation resources due to their location in a peripheral, sparse innovation 
environment. 
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The concept is that an iterative accrual of these assets over time corresponds to an 
improvement in the entrepreneurial environment.  Event-specific outcomes are broadened 
to become territorial collective competences more open to others in that particular 
territory (Lawson, 1999; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999).  Storper’s (1995) example of the 
creation of a ‘regional specialised labour market’ is beneficial because it allows others to 
benefit directly from the recruitment effort originally expended, without reincurring that 
expenditure.  Fontes & Coombes’ (2001) offered the notion of ‘densification of the 
techno-economic network’ (p. 84), in referring to the process of universities and firms 
working together to create new innovation assets.  This idea of ‘densification’ provides a 
means to bridge between micro-scale activities and meso-level developments in particular 
regional economies. 
We have elsewhere worked through this idea and highlighted three sets of key 
relationships which influence this collective asset creation process (Benneworth & 
Charles, 2005).  Central to the model is the notion of a ‘regional knowledge pool’ which 
exists between universities and their spin-offs (cf. Muller & Zenker, 2001).  However, the 
regional knowledge pool – as a technological transfer between universities and firms – is 
sustained by various other systems of relationships that support and regulate access to the 
pool. We have developed a model which endeavours to show all these relationships, how 
the knowledge pool between university and USO is sustained by other relationships.  The 
model is shown in figure 1 below, and in particular, we highlight three important 
networks and sets of relationships which have to be explored in order to make sense of 
the regional impact of USOs:- 
• Spinning off firms can make universities more open to other commercial 
collaboration activity, helping SMEs to access their knowledge resources, 
• USOs can interact with other HTSFs and partnerships and helping them solve 
their innovation problems, and  
• USOs can work with policy-makers and development agencies to help them to be 
better at working with HTSFs.   
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Figure 1 A model of the relationships involved in supporting the territorial knowledge 
pool 
 
Source: Benneworth & Charles (2005) after Muller & Zenker (2001) 
2.4 Opening the black box of the regional TEN: exploring the sub-systems  
‘Densification’ is not a singular process, and it possible to think of a number of different 
dimensions along which network densification can vary.  Within any network, some 
densification involves actions on nodes, whilst some may involve actions on linkages.  
The second variant in densification is whether the densification involves creating new 
elements (nodes or linkages) or increasing the strength of those that already exist.  Within 
a territorial entrepreneurial network, for example, a new joint venture represents a new 
node, whilst a new profit centre within an existing firm strengthens the existing node.  
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Likewise, in terms of linkages, a novel collaboration represents a new linkage, whilst 
changing the collaboration with a partner from product supply to co-development is a 
strengthening of that linkage.  This 2x2 scheme ( {node, linkage}; {more, stronger} ) 
provides a means to explore the extent of densification activity involved in particular 
entrepreneurial networks. 
The framework we use is that the central asset is the territorial knowledge pool in which 
experiences and relationships build up, and become habituated into routines, and cultures, 
which are more general innovation resources as is seen in entrepreneurial cultures 
elsewhere.  This can be conceived of as a knowledge pool into which other local actors 
can dip to supplement their internal resources.  We assume that this knowledge pool is 
territorial in the sense of Lorenz (1999) because although the assets in the knowledge 
pool can be accessed by those outside the region, they are dependent on relationships 
between people.  Consequently, they embody significant elements of what Lundvall calls 
“know-who” (1992), the least codifiable and stickiest form of knowledge.  The territorial 
knowledge pool is held in place by further regional specificities, contexts and 
relationships which contribute to that stickiness, as outlined in figure 1 above.  We 
highlight in particular three sets of relationships, the university’s internal culture of 
commercialisation (which tie the assets to university-based actors), with relationships 
with other firms (which further anchor the knowledge in the region) and with 
policy-makers that regulate the policy-environment and shape the other, complementary 
territorial innovation assets available. 
The first network and set of relationships, (1) is largely internal to the university, and that 
is the formation of the commercialisation activity within the university.  To answer the 
main research question, it is necessary to explore how these changes in policies affect the 
overall knowledge pool; whilst it has been assumed that professionalisation of the 
technology transfer community is largely beneficial, when the impacts on the knowledge 
pool are considered, professionalisation can be a problem as much as a benefit.  
Professionalisation seeks to ensure that firms do not rent-seek on university knowledge, 
but the difference is that knowledge can have greatly differing value to universities and to 
firms.  In particular, policies which stop MNCs free riding on university research 
programmes also have the potential to stop low-selectivity entrepreneurs dipping into the 
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tacit knowledge pool at universities and exploiting discrete bits of know-how.  This is an 
intriguing tension for universities to manage because even at a heavy discount, the 
potential future value of bits of unknown technology are very high, whilst indeterminacy 
makes their value to SMEs very low.  How universities manage this relationship will 
clearly play a significant role on the openness of the university to local businesses, and 
hence the accessibility of the regional knowledge pool 
The second relationship (2) is between the university and the business support 
organisations.  To some extent, this relationship is traditionally regarded as 
unproblematic, that universities transfer their technologies in ways that are coherent with 
other partners’ regional development strategies.  In this perspective, the university has the 
capacity to be a much more active partner in regional development, and to improve the 
regional innovation environment.   However, when universities start producing USOs 
(and those USOs are the result of university strategies) then this creates a new market for 
business support services in which universities have interests because those services 
contribute to equity growth in their companies and also create a beneficial environment in 
which other companies can form.  Again, the model suggests that the key research 
interest in these relationships is how they sustain the knowledge pool, encourage SMEs to 
access it and ensure that there is a high level of exchange between actors.  However, as 
Cooke found, it is not enough just to create new regional organisations, these 
organisations themselves have to produce tangible outcomes and sustain themselves. 
The third relationship (3) is between USOs and other businesses, supporting access to and 
participation in the knowledge pool.  Part of this activity might be thought of as 
clustering, working collaboratively to solve innovation projects, and more generally from 
benefiting from proximity.  USOs may play a role in shaping the regional trajectory of a 
place, and potentially its local style of innovation, if they come to play a big role in 
working with other firms.  Wicksteed’s (2000) and Lawton Smith et al.’s family trees 
from spin-off firms in Cambridge and Oxford respectively are interesting illustrations of 
how this can happen in more successful regions.  Equally, deeper webs of relationships 
between USOs, their spin-offs and other firms may improve the innovation environment 
in those places. 
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3 Methodology 
In this study, we are interested in the evolution of four sub-networks within the regional 
innovation environment, in which we have identified actors in four main fields.  The 
thesis is that the experience of spinning off companies, and the development of regional 
specific experience in spin-off commercialisation has positively co-evolved with these 
three networks, namely the connection of the university to other businesses, the 
connection of university to other innovation providers and the impact of USOs on other 
firms innovation.  This question is one of a family of lines of inquiry in regional 
development theory which are seeking to explore whether a particular set of local 
changes constitute an improvement of the situation in a particular region (cf. Hassink, 
1992; Yeung et al., 2002; Chapman et al., 2004; Hospers, 2004).  Our focus is on a less 
successful region, because of the problems associated with demonstrating convincingly 
that such changes have overcome the problems that less successful regions face in 
beginning an accumulation of knowledge capital, which Cooke (2004) refers to as the 
scalar envelope. 
We undertook this research in one peripheral industrial region, the North East England 
(cf. section 4). We already had undertaken a series of research projects which had 
established that university spin-outs around Newcastle might be contributing significantly 
to the economic development environment in the North East, which is why Newcastle 
was chosen as the study region.  This past research is summarised in section 5 below.  
Section 5 also draws upon 15 interviews undertaken within the last five years to put 
together a background to spin-off activity at Newcastle University, (8 from 1999, 2 from 
2002, 5 from 2003).  However, this material is only used descriptively in section 5; the 
analysis in sections 6 to 9 is based on the standardised methodology outlined below. 
The main research question we have posed above has been operationalised to ask to what 
extent is USO activity contributing to strengthening three kinds of network, and so the 
approach in the research focused on exploring the dynamics and evolution of the 
networks in the North East of England, and ultimately how they cohered into elements of 
a strengthened regional innovation system.  In the literature review above, we have set 
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out what we wished to explore, whether particular sub-systems had become stronger and 
better connected, along two dimensions, with regard to their situation within global 
knowledge hierarchies, and in terms of the breadth of the activities covered in the 
network, namely, to what extent they have become more generally accessible as a 
territorial innovation asset. 
Such a research project is inevitably grounded in realist methodologies, recognising that 
places containing similar underlying causal relations and structures will in practise appear 
different (Scott, 2000).  Our approach was also informed by critiques of unselfconscious 
realism embedded in a number of ‘new regionalist’ analyses, in which empirical findings 
have been overly structured by theoretical frameworks, ignoring significant differences 
between places (Lovering, 1999; Hudson, 2003; Lagendijk, 2003).  In this working paper, 
we have attempted to establish a single - if partial - history for the evolution of the three 
networks, to try to identify similarities in structures of relationships.  From this, the 
analysis argues that such structural similarities may constitute the kinds of regularities 
which warrant regarding as place-specific assets.  I assume that similar phenomena are 
linked through similar underlying causes and structures, and this then allows the 
answering of the questions about whether the set of activities has in toto constituted a 
change in the regional innovation environment. 
The research was undertaken through a set of interviews with key actors within the North 
East England.  From our past research we already had contacts with a number of the 
managers of Newcastle University as well as members of the industrial liaison office 
(which by the time of the research was included as part of the Business Development 
Directorate.)  We followed a snowball methodology (cf. Yin, 1994) in which we 
identified who were the key partners of prior interviewees, and then interviewed them, to 
build up a picture of the university network.  We undertook a first round of interviews in 
March/ April 2004 with university managers and BDD employees, and then rolled out the 
‘snowball’ in May and June 2004.  In these interviews, we sought to snowball out to 
firms and USO with whom they had some kind of working relationship about which they 
had something interesting to say.  We identified that there were five communities that we 
were interested in, university managers, academic staff, spin-off staff, other firms 
working with USOs and regional institutional partners.  It became clear in the course of 
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the interviews that the picture was more complicated that that, because many of the 
academic staff were also the principal agents in spin-offs.  In table 1 below, 
notwithstanding this difficulty, we enumerate the interviews undertaken during this 
period. 
Table 1 The interviews undertaken during the research period 
Category of interviewee Number Category of interviewee Number
University senior managers 2 Spin-off/ not academic 3 
University BDD  4 Spin-off/ previously academic 5 
Academics/ spin-off owners 8 Third party firms 4 
Business angel 1 Student 1 
Former spin-off, now academic 3 National policy-maker  1 
The interviews followed a semi-structured pattern, focusing in each case on the core 
activity and what had been done to build up and develop the particular activity, and how 
USOs had related to this.  Because of the diversity of the interviews, the particular 
questions and thematic focus varied in each interview.  Drawing on past work on 
university/ business interactions (Benneworth, 2001; Benneworth & Dawley, 2004), in 
each case our questions reflected how the knowledge pool assets were used by the 
individuals and their organisations to accumulate knowledge capital activities.  With the 
academics, for example, the interviews examined the balance between undertaking high 
quality research, running their own small business and commercialising their research 
through other routes.  The business development directorate interviews examined how the 
universities had supported individuals wanting to spin-off firms, to ensure that it 
contributed to the growth of the university.  With third party firms, the interviews 
explored how working with universities and university spin-offs has contributed to 
solving their own innovation problems and growing their business.  The student and 
business angel interviews reflected the fact that not all the contacts and activities in the 
networks were in categories which had been anticipated ex ante. 
22 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
This working paper presents a first analysis of the situation in Newcastle, to run in 
parallel with a similar analysis of the situation in Twente, and then to lead to more 
detailed comparisons of the dynamics and changes in particular parts of the system in 
each region.  For the knowledge pool and each of the supporting three sub-systems 
identified in the literature review, we have attempted to examine how the network has 
grown, and whether there is sufficient growth to suggest that it is a qualitative 
strengthening of the knowledge asset base in the region.  For each of the three 
sub-systems, there are three dimensions explored, whether the nodes are bigger/ stronger, 
whether connections are more numerous/ higher quality, and whether the shape of the 
network has changed (and whether the North East’s position in that network has 
improved).  This is done in each case to examine whether the changes have improved the 
position of the North East in the wider political-economic situation within which it finds 
itself.  These four analytic chapters form the basis of chapters 6 to 9; in order to grasp the 
significance of the analysis, it is necessary to have an understanding about the North East, 
the importance of universities to the regional economy in the last ten years, and 
Newcastle University’s own approach to commercialisation and regional engagement.  It 
is to those issues in Chapters 4 (the North East) and 5 (Newcastle University) that we 
now turn. 
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4 The North East England as a peripheral industrial 
region 
The North East economy was one of the first regions to experience industrialisation, in 
the late 18th Century, with increasing exploitation of indigenous coal reserves providing 
the foundation for the emergence of a strong local production complex best described as 
‘carboniferous capitalism’.  This pattern, of coal, steel, and metal-using industries, has 
been a common feature of industrialisation, and has often been associated with 
subsequent industrial decline, such the fate of the famous Montanenindustrien in 
Germany’s Ruhrgebiet (Cooke, 1995).  The rise of the regional industrial complex 
occurred at a time when all government orientation was extremely laissez-faire in 
outlook, with no strong nationally-driven development industry emerging in the UK as 
was to happen in Germany, or the emergence of strong oligopolies in the USA, the two 
economies first to overtake the UK.  Ownership of strategic industries remained 
fragmented within local owners, and the collapse of local banking systems in the 1860s 
and 1870s systematically choked off the flow of development finance to these industries 
at a time when their main overseas competitors were investing heavily in new production 
technologies and techniques.  By the turn of the century, although the UK in general, and 
the northern region in particular, had the most significant coal, steel and shipbuilding 
industries in the world in terms of volume, their quality, position, competitive strength 
and future prospects no longer dominated the global economy as they had in earlier 
decades. 
4.1 The roots of decline 1900-1945 
Since the turn of the last century, the defining feature of the North East economy has 
been the decline of its traditional industries.  It is possible in this period to distinguish a 
number of parallel causes of this industrial decline.  Elbaum & Lazonick (1986) ascribed 
indigenous decline of manufacturing in the UK to a system of mercantile capitalism that 
encouraged cost reduction over innovation and adoption of competitors’ best practice.  
Heim (1996) argued that poor management, characteristic of the UK as a whole, was 
responsible for the decline.  Alternatively, Tomaney & Heyward (1996) argued that a 
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focus on financial concentration in the City of London undermined independent industrial 
capital in the peripheral regions.  There were a number of clear phases in this industrial 
decline, and in the first period, the first world war created demands for the raw materials 
of war and then reconstruction produced in the North East of England, which masked the 
enduring and underlying structural problems in those industries.  However, from 1929, as 
international reconstruction efforts faltered in the light of the fall-out from the stock 
market crash, UK heavy industry found its overseas markets collapsing under the burden 
of its poor competitiveness. 
Support for industry was hindered by the dominant ideological perspective in the 
Government of the day, the so-called Treasury view.  This view was predicated in an 
almost religious belief in market mechanisms and balanced budgets, which significantly 
blinded them to the problems of industrial blight in those regions most adversely affected 
by the cessation of the European industrial reconstruction effort in the 1930s.  The only 
concession to this position came in 1934, with the creation of the Special Areas 
Commissioner for the particular areas most adversely affected by the Depression (Loebl, 
1978).  The transgressive nature of this development against the Treasury view led to its 
description of the development of advance factory units by the Commission as “a most 
interesting experiment in state socialism”.  However, what really made the difference to 
the regional economy was not the Special Areas Commission, but re-armament after 
1936, which once more created localised monopolistic opportunities for small and 
otherwise uncompetitive producers in coal, steel, shipbuilding and armaments.  This 
policy situation changed in the post-war period, with the dismantling of the Treasury 
view, and its replacement with a fiscal commitment to Keynsianism, and a political 
commitment to greater intervention in key industrial sectors. 
4.2 Nationalisation, restructuring and retrenchment 1945-1975 
During the period 1945 to 1975, UK industry was aggressively reorganised by the state 
through nationalisation and planning controls (McKay & Cox, 1979; Stråth, 1987; 
Roberts, 1993).  Both sets of policy measure aimed to modernise the UK economy and 
spatially restructure it with the South East and West Midlands as the production 
laboratory, and the remainder of the country as its workshop (Buswell & Lewis, 1970).  
25 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
The industrial composition of the UK periphery, in which the North East was located was 
profoundly affected by these policies, particularly those relating to the nationalisation of 
strategic industries, spatial planning for new high-technology industries and the policies 
for state-led high-technology industries (Watts, 1992; Howells, 1992).   
In the post war period, there was considerable pressure in old industrial regions - arising 
from a curious coalition of the national government and local industrialists - to avoid the 
establishment of new industries which would increase employment competition with 
traditional industries. Consequently, much of this activity was concentrated in the 
Midlands (Buswell & Lewis, 1970; Hudson, 1989).  There was however no such pressure 
to prevent the establishment of firms employing those outside the sector, in particular in 
the types of industries drawing on a female workforce.  In contrast to the North West of 
the UK, where the strong textiles industry had created an active and mobilised female 
workforce, the dominance of mining and heavily engineering meant that there was a 
reserve female labour army in the North East, with relatively large numbers of women 
available for employment at a relatively low cost (Stubbs & Wheelock, 1990).  Because 
of relatively low regional skill and wage levels, this increased the attractiveness of the 
North East for those firms who wished to site routine manufacturing operations in the 
context of an heavily protected economy still largely shielded from overseas wage 
competition.  This in turn favoured the attraction of particular types of inward investment 
of the general form of branch plants.  As the decline of traditional industries intensified in 
the 1960s, the attraction of inward investment appeared to offer the potential to create an 
alternative economic base for the region (Hudson, 1995).  This became increasingly 
important in the 1970s and 1970s with the recognition of the need for the creation of new 
employment to replace jobs lost through the restructuring of nationalised industries, and 
to deal with rising male unemployment. 
However, prior to 1975, nationalisation was broadly speaking a positive experience for 
the North East.  In the post-war period, the region did benefit from the whole 
nationalisation process, because what it did permit was some strategic investments of the 
kinds that had not been possible under the fragmented ownership of the private industries.  
In particular what was notable was the investment which was channelled towards 
strengthening the region’s R&D base in steel, gas, electricity, and shipbuilding, whilst 
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coal’s decline was sensitively managed; however, the decline of the coal industry could 
not be arrested by innovation because the industry was so outdated and overmanned 
(Stråth, 1987, Roberts, 1993).  Much innovation in the region was concentrated in the 
older industries; for example, the Consett Steel Company was at the forefront of the 
development of spectrophotometric techniques in the 1950s to analyse the purity of 
high-specification steel1.  Likewise, British Gas had a large Engineering Research Station 
in the North East which thrived under state ownership of the gas sector; it was the (much 
later) privatisation and regulation which squeezed the company’s R&D funds and led to 
the rationalisation of R&D onto one site in the Midlands (Benneworth, 2002). 
Consequently the subsequent politically-inspired run-down of the older industries 
disproportionately undermined the research and development activities of the North East 
(Marvin & Cornford, 1994).  Questions of whether the detrimental effects of privatisation 
would have been ameliorated by a more devolved management structure ignore the 
intense pressures that the privatised industries were later placed under by their regulators 
as well as international competition (Marvin & Cornford, 1993)2.  As Table 2 shows, the 
worst period of decline for the main heavy industries in the region was the period from 
1971 to 1981, as Britain suffered from national and international industrial crises, 
including several devaluations, an emergency IMF bailout, and a poorly-thought out 
flirtation with extreme monetarism. 
                                                 
1 Electronics Company Interview, 9th August 1999. 
2 The closure of the British Gas Research Station did not arise because the British Gas managers rationally 
evaluated the North East against a set of qualitative factors and ajudge it inferior to other regions.  Rather 
British Gas was an organisation in crisis because of demands placed on it by the regulator, it had developed 
a lavish research headquarters at Loughborough and chose to concentrate its R&D at a single site, a 
decision with debatable merits.  The structural explanation of the concentration of R&D also fails to 
capture the benefits of the closure, the creation of a number of consultancy firms selling their expertise 
back to British Gas which recklessly dispensed with much of its own technological and professional 
capacity, but also enabling these new firms to compete for business with other firms. 
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Table 2  Population and employment in carboniferous capitalism in the North East, 000s 
 1841 1861 1881 1901 1931 1961 1971 1981 1991 
Population 617 942 1458 1995 2515 2610 2678 2636 2602 
Coal miners 23 50 96 165 188 118 64 39 11 
Iron & Steel - 13 31 34 23 57 56 22 10 
Shipbuilding - 7 15 42 51 64 39 26 8 
Source: Tyneside Papers in Social Research (1926-33), Challenge of the Changing 
North, NOMIS (1998). 
One of the main weaknesses in the industrial base came about through state-led corporate 
reorganisation, which was driven by the policies of the Industrial Reorganisation 
Corporation and the National Research and Development Council (Hague & Wilkinson, 
1983; Webster et al., 2003).  The basis of this approach was on the one hand the 
development of ‘national champions’ through a series of mergers in the high technology 
secto, and on the other, a series of barriers reducing the incentives on universities to 
commercialise their research (qv). Whilst not an immediate problem in this period, this 
did leave key decisions affecting the R&D assets in the region in the hands of the private 
sector, as did the subsequent privatisation of the nationalised corporations.  These firms 
responded to problems of profitability by divesting their corporate R&D assets in favour 
of the purchase of externally-developed technology (Charles & Benneworth, 2000).  The 
IRC’s attempted to build national champions through mergers which inevitably increased 
centralisation of control around London, so that when the companies underwent 
restructuring, activities in the North East tended to be sold off or closed, whether branch 
plant such as GEC at Newton Aycliffe or Plessey at South Shields, or high technology, 
such as Vickers Joyce Loebl in Gateshead. 
During the period of the dominance of Keynsian statism in the UK, nationalisation of old 
industries was accompanied by the emergence of new industries, which remained largely 
beyond direct state control, although their geography was influenced by planning policy 
as well as government decisions over public spending on R&D and procurement (Heim 
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1988), and of course, the activities of IRC ensured a continual process of restructuring 
and reorganisation favouring the South Eastern regions.  Because of the national logic of 
economic regulation, these new industries, such as automotive and aerospace, emerged in 
new industrial spaces in the UK, rather than in the established industrial areas such as the 
North East.  Two main drivers underlay the national regulation.  Firstly, it was believed 
new industries in old industrial areas would draw labour away from traditional 
manufacturing, entirely feasible given the conditions of full cyclical employment of the 
time (Hudson, 1989a).  Secondly, these new industrial spaces were indeed more attractive 
than old industrial areas for a number of reasons, related both to their industrial history as 
well as patterns of government expenditure (Buswell & Lewis, 1970). 
The absence of any commitment to regional growth poles outside the greater south east 
and a reluctance to create alternative demands for skilled labour in regions like the North 
East meant that the composition of these new industries was predominantly low-skilled 
and low-paid, with an almost total absence of higher-order functions such as R&D.  The 
overall effect was that a branch plant economy grew largely unseen.  When later 
restructuring adversely affected the core heavy industries, which dominated R&D and 
innovative activity in the region,  the overall economic structure that remained was that of 
a branch plant economy.  Manufacturing in the region remained reliant on very large 
externally-controlled enterprises, with a workforce highly specialised in particular state 
controlled industries.  Combined with a preponderance of Government R&D spending in 
the South East, this reduced the degree to which new industrial sectors emerged in the 
North East.   
The emergence of the branch-plant economy into the North East is well documented, and 
by the time of accession of the UK to the EU, there was a foreign-owned sector (mainly 
of US origin) of some importance in the North East.  Smith and Stone (1989) estimated 
that in 1971, there were 24,400 jobs in foreign firms, rising to 53,000 in 1978, at a time 
when total employment in the region was at a level of approximately 1m (NOMIS, 1997).  
These jobs were predominantly in manufacturing, and Hudson (1995) estimates that 75% 
of the jobs created to that date by inward investment were in six sectors:-chemicals, 
mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, rubber, automotives and printing. 
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The geography of the development of the service sector in the UK in the post-war period 
demonstrates a spatial division of labour as extreme as that in manufacturing (Aksoy & 
Marshall, 1992).  Government policies had a strong influence on the patterning of 
employment in the service sector.  Organisation of manufacturing around a national logic 
(‘national champions’) in turn created pressure for the organisation of business services 
around a parallel national pattern.  The continuing strength of the City of London 
throughout this period ensured that as service industries grew in importance, essential 
business services were concentrated in London and later the South East (Allen, 1992).  
Business service growth in the South was paralleled by a growth in other high-level 
professional services, connived at, if not driven, by central government.  The current 
spatial division of labour is based upon the concentration of the high value-added 
business services in the core regions, especially London (Kirby, 1995).  Producer services 
by this time were highly concentrated in London, and to a lesser extent, the South East 
(Wood, 2002).  The peripheral regions, by contrast, tended to have a much higher 
concentration of consumer services such as retail and construction, as well as higher 
employment in public administration, education, health and caring (Charles & 
Benneworth, 2001). 
4.3 The move to a post industrial economy 1975-2000 
The next significant period in the economic decline and restructuring of the North East of 
England was precipitated by international events in the 1970s, not least the two oil crises, 
UK relations with the IMF, and the accession of the UK to the European Economic 
Community.  Against this gloomy economic background, the Wilson and Callaghan 
governments struggled to preserve economic stability and full employment, and then 
from 1979 onwards, the incoming Thatcher government shifted the target towards purely 
monetary stability, initially removing much of the regulatory apparatus upon which less 
successful regions had depended, then undertaking an extensive privatisation programme. 
Early on in this period, the Northern Regional Strategy Team, established at the 
suggestion of Central Government, developed an analysis of the economic situation in the 
region, which was remarkably prescient, alongside an action programme which was never 
implemented due to the unfavourable economic, then later political, climate for direct 
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regional intervention.  By 1975, the economic problems of the North East were severe; 
there was a large branch plant economy which had very little stability, with plants closing 
or massively downsizing during economic downturns.  Alongside this, the nationalised 
industries and the public sector in health and education were facing heavy expenditure 
squeezes.  Tight public finances alongside a Labour government committed to full 
employment led many public sector employers to maintain employment levels whilst 
cutting investment and expenditure programmes, particularly problematic for the already 
underfunded nationalised industries with decreasing competitiveness.  This underfunding 
frequently meant that later on, in order to survive as privatised industries, firms were 
forced to hugely cut employment, which would not had been necessary had there been 
sufficient long term investment in those industries. 
From 1979 onwards, there were severe problems across manufacturing industry in 
response to the monetarist ‘squeeze’, in which interest rates were set to hit strict money 
supply targets without concern for the impacts on the real economy.  Contemporaneous 
sources estimate that around one third of manufacturing employment in the UK was lost 
in this period, not merely in branch plant activities, but in activities that would have, 
during healthier economic times, been dynamos of economic growth.  The response to 
this situation was the promotion of new waves of inward investment, despite the fact that 
inward investment was at least partly responsible for the North East’s structural 
problems.  Clearly, inwards investment was a part of the hidden emergence of the branch 
plant economy which meant that in times of downturn, the region had little control over 
its destiny. 
What really created an environment in which inwards investment was seen as the solution 
to the ‘regional problem’ was the Nissan investment, announced in 1982, and which 
opened to great fanfare in 1987. That particular investment was economically and 
symbolically important, and was legitimated by both regional and national policy-makers 
as Japanese investors bringing new techniques and innovations to a region with a problem 
in promoting innovating.  Nissan’s insistence upon just-in-time manufacturing techniques 
ensured that a number of its suppliers also opened production facilities around its’ 
Washington site.  By the late 1990s, this Washington production complex had cemented 
both its own longevity and status as the most productive car plant in the whole of Europe. 
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The success of Nissan awakened policy makers to the apparent potential of inward 
investment to help deal with the economic problems of the region.  It is possible to 
differentiate two, overlapping, periods in which inward investment attraction was seen as 
the solution to the North East’s economic problems.  The first was through a number of 
high profile investments in ostensibly high technology sectors, such as electronics; 
Samsung (1987), Fujitsu (1989) and Siemens (1995) were all hailed as proof that inward 
investment was turning the North East economy around, as each represented a deeper 
form of investment than previously.  Samsung was an electronics company (perceived as 
more ‘high technology’, and with the promise of a micro-chap factory), Fujitsu was a 
micro-chip factory, and Siemens was a state-of-the-art micro-chip facility, with the 
promise of further later investment in R&D.  It was assumed in the popular discourse that 
the fact that these investors were in high technology sectors that they would help the 
North East to rebuild the R&D activities which public sector mismanagement had eroded 
within the region in the previous half-century. 
The second phase of inward investment related to the attraction of a large number of ‘call 
centres’, offices in which telephone inquiries for customers are dealt with in a centralised 
‘back office’ environment.  The North East was a natural home for such call centres 
because of the large amount of office space available, and low prevailing wage rates in 
the region.  The sector grew quickly in Europe in general in the 1990s, and in the UK in 
particular;  although the growth was not particularly extraordinary in the North East of 
England. As Richardson et al. (2000) note, the North East was somewhat overrepresented 
in the sector on account of its small workforce.  Although at the time there was some 
policy consideration that the sector could become an important employer for the region, 
Richardson et al. questioned the sustainability of the jobs, both from competition from 
other places, but also with the introduction of new technologies removing the need for 
human agents.  Indeed, since that time the North East has already lost jobs explicitly to 
other Anglophone countries with lower wage costs, in a number of high profile 
announcements, from amongst others Lloyds TSB. 
Despite the failure of inward investment to materially improve the position of the 
regional economy with respect to other competitor regions, it is important to stress that 
the region still has some economic strengths.  The chemicals industry, although it has 
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reduced in size, did successfully diversify in the post-war period, and the pharmaceutical 
industry has to date been successful in the region, and more latterly, some diversification 
into biosciences has taken place (Benneworth, 2004). There are a number of exemplar 
local innovating SMEs, which have grown and created new employment, and there 
remains an active regional economy in diverse elements of engineering.  There have been 
some new knowledge-intensive business services created, in engineering consultancy, for 
example, and the public sector, health and education particularly, are important sources of 
high productivity, high value added employment.  However, the region’s relative wealth 
with respect to the rest of the UK has dwindled in the last thirty years, to a point where it 
is some 80% of the national average, what the HM Treasury would regard as a £12bn 
productivity gap with the rest of the UK. 
4.4 Conclusions: the economic challenges facing the region  
In each of the three periods described above, the overriding concern has been the 
continuing economic decline of the North East of England.  Throughout the last century, 
there has been a recurrent failure by industry to invest in the creation of new forms of 
knowledge, and to promote competitive strategies based on quality and innovation rather 
than cost reduction.  This has been compounded by a view from the central government 
of the ‘place’ of the North East which has undermined the technological modernisation of 
the region, and detached the management the problem of economic decline from the 
associated problem of finding a new role for the region in the national space economy.  
These changes remain as acute today, albeit manifested in different forms; the lack of 
Government spending on R&D in the North East either through new centres or relocation 
(such as the Met Office) has undermined changing the external image of the region by 
others.  There is a problem with the retention of control over decision-making in the 
region, which exacerbates the adverse economic climate by reducing the number of 
autonomous actors able to innovate and drive productivity improvements. Throughout 
this period, however, the universities in the North East have played some role as 
autonomous institutions with strong knowledge bases available for the improvement of 
regional industries.  As background to the analysis of the role of spin-offs, this report now 
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turns to look at how one of those universities, the university of Newcastle, has chosen to 
engage with the regional economic environment. 
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5 The changing policy environment at Newcastle 
University. 
The most obvious feature of regional engagement at Newcastle University is that it was 
built centrally into its mission.  Early discussions around the desirability of a university 
for the North were initiated by T. M. Greenhow, who in a lecture to the Newcastle 
Literary and Philosophical Society in 1831 argued that the inaccessibility of Oxford and 
Cambridge to all but the aristocracy, and the remoteness and licentiousness of London, 
meant that the north required a university to promote the economic development of the 
region3. 
“Indeed, the increasing wealth, population and intelligence of the country must 
soon call into existence such establishments in various parts of the country, 
appears not only probable … but almost a necessary consequence of the 
encreasing (sic) demand for knowledge, and the total inadequacy of existing 
academic institutions to satisfy the demand” (p.7).   
Moreover, Greenhow argued that the presence of a university would act as a great 
stimulus to existing industry, and help with processes of adaptation and change.  
“The probable failure of old channels of trade and the necessity of discovering 
new ones, which may not only supply their place, but afford encreased (sic) 
opportunity for disposing of the immense surplus produce of our several branches 
of manufacturing, and give employment to the rapidly accumulating capital of the 
country” (p. 8). 
It took a further forty years for Greenhow’s vision to be realised in Newcastle; Newcastle 
University as an entity is itself a recent creation, which came from the granting of an 
autonomous royal charter to King’s College Durham (Potts, 1997).  King’s College was 
itself created from a merger between Armstrong College, and the Durham Schools of 
                                                 
3 T. M. Greenhow (1831) “The expediency of establishing an academic institution, of the nature of a college 
or university, for the promotion of literature and science, more especially amongst the middle classes of the 
community, briefly considered”, Paper read to the Literature and Philosophical Society of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, April 5 1831, 13pp.  Available in Newcastle University Library Archive. 
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Medicine and Dentistry in 1937 (Loebl, 2001).  The faculties of Agriculture and 
Engineering were created in the 1871 as Armstrong College in response to particular 
needs of regional business communities (Chatterton, 1998).  The current strengths in 
marine engineering are a consequence of 150 years of collaboration between the various 
versions of the university and the shipbuilding industry, and more recently in the 20th 
century, the chemical engineering department developed strong links as Teesside became 
a focus for the activities of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). 
However, despite these apparently auspicious origins, a number of factors reduced active 
collaboration between the university and its’ industrial partners over the second half of 
the 20th Century, as outlined in Chapter 4.  The role of the North East itself changed, and 
there was a loss of high-technology R&D functions from the region of the type that could 
have engaged with the university.  As mentioned at some length in the previous chapter, 
the national framework for science and technology at this time did not encourage regional 
collaboration. As all intellectual property was owned by a government agency, the 
National Research and Development Corporation (NRDC, later 3i), and grant funding 
provided specifically for teaching and research, there were both disincentives to and a 
lack of rewards for, pursuing regional economic activities.  Moreover, the policies of the 
university itself, such as they were, did not encourage academics to engage with industry.  
However, there was some interest within the university in regional engagement at this 
time, but not in a co-ordinated manner.  Despite this lack of focus on regional 
engagement, some local firms built strong links with universities and became adept at 
exploiting their technological advances (Benneworth, 2001a).  As the founder of one such 
company, Herbert Loebl, was to write,  
“In 1953, Joyce-Loebl undertook its first licensing agreement, with the [Durham] 
Medical School [i.e. Newcastle University].  We engaged undergraduates from the 
university, most of our scientific instruments were first tried out in the University, 
and we sold some to the University.  We also received technical advice from 
members of staff” (p. 233). 
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5.1 The changing regional policy environment  
By 1989, however, there was some concern that this lack of oversight had allowed these 
beneficial activities to drift to the point where there were clear costs to the region in not 
exploiting the universities’ strengths.  The North East by this point was emerging from a 
particularly difficult period in its’ industrial evolution; the harsh recession of 1980-81 
coupled with an unwillingness of the Government to support regional industries and a 
particularly misguided enterprise policy had created a huge problem of unemployment 
(Greene et al, 2004).  The Government’s solution to this policy issue was two-fold, to try 
to remediate the worst of the unemployment through the attraction of new inward 
investment projects, and to deal with the physical debris left by this deindustrialisation 
through the creation of the Urban Regeneration Corporations.   
The key issue with this central government response is that it was primarily an 
amelioratory response, rather than attempting to sow the seeds of new growth in the 
region.  This created something of a regional vacuum for growth-promoting activities, 
and the universities began to play something of a regional role because of their 
possession of such potentially economically valuable assets around high technology 
activities.  Subsequently, the 1980s saw a number of activities which led to attempts to 
increase the formal role of regional engagement by Newcastle University.  This process 
latterly became tied up with an emerging regional agenda for universities to engage with 
‘their’ regions.  The North East universities were at the forefront of policies to support 
regional development.  This fitted very well with Newcastle University’s pre-existing 
orientation towards commercial engagement as an applied engineering university 
(so-called redbrick) with strong links to industry. 
5.1.1 The first phase of this new regional engagement 
In the 1980s, there was a slow gathering momentum of the regional agenda in the North 
East, as the universities slowly began to work with each other in ways that would later 
become a model for all the English regions (CVCP, 1994).  Higher Education Support for 
Industry in the North (HESIN) was created by the five regional universities in 1984 as an 
attempt to create a single gateway for firms to access university services.  This first 
service offered by HESIN faltered to some extent because of the lack of resources to 
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ensure that queries met respondents in the universities willing to listen, and then help 
them deal with their problems (Benneworth 1999).  The first real initiative of substance 
achieved by HESIN was to create a single framework for continuing professional 
development for engineers; HESIN bid to the research council responsible for 
engineering (SERC) to run such a programme in the North East, and they were granted 
this, and also they changed their statutes to allow themselves to confer joint degrees.  As 
a SERC initiative, the DTI did not penalise the universities for accessing this funding; 
however, the initiative quickly ran its course, the potential pool of recruits was exhausted, 
and consequently the universities ended the programme.  HESIN was not particularly 
well-funded, and was run for several years by one individual who managed to access 
various European regional development initiatives, without ever building very much 
beyond those particular initiatives4.  That is not to say that HESIN did not have its uses, 
and was engaged by the regional development community as a regional asset; given the 
emphasis from the 1960s onwards amongst regional policy makers in promoting inwards 
investment, it is unsurprising that the universities became enrolled in supporting this 
process.  As one interviewee on a former project put it … 
“[The Northern Development Corporation] used HESIN whenever they needed to 
put some clever bastard in front of the inward investor to prove that there was 
specialist knowledge in the North East”5 
The universities comprising HESIN gradually awakened to the idea of regional 
engagement.  When the Department of Trade and Industry changed the funding rules in 
1995 for European Structural Funds, making ERDF supplemental rather than substitutive 
- the idea of properly funded and permanent regional activities seemed to be a greater 
possibility.  Before that time, universities who went to the trouble of accessing these 
funds experienced a direct, pound-for-pound reduction in their core grant, making them 
worthless as sources of corporate investment.  Consequently, universities tended to 
                                                 
4 Much of this section is based on research undertaken in the framework of a previous project in 1999; this 
involved 9 interviews with university employees active in regional development as well as regional 
stakeholders. 
5 From note of interview 05/11/99 
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involve themselves in projects for which they did not receive direct funding, which led to 
the activities being regarded as outside the core concern of the university.  These changes 
also provided resources to run a more properly funded set of regional activities and in 
particular for a permanently established organisation such as HESIN.  The first initiative 
to be proposed with the revised funding regime was called “Knowledge House” (in its 
first incarnation).  Although very different to its current form, it was created to act as a 
knowledge bridge between industry and academics, which ensured that SMEs received a 
response to their enquiries, providing some seed funding to stimulate academics to 
involve themselves.  As one university senior manager noted, it had a very simply 
philosophy. 
“It was based on the idea that if an SME rang a university and said they were from 
Scrotum Manufacturing, and were looking for some way to stick cardboard to 
steel, they would get nowhere.  They would get a very courteous academic who 
would put them through to someone they though might know about it, and then 
after a number of attempts to transfer the individual through the system, they 
would fall prey to an electric glitch and fall into an electronic black hole.  There 
was no way forward from this, unless you were to put a lot of numbers in the 
phone book, but for SMEs to use those numbers properly, they would have to 
understand how the universities worked, so what they really needed was a 
sign-posting service.”6 
The consequence of the fact that it was funded from a regional fund meant that all the 
universities had to be involved with it, rather than representing a single university 
technology transfer mechanism.  A second initiative was the “Three Rivers strategy”, 
named after the three principle waterways in the region, the Tyne, the Wear and the Tees 
(cf. Potts, 1998).  The idea was that a technology centre to exploit university knowledge 
would be created in each of the three localities. All three still exist in some form but the 
                                                 
6 From note of interview 02/11/99 
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links with the universities are perhaps less than anticipated in 1995/67.  All of these 
activities were funded by the ERDF, but not at the kind of levels that ensured the 
sustainability of the programmes; consequently, these activities were permanently 
engaged in seeking continuation funding, which undermined the perception that potential 
users had of those organisations.  Fraser (1999), for example, sets out the problems that 
the European Process Industry Competitiveness Centre (EPICC) on Teesside faced, 
despite a seven year grant to support its existence, leading to its’ incorporation in 2002 
into one of the five regional extra-university Centres of Excellence as part of the regional 
science strategy 
Shortly after its inception, in the subsequent funding round, the local Government Office 
in the North East demanded that universities no longer propose projects as individual 
universities, but to co-ordinate the bids amongst themselves.  HESIN had had been run as 
a meeting of Pro Vice Chancellors, university senior managers, and predominantly of 
those with responsibilities for regional engagement.  The new demand that they speak 
with one voice meant that HESIN could not provide that voice, because a single voice, 
rather than collective action, demanded agreement between the universities’ chief 
executives, the Vice Chancellors.  A lengthy period of negotiations followed in which 
several things became clear.  The most significant of these was that following an election 
in 1997, the new left-of-centre Government was intent on creating a new set of regional 
                                                 
7 The Teesside Centre, the European Process Industries Control Centre (EPICC) still exists today and 
works closely with the Process Industry Centre of Excellence (qv); The Wearside node, the European 
Centre for … evolved into the Institute for Automotive and Manufacturing Advanced Practise.  The Tyne 
Centre, The European Centre for Advanced Industries, was originally conceived as a place to host clusters 
in pipeline engineering and marine technologies, but was reoriented towards semi-conductors, with the 
arrival of Siemens, and some of its purpose has been restored with the reopening of the Siemens facility.  
The centre which has retained closest links with the university is the Resource Centre for Industrial Design 
and European Design Centre at Newcastle University, but this was never part of the Three Rivers Strategy. 
Or, as Lagendijk (1999) put it (p. 200) 
“Initially, there was the intention to establish a ‘low-volume’ engineering centre of excellence on the 
northern bank of the Tyne (ECAI), as part of the ‘Three rivers strategy’, complementing the ‘high volume’ 
centre on the bank of the Wear (CAMM) and the process-oriented centre on bank of the Tees (EPICC). 
ECAI, the European Centre for Advance Industries, was initially seen as providing, among other activities 
associated with marine engineering, a new home for the RSC and various clusters. ECAI was presented as a 
flagship regeneration project on the north bank of the Tyne symbolising the striving for economic renewal 
in the area. However, when Siemens announced its massive investment in a silicon chips factory on 
Tyneside, ECAI was ‘hijacked’ and renamed as the North East Microelectronics Institute - Centre for 
Advanced Industries (NEMI-CAI).” 
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development institutions.  This suggested that it could potentially be greatly beneficial to 
the universities if they had their own regional association to deal with the new regional 
development agency. 
5.1.2 North-eastern universities and the new English regional agenda 
“Universities for the North East” was created in April 1999, almost exactly at the same 
time of the official launch of the Regional Development Agencies (Benneworth, 2001).  
This was enormously beneficial for regional engagement, because the first main tasks for 
the newly created RDAs was to draw up regional economic strategies for their regions.  
Given the relative poverty of the North East in comparison with other parts of the 
country, and the absence of good regional ‘success stories’ for economic development 
policy, the universities were one of a relatively select group of regional actors with 
genuinely global scope and who were internationally competitive.  This was reflected in 
the emphasis which the strategy placed on universities, and in the final strategy, launched 
in November 1999, the fourth out of six themes to the strategy was “Placing universities 
and colleges at the heart of the region”, on a par with regeneration, creating employment 
and increasing the regional enterprise culture.  This relationship developed and in the 
revised strategy, completed in 2002, universities remained with their own theme, 
“Recognising our Universities and Colleges at the heart of the region’s economy”. 
A second element was that the newly formed organisation began building up its’ own 
capacity to deliver particular outcomes and creating what could be described as “regional 
added value”8.  Although the Vice Chancellors led the organisation, much of the work 
was undertaken by its’ various committees, which covered both the purposes of 
universities (teaching, research and the so-called ‘third strand’) and special purpose 
committees which worked where there was value-added in collaboration to address 
common issues.  There was a committee, for example, which provided a single point of 
contact in the development of the final (unsuccessful) bid for City of Culture in 2003.  A 
range of activities were developed, exemplified creating a regional music degree pathway 
                                                 
8 Interview 01/12/03 
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for talented students linking with the new Sage music centre.  The idea was one of 
‘critical mass’, addressing the peripherality and small size of the region by bringing the 
universities together to act as one.  In the case of the music degree, the idea was to attract 
and retain musically talented students by linking them with expertise in different musical 
genres in the different universities. 
A third element of this relationship between the universities, the region and the regional 
development agency can be seen in the creation of the regional science policy for the 
region, Strategy for Success.  This strategy has its origins in the North West, where the 
threatened closure of a large Government research laboratory in Cheshire stimulated a 
regional backlash against centralising research around London and the South East9.  To 
defuse these tensions, additional funds were provided to regional science actors in the 
North West, and a report was commissioned from a science consultancy, Arthur D Little.  
The success of the North West stimulated the North East to respond, and they likewise 
commissioned a report from the ADL consultants (Charles et al, 2003).  However, in the 
North West the problem was one of weak bridges between universities and industry and 
the absence of Government research laboratories, whilst in the North East, the main 
problem for university commercialisation activity was that the user community for 
science was relatively weak (Benneworth, 2004). 
What emerged from the consultancy exercise in the North East was a proposal to create 
five new centres of excellence in five scientific areas in which the North East had a 
world-class technological base, and to use these new centres to stimulate user demand as 
well as act as a bridge between science and industry.  One NorthEast decided that the 
fundamental problems afflicting the region, low rates of enterprise and growth and weak 
employment could not be addressed without finding a place for the region in the new 
knowledge economy.  They therefore decided to invest heavily in this programme, 
directing £200m over 5 years to the project.  However, the bulk of this money was to be 
                                                 
9 This was the subject of a previous ESRC Project managed by Beth Perry at SURF, Salford University. 
‘Making science history’: the regionalisation of science policy? Award Number: L144 25004.  More 
information on this project is available at  
http://www.surf.salford.ac.uk/TerritorialKnowledge/MakingScienceHistory.htm  
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invested in the centres of excellence with only very limited funding made available to the 
regional universities.  Thus although universities might have featured prominently in the 
rhetoric of the RDA, it was less clear to what extent the RDAs were in reality willing to 
fund the universities’ activities. 
Figure 2 The schematic outline of the strategy for success, and the role of the regional 
universities, 2001 
Source Benneworth, 2004. 
5.2 The new regional engagement at Newcastle University 
Within Newcastle University itself, as was previously noted, individuals were involved 
with local firms and organisations throughout the post-war period, although there was no 
strategy for engagement.  Potts (1998) in Chapter 5 of his Ph.D. thesis, provides a 
detailed overview of the history of the engagement of Newcastle University with local 
industry.  Potts highlights that the period 1945-1970 was a period of vacillation by 
policy-makers and university staff, and the formation of the Industrial Design Unit in 
1970 was the first real attempt to co-ordinate central activities for the benefit of industry.  
However, he also notes that in the departments he studied, there were much stronger 
informal links between the university and industry, mediated through the departments, 
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firms and industrial associations, including the North East’s only industry research 
association, the British Shipbuilding Research Association (Buswell & Lewis, 1970).  
There were a variety of attempts by both policymakers and the university managers to 
formalise this regional engagement, but it had not been successful.  There was an attempt 
to create a ‘Science City’ in Peterlee, according to Potts (1998), with close links to the 
university computer science department.  When this failed in the late 1970s, the next 
proposal was for a Newcastle Technology Centre, strongly encouraged by W. Reay 
Atkinson in the Regional Office of the DTI. 
The history of the Newcastle Technology Centre is an interesting one, because it is an 
example of what Vestergaard calls (2004) “The Newcastle Model” in action, using the 
research base within Newcastle University to inform policy decisions.  Loebl (2001) 
notes that the original idea for the Newcastle Technology Centre arose from a paper 
written by Alfred Thwaites, at the time a researcher within CURDS.  Although Loebl is 
very critical of what emerged, the original proposal was an attempt to create an office to 
make existing university activities more accessible to small firms, such as the 
Micro-Electronics Applications Research Institute (MARI) and the Mechanical 
Engineering Design Unit10.  The Newcastle Technology Centre was separate from the 
main university, and a number of the older spin-offs in this research project mentioned 
that they had had some contemporaneous involvement with it.  The NTC was involved in 
providing basic support services like market research and business planning advice. 
An unforeseen consequence of the existence of the NTC was that it in turn provided the 
rationale for the implicit university policy of benign neglect, in which firms emerged, 
“escaping from the university”, “despite rather than because of university policies”11.  
Loebl and Potts tell similar stories about the decline of the NTC12, that it failed to have 
sufficient impact and in particular was unsuccessful in getting technologies out from the 
                                                 
10 “Proposal for a Newcastle Technical Centre” was a discussion paper written by Alfred Thwaites; his 
archive on the establishment of the centre is currently in our possession. 
11 Forms of these words were regularly used by the interviewees, in the older companies as well as the new 
technology transfer community within the university to describe the policy of benign neglect. 
12 Although they are not independent; Loebl’s discussions with Potts formed part of a process whereby 
Loebl was gathering his thoughts for completing the manuscript for his own memoirs, Loebl (2001). 
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university.  The failure of NTC in 1989 therefore removed this rationale for the university 
to take no action, and so it was in direct response to the failure of the Technology Centre 
that NUVentures was created, the next attempt or commercialisation regime within the 
university (Loebl, 2001). 
“In the summer of 1989, the University asked Mr. Whitworth, a retired 
industrialist, to examine whether it would make sense to establish its own 
technology licensing organisation … As a result of his report, NUVentures Ltd 
was established to exploit the University’s discoveries and innovations” (p. 288). 
NUVentures therefore became the de facto guardian of intellectual property in the 
university, and at that time, a number of companies were formed which have survived in 
some form to this day.  As part of this, the University was involved in creating the 
Quantum investment fund (Potts, 1997).  The university placed £½m into this fund, along 
with similar funds from local companies, to invest in university spin-off companies.  As 
trading company shares was outside the permitted activities of the university as an 
educational charity, a specific company was set up for the purpose, which is what 
NUVentures was, and this received both university and central government support 
(Potts, 1997).  This was ultimately an unsuccessful venture, and following a number of 
problems relating to the relationship between the university, potential entrepreneurs and 
their host departments, NUVentures was substantially changed, with a new manager 
appointed to focus on licensing technologies to large companies with the resources to pay 
for them. 
Alongside this development of the regional agenda implicit in attempting to increase 
commercial engagement, a parallel and very significant step in the development of the 
regional agenda at an institutional level came with the appointment of Professor Andrew 
Hamnett to the role of Pro Vice Chancellor (Research).  Hamnett had arrived in 1989 
from Oxford to a chair in Inorganic Chemistry, and was rapidly promoted to the PVC 
(Research) position.  In the governance system at the time, there were two Pro Vice 
Chancellors, responsible for Teaching and Research respectively, subordinate to the Vice 
Chancellor, the Chief Executive of the university.  Although the position did not formally 
stipulate that the PVC was responsible for regional engagement, his own background was 
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on the research on fuel cells, something with a strong industrial orientation, and he was 
interested in commercial engagement and the regional agenda.  Consequently he began to 
assume a greater interest in so-called ‘third strand’ activities alongside his formal 
research remit; as Potts (1997) points out, his fellow PVC Teaching was formally 
responsible for, but less interested in, the regional engagement dimensions of teaching.  
The experience of HESIN was that the university was remarkably positive, almost 
naively so, about regional engagement.  Some resistance was to arise later, but within the 
context of increased pressures to perform research to maximise performance in the 
Research Assessment Exercise. 
5.3 Building a regional engagement mission (1995-2001) 
In 1996, the next step was taken to institutionalise this regional engagement issue with 
the appointment of a Regional Development Officer (RDOs), something which was 
relatively uncommon within universities in the UK at the time, although much more 
commonplace amongst US universities following the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. The 
appointee, John Dersley, came from a civil service background, and was appointed at a 
time when there were few other RDOs there were in the UK, something he experienced 
when he attempted to define his role by contacting others with similar responsibilities 
elsewhere in the UK system.  In parallel with the creation of the regional development 
office, the remnants of NUVentures had evolved into an entirely separate organisation 
within the university, the Technology Transfer Office, under the control of the titular 
head of NUVentures, with three operational officers. The role of this technology transfer 
office was to seek the best routes for the commercialisation of technologies, but which, 
because of the aversion to spin-offs, tended to focus on licensing to large companies.  As 
one individual interviewed in this research noted:- 
“The thrust was to be licensing … looking for technologies, and seeking routes to 
license them to big companies, preferably companies with capitalisation at least 
the size of the university”13. 
                                                 
13 Interview 11/03/04; the significance of this comment becomes apparent later on. 
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In parallel with this, Newcastle was beginning to develop a research competence in the 
field of universities and regional development, building on the research activity which 
had led to the development of the admittedly ill-starred Technology Centre.  The 
Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), the national group representing 
universities through their vice chancellors, commissioned CURDS in 1994 to carry out a 
piece of research, Universities and their Communities.  This high profile report was the 
first substantial contribution to a growing realisation in the UK that universities had a 
significant role to play in the development of their regional economies14, and led to 
follow-on work from a range of sources.  These sources included the Department for 
Education and Employment, Government Offices in the South East and North East, and 
ultimately to the OECD Institutional Management in Higher Education programme.  The 
Professor responsible for this, Professor Goddard, had also in the 1990s been part of 
attempts by the then-Vice Chancellor to consider non-traditional funding routes, such as 
“additional places” for students.  Goddard had then moved to become a third PVC, 
responsible for the implementation of an accounting software system in the university. 
The real take-off point for the regional development agenda within the university strategy 
dates to the time when there was a concordance of three forces, Hamnett, a manager 
committed to the idea, Goddard, a manager supportive of Hamnett and with expertise in 
the subject, and Dersley, the regional development officer with capacity to initiate and 
progress regional activities.  This development was not entirely endogenous; it was clear 
there was a growing regional agenda in England from the creation of the Government 
Offices (prefectures) in 1994, and certainly consolidated following the 1997 election (cf. 
5.1.2).  Of course it does not make any sense to view those changes in isolation from the 
creation of Universities for the North East, and the lessons of the HESIN experience.  
Particularly notable was the immediate shift towards far greater regionalisation of 
economic development activities in England, with the presumption that this would be 
                                                 
14 The report into the future of higher education which really set the post-enlargement landscape (fees and 
competition) was commissioned by the last Conservative government under the Chairmanship of Lord 
Dearing.  Lord Dearing was aware of the work that Profr Goddard was doing onto universities and regional 
development through his chairmanship of the inward investment agency the Northern Development 
Corporation.  Subsequently, a full chapter of the Dearing report (9) was focused on this dimension, and 
Profr Goddard provided a lengthy written annex for the Inquiry. 
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followed by political decentralisation.  It is perhaps unsurprising that universities would 
face increasing incentives and pressure to regionalise their activities, or at least become 
more regionally engaged, but it appears that Newcastle were well advanced in making 
these changes with respect to some other institutions, and indeed to have institutional 
capacity, if not total commitment, to this emerging regional agenda.  Consequently, as 
these opportunities arose, what could be considered as the new ‘regional engagement 
triumverate’ (Hamnett, Goddard, Dersley) were well positioned to respond and exploit 
them for the benefit of the university. 
The first of these schemes emerged from the Department of Trade and Industry, who 
provided funds through a bidding process for universities to improve their engagement 
with business and the community (the project was called Higher Education Reach Out to 
Business and the Community, most often referred to by its acronym of HERO-BAC).  
HERO-BAC was also significant because it was a grant to all universities, subject to a 
bidding process to ensure that the bid met quality thresholds and the intentions of the 
scheme.  This was the first in the line of a set of funding streams for university 
commercialisation at the same time as a general government tendency towards 
concentrating research funds on funding fewer ‘excellent’ universities, predominantly 
located in the South East of England.  
Although this was not explicitly a regional fund (for example, a North Eastern university 
could have applied for funds to work more closely with London-based companies), in the 
case of Newcastle, the decision was taken to apply for funds to promote regional 
engagement.  The Newcastle proposal (qv), submitted on 14th September 1999, had at its 
core the appointment of four Business Development Managers to co-ordinate the 
exploitation of knowledge within the university.  When the results were announced on 
30th November 1999, Newcastle University had indeed been awarded the full £1.1m for 
which it had bid, and duly began the process of appointing four business development 
managers to begin this process of ‘opening up’ the university.  Obviously, there was 
considerable overlap with the existing technology transfer officers within the Technology 
Transfer Office, and it remained to 2003 for this issue to be properly resolved from an 
organisational perspective (cf. section 7.1.2). 
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Recruitment of the BDMs was not a simple process, not least because the university 
wanted to recruit senior staff with the capacity to involve themselves in strategic 
change within the university as well as straightforward commercialisation activities15.  
Particularly difficult to secure was agreement that the posts would be paid as “ALC 5”, 
the highest scale open to administrators, library and computing staff.  The posts were also 
difficult to appoint to, and so by late 2000, two were appointed, along with a further two 
the following summer.  It is perhaps worth reiterating that all these changes happened 
under the old regime of Professor Wright, and many activities were created which were 
then subsequently mainstreamed. 
The focus for the mainstreaming of these activities was a change at the top of university.  
Around the same time as the arrival of the BDMs, the university appointed a new Vice 
Chancellor, who arrived from Imperial College of Science and Medicine to improve the 
fortunes of the university.  The appointment was made specifically with a view to 
strengthening regional engagement as well as international research excellence. 
“The University is seeking to appoint a [Vice Chancellor] … as it strives for 
excellence and the further strengthening of its position as a major high quality 
research and teaching institution of international, national and regional 
importance”16. 
The analysis of the new senior management team was that there had been a historical 
pattern of substantial underinvestment in the university, particularly estate and central 
services, which the current ad hoc approaches to regional engagement could not turn 
around. Restoring the position of the university required creating a permanent internal 
investment stream within a broader context that new automatic funds from the 
government were unlikely to substantially increase.  At the same time as the BDMs 
                                                 
15 This becomes significant when thinking about the role of the BDMs within the community of practise, 
because they had been recruited in such a way that they were almost part of central management in a way 
that a more free-standing “Industrial Liaison Office” in the Klofsten et al. manner might not have been (cf. 
7.2.3). 
16 “University of Newcastle upon Tyne: Office of Vice-Chancellor”, Report from the Joint Committee on 
the Vice-Chancellorship, Appendix I to Minute of Joint Meeting of Senate and Council, 23 May 2000.  
Senate Minute120, Council Minute 160. 
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arrived, and began started to have an impact on commercialisation, the new Vice 
Chancellor was also implementing a large programme of redundancies, the so-called 
voluntary severance scheme, in parallel with a significant organisational restructuring of 
the university.  The most two striking features of the new business plan were firstly that it 
created a 3% headroom fund for future strategic investment, and implemented a huge 
organisational change, rationalising 7 faculties and 78 departments into 3 faculties and 
around 30 schools.  The aim of the restructuring was to rebuild the university to deliver a 
new business plan which set targets for the constituent elements of the university, in 
contrast to the previous business plan which had brought together the various strategies of 
the university components.  The business plan set targets for generation of revenue from 
‘third stream’ i.e. Commercialisation funding, and for the creation of spin-off firms.  The 
purpose for this was to ensure that there was a 3% fund which could usefully be 
reinvested in the areas which had hitherto been neglected, and allow the university to be 
more proactive about shaping its own future form rather than reacting to particular central 
government proposals. 
The new business development managers therefore found themselves in a very chaotic 
situation in which to be encouraging staff to establish companies.  However, the 
university’s statistics (cf. figure 3 below) indicate that the BDMs were successful in 
raising the level of commercialisation activity.  What was also serendipitious was that in 
2001, a spin-out company from the ‘benign neglect’ period of the late 1980s, in which the 
university had a 15% shareholding, was bought out by an Australian collaborator, 
realising £6m at the same time that the university faced a £6m deficit17.  This ensured that 
the restructuring deficit did not precipitate emergency financial measures, although the 
funds so raised were hypothecated for investment programmes.  A bid to the successor 
programme to HERO-BC programme, the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), in 
2001, was unsuccessful, in part because it had been organised as a regional bid, trying to 
                                                 
17 As one Dutch interviewee pointed out, universities in the UK as much as the Netherlands do not run on 
expectations announcements but on cash in the bank, so a deficit can be an immediate and grave problem 
for a university.  By preventing the university having to begin emergency measures, the deficit could be 
managed without precluding using the £6m from being invested productively, which is what happened in 
this case. 
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reconcile the divergent interests of two research-intensive and three teaching-intensive 
universities.  The university did successfully bid for and receive funds under HEIF 2, the 
successor for HEIF, in a bid that developed the BDM roles and devolved them to the 
faculties (cf. 7.3.3). 
The final element of the development of innovation services to the time of this research 
came with the reorganisation of all those central elements responsible for business 
development.  There had been some hybridisation and cross-fertilisation between the 
business development managers and the technology transfer office before 2003, when 
they were moved into a single office (cf. 7.2.3).  The BDMs had provided Newcastle 
University’s input into the North East Centre for Scientific Enterprise, which was a TTO 
responsibility; likewise, when there were staff shortages within the BDM team, then the 
technology transfer officers involved themselves in supporting the BDM roles.  It was 
clear that there was both the opportunity and potential to rationalise the activities, and the 
university convened a group to explore the issues involved. One of the outcomes from 
that group was the decision to appoint a senior member of staff to take responsibility for 
all business development and commercialisation activity in the university.  Dr. Robertson 
was appointed to this position in 2003, and began to build the Business Development 
Directorate out of the various teams with cognate responsibilities across the university.  
The arrival of Robertson was the final element in the development of the university’s 
commercialisation services by the time of the research (spring/ summer 2004). 
5.4 The 2004 Newcastle University commercialisation context 
Having set out a brief recent history of Newcastle University’s commercialisation 
activities, it is worth perhaps saying a little about the state of those activities at the time 
of the research (March-July 2004).  At the time of the research, commercialisation 
activities were at something of a high water mark, with the appointment of the new 
director, and the creation of a single directorate for all the commercialisation activities.  
The university had received plaudits in 2003 for the fact that it had the highest income 
from spin-off companies, due to the sale of Novocastra, from which the university had 
received around £6m.  The new BDD website suggested that there was a qualitative 
increase in the number of companies formed in response to the changes initiated since 
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1996.  Figure 3 below charts the rise of spin-offs at Newcastle University as recorded in 
the BDD website. 
Figure 3 The number of spin-offs from Newcastle University as recorded on the BDD 
website, 2004 
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The table on the website is not complete for a number of reasons, not least because of the 
benign neglect shown by the university towards its spin-out companies prior to the 1990s 
meaning that it was not aware of all those companies which had formed during the 1990s.  
Consequently, the chart does not show any of the failures that happened during the 
NUVentures period.  Also, a number of companies are omitted from the list because of a 
breakdown in their relationships with the university; these companies have been captured 
in work such as Potts (1997) and Benneworth & Dawley (2002).  In the study, although 
we have managed to interview one failed company, Epitope Custom Peptides, which we 
included in the study, we did not seek to go after companies which no longer had good 
relationships with the university.  Table 2 below gives some outline details of the 
companies which are included in this study, their date of formation, the academic founder 
and the first manager (cf.. 6.1.3) 
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Table 2  The spin-off companies interviewed in this study 
Company Date   Academic Founder Department First manager 
Seabait 1986 Peter Olive Marine Science Peter Cowin 
Novacastra 1989 Wilson Horne Pathology Ian Milton 
Epitope CP 1991 Ian Corbett Pathology Lynne Scott 
NUWater 1993 Paul Younger a Civil Engineering Alan Lowdon 
Xcellsyz 2000 Steve Yeaman Biochemistry Reza Halse 
Bioprofiles 2001 Kirsten Woolf Biology Marie Hale 
Arjuna 2002 Santosh Shrivastra Computer Science Steve Caughey 
Envision LLP 2002 *** Marine Sciences Bob Foster Smith 
Hale Stephenson 2002 Jack Hale Mechanical Eng Robin Stephenson 
Newchem  2002 Goulding Chemistry Bob Tyson 
Orla 2002 Jeremy Lakey Biochemistry Dale Athey 
Viratom 2002 Geoff Toms Pathology *** 
Biofresh 2003 Jeremy Barnes Biology Phil Harley 
SCHIN 2003 *** *** Ian Purves 
Spin-outs were an important element of the way that Newcastle University viewed its 
research valourisation.  Figure 4 below shows a web-page from the university web site in 
March 2005, which is intended to encourage firms to want to collaborate with the 
university.  The activities mentioned in figure 4 will become recurrent themes within this 
report as activities in which Newcastle University was very proud during the period of 
the research.  Figure 4 also implicitly carries the university management narrative 
towards spin-out companies, which is the argument that commercial benefits are a 
consequence of both an active commercialisation infrastructure as well as high quality 
research in the university. 
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Figure 4 The role of university spin-outs in the way the university presents its’ 
achievements 
 
Source: “Collaborate with us” <http://www.ncl.ac.uk/research/achievements/> <22nd 
Sept 2004><Viewed 23rd March 2005> 
A second factor was the university estate was being re-planned to consolidate activities 
around the three new faculties, and the master planning was starting to reshape the estate. 
The new Devonshire Building had just been opened, to bring together all researchers in 
the field of Environmental and Sustainability research across social sciences and 
engineering, whilst engineering consultancy services had been consolidated in the 
Stephenson Building.  The MEDSPAN project was already underway, in which the 
medical activities adjacent to the Royal Victoria Infirmary site were being rehoused on 
the same site, but within new and refurbished buildings.  There were plans already well 
advanced for the development of new sites to hold new research and commercialisation 
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activities, including the so-called “CultureLab” site for promoting commercialisation and 
entrepreneurship in the areas of culture and digital media.  The concept for the master 
planning of the estate was to concentrate activities in three faculty areas, linked through 
shared facilities which encouraged movement into and within the university; the concept 
is shown in figure 4 below. 
Figure 2 The concept map for Newcastle University Master Plan, 2002 
 
The third issue was that there was a significant organisational infrastructure supporting 
the new commercialisation activities.  The university had placed regional engagement 
and commercialisation as a central part of its strategy, and all three faculties had been set 
targets for raising revenue from third stream activities.  This was set in the high level 
objectives in the business plan, including “to produce a more entrepreneurial environment 
with much clearer incentives for income generation; …to enable us to engage with the 
city and region at the appropriate level with the services that are in demand and to 
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contribute to the strengthening of the North East of England”18.  The Business Plan also 
included a specific section (3.3) on Third Strand Activity, giving it some parity with the 
teaching and research sections (3.1, 3.2).  Each faculty was set a target for increasing 
third strand income during the planning period, and given specific areas on which to 
focus, with HASS focusing on student fees, and both Medical Sciences and SAgE 
prioritising consultancy.   
As part of this, the reorganisation of the university had produced a significant 
commercialisation support infrastructure, including:- 
• Business Development Directorate: this was a central service responsible for the 
co-ordination and control of business and regional development activities in the 
region, directed by Dr. Douglas Robertson, and with 57 staff.  This included 
o Regional Development Office: responsible for co-ordinating relationships 
with regional partners and the drafting of bids for external engagement 
funds. 
o Business Development Managers: there were three of these for 
Engineering, Humanities/ Social Sciences and IT. 
o Technology Transfer Officers: responsible for managing licensing and use 
of technologies, licensing to large firms or spin-offs. 
o The Equity Committee: chaired by Richard Maudsley, this group was 
responsible for considering business plans prepared by academics seeking 
to use university IP in spinning of a company, in return for a stake in the 
company. 
o The Research Beehive: a formal infrastructure for technology transfer 
activities, housing the business development team, but also with space 
available for short-term placements of cross-functional and multi-
disciplinary teams. 
                                                 
18 University of Newcastle Business Plan (2002), p. 15 
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o The Institute for Nanotechnology Exploitation (INEX): a research and 
incubator facility funding with Government and European funds for the 
commercialisation of nanotechnology through product-market research 
work, technology transfer and spin-offs; this also functions more generally 
as a University Innovation Centre. 
o The Research Institutes: each of the three faculties designated ‘Research 
Institutes’ in which to concentrate research activity and resources, and to 
create simpler faculty administrative research structures (see table x 
below). 
Table 3 The Research Institutes at Newcastle University, 2004, by Faculty 
Arts, Humanities, Social 
Sciences 
Medical Sciences  Science, Agriculture, 
Engineering 
Newcastle Institute for the 
Arts, Social Sciences and 
Humanities 
The Institute for Ageing and 
Health 
The Informatics Research 
Institute
The Institute of Policy and 
Practice 
Institute for Cell and 
Molecular Biosciences 
The Institute for Nanoscale 
Science and Technology 
Institute for Research on 
Environment and 
Sustainability (with SAgE) 
The Institute of Human 
Genetics 
 
 The Institute of 
Neuroscience 
 
 The Northern Institute for 
Cancer Research 
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6 University spin-outs building a territorial knowledge 
pool 
In the model proposed in chapter two, we identified that the ‘knowledge pool’ effect 
appeared to be the main mechanism whereby regional territorial advantage was built by 
spin-offs companies.  Although the literature review suggested that there were other 
important mechanisms by which the ‘pool’ was built, developed and sustained, at the 
heart of our model is the idea of this ‘pool’.  The basic idea is that the process of spinning 
off a company makes the university better at working with other companies, and hence 
makes the university more competent at working with these firms.  It is possible to 
envisage a range of mechanisms by which this would occur, such as the professionals or 
academics being involved with spin-offs becoming more commercially minded, or the 
improvement of technology transfer institutions, projects and routines within the 
university.  In this chapter, we look in more detail at the process of building a territorial 
knowledge pool, and the operation of those mechanisms.  The conceptual basis of the 
pool begins from the assumption that spin-off activity contributes to building particular 
shared territorial innovation assets which are more readily available than previously.  
Because the North East of England is a poor environment for innovation and 
entrepreneurship, this would –if true – constitute an improvement in the overall regional 
economic situation. 
In this chapter, we begin by considering who are the key actors in the process of spinning 
off, and how the particular activities they undertake become ‘regularised’ into ‘assets’ 
which can be used more repeatedly by others.  We then consider the nature of the general 
assets which are produced at a regional level, and the extent to which these things are 
genuinely ‘regional’, in being more open and accessible.  We in particular problematise 
the basic mechanism outlined above, and highlight some of the key issues which seem to 
be affecting the operation of the knowledge pool in the North East of England.  We then 
conclude the chapter with a more general discussion of how the spin-off process is 
directly contributing to a densification of the territorial innovation environment. 
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6.1 The key actors in the knowledge pool 
In this research, we are concerned in the kinds of knowledge which are rooted in 
particular places, and have some kind of ‘stickiness’ which allows them to become the 
basis for particular innovative and competitive businesses.  This concept of knowledge is 
as a very tacit form of knowledge, incorporating a great deal of know-how, know-who, 
and learning by doing, to situate knowledges in particular places, and to increase the 
access and uptake of the knowledges – codified and tacit – held within universities.  Tacit 
knowledge and know-how are embodied in particular individuals, so as a first step in the 
analysis of the knowledge pool we turn to look at the individuals who participated in 
technology transfer activities in which spin-offs were significant elements.  There were 
four main groups involved in this process, the technology transfer professionals, 
entrepreneurial research staff in the university, professional managers within spin-offs 
and third party firms seeking access to knowledge.  In this section, we analyse their 
participation in the knowledge pool as distinctive groups. 
6.1.1 Business Development Managers & technology transfer officers 
At the time of the research, there had been significant attempts to integrate the various 
professionals involved in technology transfer into a single structure within the office, 
although the roles were separately demarked, with TTOs focusing on IP management, 
and the BDMs on deal flow for equity activities (cf. 7.1.2).  The individuals involved 
tended to feel that they were, certainly informally, well-integrated and to some extent 
interchangeable.  One of them, for example, remarked that a potential entrepreneur had 
tried to play off a BDM against a TTO, but because the two groups communicated 
effectively and informally with each other, that particular attempt had failed.  Thus, when 
we talk of Business Development staff or managers, we are referring to this extended 
group of BDMs and TTOs, numbering in total seven, but for a variety of reasons, 
considerably less at some points in time.  Using the larger business development group 
also has the advantage of beginning to anonymise the accounts given by particular 
interviewees 
The main role of the Business Development staff was in providing services for spinning 
off, both to people thinking about spin-offs as well as to firms seeking access to expertise 
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in the university.  Although there was a division of labour between the team, there were 
certain core tasks that all performed.  Firstly, all were a first point of contact for 
academics interested in commercialisation; each had a particular set of disciplinary areas, 
generally corresponding to a faculty area, and they were also responsible for raising 
interest in entrepreneurship amongst university staff.  This dual role translated into the 
second set of activities; they got involved with the presentation of ideas to the Equity 
Committee (qv), and in negotiating with the university about the ‘deal’ – the exchange of 
IP for equity.  In this area, they performed two distinct roles, which at different times sat 
uneasily alongside each other.   
• Firstly, they were responsible for negotiating on behalf of the university when 
the academic entrepreneur wrote the Heads of Agreement with the university and 
the subsequent licensing deal, to ensure the university was properly represented. 
• Secondly, because of the way that the technology transfer process worked, they 
retained a mentoring/ ‘hand-holding’ relationship with the academics, 
encouraging them to persevere through a set of systems which were often very 
frustrating for particular academics. 
As one BDM noted, success in spinning out a company for a BDM involved 
“getting to know the academic and an academic team to the point where they trust 
you to hold their confidence, whilst bearing in mind the fact you have a duty to 
the university, as employer”. 
However, there were people who were spoken to who felt that this dual position 
compromised the value of the business development staff, or at least it hindered the staff 
working to their full potential.  As one spin-off noted:- 
“in the beginning, we couldn’t really place the manager, I think it depended on 
what they told him from above, I think.  It was very changeable, and then later, 
let’s say the last … 2 years he has been much more helpful, and much more 
friendly.  At least, two years ago, he said well, we’ve had enough of this, just go 
ahead and do it, and just write something on paper, put it on paper - a page, 
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whatever- just have an agreement with your head of school, and we won’t bother 
you if you won’t bother us”. 
Within this dual role, there were clear differences in the way the individuals found a 
balance between those two positions.  This did reflect both their own interests, but also 
the original positions to which they had originally been appointed.  Each came from very 
different backgrounds and each of their experiences influenced what they brought to the 
particular job; all had had extensive business expertise, and three of them had run their 
own company.  One member of staff had run an engineering company previously for 
which he had won a number of SMART awards, small government grants which 
subsidise small firm R&D activities.  He was also active in helping university spin-off 
firms write SMART awards, and a number of the firms with whom he worked developed 
SMART awards in concert with him.  Another BDM had spun-out a business unit from 
an existing company, and had much greater experience of running a large business; his 
focus was on trying to get potential entrepreneurs to think of what a potential operating 
business would be rather than simply planning a set of incremental steps from where they 
currently were.  Their positions within this group were not fixed, and indeed, the group 
had a relatively high turnover; one BDM was recruited but left shortly after appointment, 
and another BDM undertook a couple of secondments during the life of the HERO 
project.  A third BDM had just left before the research began, to run the start-up company 
that he had worked on establishing with the academic. 
Part of the differences in behaviour within the team reflected the best routes to market for 
each of the types of technology.  It was recognised by the team members that the 
appropriate routes to market varied by sector.  With medical technologies, there were 
much greater opportunities to protect IP and then license that to a company or spin-out.  
By contrast, engineering depended both on an effective solution but also the speed to 
market of that solution, so IP was not as important to them.  With IT and computer 
software, there were very few effective routes for IP protection because of the weakness 
of copyright protection, which meant that know-how was most important, which in turn 
meant that it was much harder to protect the university’s position. 
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There was also a change in the status of the various members, starting the year before the 
research began.  The BDMs had originally been brought in to bring a set of fresh 
perspectives on commercialisation, but that capacity had quickly been exhausted, and 
they found themselves becoming bogged down in various activities which were in some 
ways quite remote from the strategic culture changing role for which they had been 
introduced.  In part this was because the turnover of staff within the team meant that they 
were having to cover for each other, but also because they were fully funded, regional 
development agencies and the university administration were drawing on them as 
capacity to deal with liaison with the local development agency and city council.  This 
change in role was recognised by the university and reflected in the way the university 
bid for follow-on funding from the HEIF (Higher Education Investment Fund) 2 fund.  
When a second set of BDMs were bid for (and won), within the HEIF 2 project, the 
university decided that their focus would be operational, and created the positions within 
the faculties and research institutes rather than being attached to the central organisation 
(cf. 7.3.3). 
6.1.2 Professors and other entrepreneurial employees 
The second group active within the knowledge pool were those university academic and 
research staff who were involved with spin-outs, but in a part-time capacity, retaining 
also their position within the university.  This was generally only possible when the 
individual had a permanent academic position; research staff on fixed term contracts 
tended to leave the university to set up their firms (2/14), but with the professors and 
senior academic staff, in a majority of the cases, they were able to use the 
commercialisation activities to produce benefits for themselves and the university.  Of 
course, the benefit to the university was largely in the form of retaining high quality staff 
members who were able to oversee somewhat autonomous research units with a steady 
throughput of students, post-docs, projects and papers.  To some extent, these activities 
(commercial and university research group) overlapped, although the university’s aim 
was to ensure that the firms did not free-ride on university facilities and infrastructure, 
without being concerned if the university was deriving similar free-riding benefits from 
the commercial activities undertaken within this extended research group.  Many of the 
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firms did pay money into the university to perform research and consultancy for them, 
and by the time this research study was being done, the university was assiduous in 
levying a 105% overhead on that contract work to ensure that the university was not 
exploited by its’ spin-offs for private gain 
The precise nature of the dual roles of academic and research manager depended on the 
importance of R&D, and in particular, academic research to the company.  For 
biotechnology companies, the role of the professor tended to be as a scientific director, as 
an essential part of the team within the company, and to whom the venture capitalists 
were looking as a key part of the future value of the company.  With the biotechnology 
sector, in many cases there was a need for academic research to prove the validity of 
ideas and establish the therapeutic or diagnostic value of particular innovations, and so in 
some cases the firms retained academic staff to undertake research work which helped to 
validate the technologies developed in the particular companies.  In the engineering 
sector, by comparison, the role of permanent staff was more as an employee or associate, 
having the capacity to do the research work, or to arrange the work to be done within the 
university’s research group.  In the software sector, the firms tended to be formed of full 
teams which left the university at the end of a project or in response to some other 
stimulus; as the teams had been responsible for developing the software, they retained 
much looser links back to the professors, much more around informal network and 
exchange of ideas than either providing them with blue-skies research or work capability. 
6.1.3 Professional Managers 
The use of professional management did vary between the companies, although most of 
the companies employed someone with a responsibility to run the business.  The 
businesses tended not to be run entirely within the university, except at the early stage in 
their lives, when they were just informal consultancy activities.  There were a number of 
companies who had established themselves by just being shells, and winning work, then 
paying the university to do it, including the 105% overhead by that time insisted on by 
the university.  However, academics tended to find that a wearisome approach, not least 
because each piece of work had to be dealt with them as a special and one-off project 
each time they won new work; they would have to negotiate with colleagues, research 
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staff and students, and then themselves be liable for the successful completion of the 
work.  Consequently, there was a tendency to try to recruit professional managers who 
could deal with a ‘base load’ of work themselves, possibly recruiting other employees, 
and then pass on the most lucrative and complex work back to the originating professor 
as required. 
The role of the professional manager tended to be to ensure the commercial viability of 
the company, which in turn tended to relate much more to the generation of sales and 
finding new investment – often venture funding – rather than undertaking new 
commercialisation research.  Because of the diversity of activities and styles of 
innovation in the various spin-out companies around Newcastle, there was no one single 
model for the use of a professional manager, but there were some similarities.  There was 
very little use of interim or professional managers, that is hiring someone through an 
agency to establish the company.  Consequently, the professional managers which came 
into the spin-outs were already known to the academic founders.  In many cases, they 
were either researchers or students of the academic founder – out of 14 spin-offs 
interviewed, 3 were initially managed19 by former students, and three by former post-
docs.  Interestingly, in two cases, academics recruited people who had previously funded 
their own research, and who were looking for a change of direction for their own careers. 
Two companies had recruited business development managers from the university on 
some kind of basis to do the basic management.  In three cases, the firm left the 
university entirely and so the research leader became the manager.  Only in one case did 
the professor also act as full-time managing director for the company. 
6.1.4 Third party businesses 
What we will refer to in this report as the ‘third party businesses’ were those that came 
into contact with the university and drew on the knowledge in the ‘knowledge pool’, that 
is got involved in commercialisation through contacts through at least one of the three 
previous groups of actors.  In the research, we spoke to five third party businesses, and it 
                                                 
19 This form of words is used because some of the spin-offs interviewed were well-established, and so had 
been through changes of management. 
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is clear that their involvement in the knowledge pool was not as simple as previously 
thought.  Certainly, they did not simply ‘dip into’ the pool and take away pieces of 
discrete knowledge that had been ‘fixed’ in the region by the spinning off process; only 
one of the five relationships followed this pattern.  Their involvement was rather in some 
cases more complex, and typically, they were already involved with the university, and 
that became a mechanism for supporting the USOs. 
The Business Development Managers were obviously a key mechanism for involving 
third parties in the knowledge pool, because at least a component of their remit was in 
marketing expertise within the university to businesses.  Unfortunately, that did not result 
in large numbers of local SMEs getting involved with the university, because of the 
pressure to concentrate on larger firms, recognising that small (local) firms would not 
have the resources to license a technology from the university; thus the BDMs tended to 
be pressurised, albeit informally, to ignore local SMEs and so the informal networks were 
not built up as perhaps might have originally been anticipated.  There were some 
examples of BDMs building up relationships with local firms, but those tended to be light 
touch, about understanding the local sector in the region and future potential, rather than 
transferring lots of technology repeatedly into local firms. 
The other interesting difference between what was observed in the case of Newcastle, and 
what had been expected in terms of the heuristic process was that the USOs tended to 
draw on the knowledge pools between the university and third party firms in a variety of 
ways.  As the BDMs built up their contacts, they became aware of local innovating 
SMEs. Consequently, when potential spin-offs (i.e. academics and research staff) came to 
them looking for local partners, they were able to point them towards the local SMEs.  
Likewise, such pre-existing relationships between academics and firms were also helpful 
when those academics were establishing USOs, helping them build their ‘softer’ 
networks.  Just as pre-existing relationships with businesses were useful to a number of 
firms to find managers, they provided other assets for USOs.  One new firm spun-out of 
an existing large business in the region and to make a clean break with its parent, rented 
some space in the university, and found itself next to a laboratory hosting another newyly 
formed USO.  They decided – as two newly-established micro-businesses – to collaborate 
on a joint project, and won a SMART award, which helped to capitalise the USO rather 
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more than the other firm, which had already had had some considerable success in raising 
venture finance.  However, the firm did also benefit by recruiting staff from the 
university whilst located within the laboratory area, which helped to cement the 
relationship between the USO and third party.  Two of these firms had directly recruited 
staff through their relationship with the problems, although four of the five also recruited 
other Newcastle University graduates outwith the direct professorial relationship. 
6.2 Processes of participation in the knowledge pool 
Each of the various groups outlined above had their own reasons for participating in the 
knowledge pool, and which stimulated the group in aggregate to function as a broader 
network, and their network gave rise to regularities in routines and attitudes which could 
in turn be considered as a territorial activity and even (perhaps stretching the analogy) as 
a pool.  Broadly speaking, the universities were interested in increasing their resources to 
spend on core activities (mainly research), the spin-offs were interested in accessing 
assets which helped them as high-technology small firms, and the third party firms were 
interested in using university expertise and resources to support their own innovation 
processes.  To get a sense of the scale of the activity, and consequently of the magnitude 
of the knowledge pool, it is worth turning briefly to look at how each of the various 
groups, the university, the spin-offs and the third party firms, involved themselves in the 
regional technology transfer activity. 
6.2.1 University participation in the knowledge pool 
We have already noted that there was a policy of benign neglect in the university’s 
technology transfer policies in the 1980s and late 1990s, which partly embodied an 
assumption that commercialisation and spin-off activity was broadly neutral towards the 
university, or at best could bring a range of benefits to the university.  Broadly speaking, 
the spin-offs were contributing (by the time of this study) four elements to the university, 
the direct cash they brought in, the interactions and support they had with the academic 
founder’s/ founders’ research group, the assets they provided access to, and their value as 
a long-term research partner.  In the research we found that there was a wide variation in 
what the various spin-outs brought to the university in each of those four categories, both 
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in terms of the quantity but also the quality of the interaction.  In one case, arguably the 
most negative outcome, the spin-off was almost neutral to the university, in that the cash 
ended up being spent on the wages of the professional manager, and running the company 
had distracted the academic and reduced his capacity to do other commercialisation 
activity.  In two other cases, the spin-offs were a reflection of much longer term 
collaborative activity between academic and commercial partners which eventually found 
expression in spin-offs.  However, there was evidence that there was in many cases a 
significant flow of resources back into the university in terms of all four factors. 
In terms of the first factor, cash, the most significant example of this was the £6m raised 
from the sale of Novocastra, which was at least partly reinvested in the redevelopment of 
the Medical Site adjacent to the RVI, the so-called MEDSPAN project.  Some of the 
directors of Novocastra also invested some of their sale proceeds back into university 
research in some form, increasing the impact of the sale.  Novocastra had also paid a 
dividend to the university  during the period 1995-2002, and there were a number of 
companies who as part of their licensing deal with the university were paying a royalty.  
Under the new arrangements, USOs were also expected to pay for the costs of the 
university defending the IP, and so although some of that did go to the university’s legal 
advisors, some of that was also involved in offsetting the other costs of the business 
development directorate.  The three businesses that were filtering and channelling 
consultancy back to their academic founders professors were likewise generating cash 
which helped those faculties to meet their third strand inputs, and two of the firms also 
contributed directly to the salary costs of the academic founder, one at 100%, one at 20%.  
Five of the 14 were also involved in funding Ph.D. studentships within the academic 
founders’ research group.  In summary, in 6 of the 14 cases, the total cash contribution20 
was small (rent and equipment use), in five cases they were significant (£10,000-25,000), 
and in two cases they were around £100,000.  The money was paid for a variety of 
different services, and activities, and much of it bought time of employees rather than 
representing a license fee type of free cash which could be invested elsewhere. 
                                                 
20 The figures are not directly comparable; in some cases, they are the last year, in some cases, they are the 
average of the last few years to smooth out anomalous events like the Novocastra sale. 
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The second benefit that the university received from the spin-offs was that they 
contributed to the life of the academic founders’ research group.  In most cases, the 
spin-offs were a consequence of an active research group, and they merely formed a 
strengthening role, through the funds they brought directly (as funders) and indirectly (as 
industrial ‘clients’ for research council grants) into the research group.  However, in two 
cases, the spin-off had been more intimately involved in the emergence of a research 
group within the university.  In one example, the firm had placed significant sums back 
into the research group to pursue an entirely new research theme related to commercial 
questions facing the company, thereby creating new research skills within the university 
research team that would not have existed had the company not stimulated the activity.  
In a second, the company became a means for a non-professorial staff member to build a 
team within the university over a much longer period, culminating in a research group of 
three academic staff and 6-7 students.  Obviously, this benefit has not been created in the 
three of the fourteen spin-offs where a research team left the university. 
The third element that firms were able to bring to the university was through helping with 
the university in meeting its other targets.  A number of the spin-offs were involved in 
education within the university, in a variety of ways.  Firstly, one firm has offset its rent 
of university premises in return for delivering a Master’s course. A second spin-off 
entrepreneur teaches a course on commercial aspects of the technical subject relating to 
his company, and he brings guest lecturers in drawing on his own commercial contacts.  
A number of former members of the university negotiated some kind of visiting lecturer/ 
professor status for themselves within the university, in return for helping with teaching 
at the university.  Some of the USOs were also helping to provide the university with 
research projects for undergraduate and masters’ students, although the capacity of the 
firms to deliver them does vary over time.  The links between the teaching base and USO 
are also important in terms of developing other links with companies, as demonstrated in 
terms of the links with the third party firms.  A number of the academics have developed 
and undertaken teaching company schemes, CASE studentships and received masters 
placements from third party firms with whom they have contact from the spin-off. 
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6.2.2 Spin-off participation in the knowledge pool 
The second group to involve themselves in the knowledge pool was the spin-off 
companies themselves. The initial rationalisation for their involvement was that they 
needed to have the technology transferred into them, and it was this technology transfer 
process about which the university learned, which made the university more effective as a 
contributor to regional economic development.  The spin-offs participated in the 
knowledge pool at a range of times, including in the assembly of assets to form the 
company, during the spin-off process itself, and then as the company sought to grow and 
establish itself from the university.  However, in agreement with Dahlstrand (1999), it is 
clear that the relationship between the firm and university is not all that close during all 
those periods, and some of the firms did move away from the university towards full 
independence, establishing the kinds of relationships that the university enjoyed with 
other firms. 
The nature of the initial relationship with the university was naturally strong, which is 
hardly surprising, as the nature of a spin-off company is one in which the roots of the 
company lie in the intellectual assets developed within the university.  The largest 
number, 8 companies, were developed to exploit particular technologies and techniques 
which research had produced, but in which the technology was tangential to the main 
thrust of the academic research.  Three of the companies had been incubated within the 
university as a research team, and then subsequently set up the company on the basis of 
this research team, taking the staff, existing contracts and other resources which meant 
that at the point of formation, they were able to take from the university a number of the 
elements of commercial stability.  Two of the remaining three were set up as a means to 
leverage value for professors in having someone to manage their consultancy load, and 
allow them to maximise their day rates21. 
The next step in the spin-out process was the step moving from having a legal company 
registered with Companies House to having a real company populated with employees, 
                                                 
21 The final company was set up in such a particular way that to describe it or the process would breach the 
confidentiality of the research. 
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working capital, premises, and sales (although this was not a significant issue for the 
three extant research groups).  The role of the university was also significant in this, 
particularly for the more recent companies.  The Government SMART award became a 
very common way for small companies to capitalise their research in the North East, as 
previously noted, and the BDD became adept at encouraging and supporting SMART 
applications from their companies.  Secondly, the university helped three of the academic 
founders enter and win Business Plan Competitions from their respective science 
councils. These competitions brought access to resources, in one case helping with 
winning a six -figure Government commercialisation grant, which contributed 
significantly to creating a fully capitalised business.  Finally, the fact that from 2002, all 
applications had to progress through Equity Committee meant that all the companies had 
some capital, even if it was held in the form of intellectual property.  The Equity 
Committee were interested in ensuring that the companies were suitable vehicles for the 
exploitation of research, so even if Equity Committee did not add to the value, those 
companies that emerged from the Equity Committee process were ‘real’ companies with 
some assets in them. 
A number of the companies also used the university as an incubator; the INEX centre (qv) 
was a formal incubator centre in which 2 of the firms were based; all but one of the USOs 
had rented some space (not necessarily INEX) from the university at an early stage in 
their life, such rentals being associated with access to other researchers, knowledge, 
equipment and potential employees22.  For biotechnology companies, the university was 
also important for meeting particular regulatory demands, because a number of them 
were dependent on using tissue samples, were producing clinical waste, or required 
particular certificates for hazard control which would have been expensive to arrange 
themselves.  Although the university did apparently price access to these services fairly, 
there was an issue of accessing these kinds of services, and as spin-offs the staff had a 
familiarity with regulatory regimes and university’s compliance regimes, which reduced 
the negative costs of compliance in the start-up process.  The presence of the Institute for 
                                                 
22 A number of interviewees noted that one advantage of the university was that it was poor at issuing 
invoices for consumption of resources.  However, in a couple of cases, where SMART awards expenses 
required claiming within a limited time period, this could also pose a financial threat to the company. 
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Human Genetics at the Centre for Life also meant that these services could be provided 
off-campus, upgrading the quality of incubator units by embedding scientific services on 
the location. 
The final stage of the spin-off process was certainly typified through a weakening of the 
linkage to the university as the firms established themselves away from reliance on the 
explicit subsidies and hidden supports of the university system.  The two oldest 
companies retained some research relationship to the university, in part through retaining 
the academic founder in a research role within the business.  The third oldest of the 
businesses was a consultancy business exploiting the reputation of its academic founders, 
and thus retained close links back to the parent institution.  The case of Mindware [a 
pseudonym] is interesting, because the firm was originally formed and spun out in 1998, 
and then was bought by a supplier to a top computer manufacturer, who were themselves 
bought out that top company.  The Mindware Laboratory was closed down by the new 
management, and the Mindware team span themselves out once more, back towards the 
university, locating within the incubator and using links with the department to help 
maintain their technological development at a time when the commercial focus was on 
finding new funds. 
6.2.3 Third-party firm participation in the knowledge pool 
Much has already been written on the diverse nature of university/ business interactions, 
and the interaction and participation with third party firms around Newcastle was as 
diverse as the literature would suggest.  The original mechanism suggested in the 
conceptual framework was that the spin-off experience would open up the university 
departments in ways that made them more accessible to third party firms.  The heuristic 
for this was that a professor, having started a business, and then retired to a safe distance, 
would be sufficiently commercially minded to be better at working with other businesses. 
Drawing on Muller & Zenker’s model, for example, the idea would be that the spin-off 
company would be exploiting a particular technique, and there would be other 
applications and domain fields to which the application could be applied, and the 
professor would be better at transferring the technology to the new company. 
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The research did not discover this mechanism in operation in precisely this fashion, 
although there were two types of example where a similar process took places.  Firstly, 
there were two examples where university academics left one company, and then started 
up another company, often not directly linked to the first.  In one of those two examples, 
this second company developed a very close relationship with a non-university spin-off 
firm, and they began a collaborative project.  The second process was that in the 
consultancy businesses, the professors were acting much as Muller & Zenker’s model 
suggested, that they worked with a range of clients to solve their particular problems, 
although there were relatively few examples of where this worked in the region. There 
were two companies, both themselves spin-outs of much larger established concerns, who 
had developed close working relationships with universities through consultancy work 
undertaken with the USO, and who valued that relationship – both had sponsored both 
short-term consultancy, but also longer-term and more expensive doctoral research.  In 
one case, the third party firm had developed a series of multi-disciplinary projects within 
the university which expanded that firms access to academic knowledges, from 
engineering into computer science, for example. 
6.3 Solidifying shared territorial assets within the knowledge pool 
The next step in the analysis is to move from the analysis of what each group of actors 
was deriving as benefit from the knowledge pool to looking more closely at how one-off 
transactions were producing more stable entities that could be regarded as territorial 
innovation assets.  The idea of a boundary spanning function is already well developed in 
writings about university/ business interactions, and so we would expect to see the 
creation of such ‘boundary spanning’ institutions in the North East if all the activities, 
transactions and exchanges were densifying the regional innovation system.  Critical to 
the model we have adopted is that the boundary spanning functions involve all three 
elements of the spin-off system we have identified, the university, the spin-offs and the 
third party firms.  In this next section, we outline some of the tangible boundary spanning 
institutions which have emerged from all this activity, and separate out those which have 
a formal institutional role from informal, but nonetheless territorial, habits and routines, 
and the creation of regional network activities. 
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6.3.1 New spaces of knowledge production: the ‘hard’ infrastructure 
Perhaps the most notable feature of much of the spin-off and technology transfer activity 
in Newcastle University is the extent to which it has inserted itself around the spaces of 
ongoing research and teaching activities.  Many of the activities either buy time from 
ongoing research teams (particularly the consultancies) or occupy marginal space within 
the university as a precursor to moving out into their own accommodation.  In part this 
reflects the fact that the university did not at the time of the research have a formal 
science park on its estate23.  Much of this spatial location, we have argued, is bound up 
with academics’ – i.e. entrepreneurial professors – strategies in managing commercial 
and academic consultancy as two parallel and mutually reinforcing strands in one 
location.  Three of the spin-offs were nurtured to such a size within this system that at the 
time of their departure from the campus, commercial space was actually preferable to 
them rather than some kind of flexible incubator. 
However, these kinds of activity (informal space within universities) are notoriously 
difficult for those outside the university to access, despite a rhetoric within the 
university’s senior management about bringing entrepreneurs onto the campus.  By the 
time of the research, there was only one example where we found that a third party firm 
had been brought into the campus on similar terms to those enjoyed by the USOs which 
evolved into those spaces, although that company had clearly benefited from its time 
there in terms of its subsequent sustained growth and R&D levels.  During the research, 
the medical faculty was being restructured through the MEDSPAN programme to attempt 
to create new entrepreneurial spaces, and bring new firms onto the campus, but few 
resources directly applicable to small firms had been created and was accessible by 
mid-2004. 
There was one example of a ‘hard’ infrastructure asset built on the university campus 
which was intended to help entrepreneurial new firms come into the campus, thereby 
helping both spin-offs and non-spin-off start up firms.  This was the Institute for 
                                                 
23 There had been some attempts in the region to create science parks but they had not been particularly 
successful in terms of developing close business/ university linkages 
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Nanotechnology Exploitation (INEX) , which did bring together university, spin-offs and 
third party (‘spin-in’ type) companies (cf. 8.4.2). At the time of the research, it comprised 
a set of clean manufacturing and research facilities, as well as office and incubation space 
for companies.  Only one of the nine tenants at the time of the research were active in 
nanotechnology, although there was another company in the interview sample who had 
located there because it was close to university colleagues.  There were examples of the 
INEX management helping their tenants to develop links with other local companies, and 
so assisted with the transfer of technology into other local businesses.  The INEX 
example does illustrate the fact that the technology transfer process is not the simple 
heuristic portrayed within the model, but is instead dependent on a number of 
relationships which come together in particular times and places.  One of the spin-outs in 
INEX had commissioned work from another spin-out, was doing work for one local firm, 
and was potentially going to develop a manufacturing process for another spin-off.  It is 
important not to attribute the success of that dynamic entirely to the hard infrastructure, 
but it is inter-related with the building of a more general territorial expertise in 
nanotechnology in the North East of England (cf. chapter 8 for more detail about this 
specific nanotechnology case) .  
There is another example of the three sectors coming together in a constructive way 
elsewhere in the city, but the particular example lay not in the university campus, but on 
the International Centre for Life, where a set of activities had built up, particularly around 
bioinformatics, namely the automated processing and analysis of biological data.  The 
centre is home to the Institute of Bioinformatics, a partnership of the regional universities 
and a number of related companies. Up to 2002, the ICfL hosted BioSci North, a 
representative body for life sciences in the region, and an organisation which a number of 
the spin-offs cited as being useful for particular elements of their work.  The site also 
hosts the Institute for Human Genetics, the Genetics research capacity of Newcastle 
University, who have achieved a public profile recently for their work on stem cells and 
human embryo cloning.  Two of the spin-offs and one third party firm had been located 
there in the year preceding the research, and there was also another high profile 
bioinformatics company.  The value in ICfL, as much as with INEX, is not in 
instrumentally mediating between companies and the university, but providing a space 
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where the activities were actively cross-fertilising.  This concept is intuitively 
problematic because it lacks a concrete mechanism, but there appears to be something 
significant in these activities, even if it is not immediately clear from which processes the 
advantages derive.  More is said in detail about INEX and ICfL in Chapter 8. 
6.3.2 New institutional arrangements for university/ business interaction 
There has been a considerable reorganisation of technology transfer activities within 
Newcastle University since the period of benign neglect in the 1980s, and there has been 
a concerted attempt to promote spin-out firms.  This has corresponded to attempts by 
public sector agencies to encourage new firm formations from universities, and so there 
have been the emergence of new institutional arrangements attempting to increase 
university entrepreneurship which have affected Newcastle University.  In terms of 
external actors, the regional development agency for the North East, One NorthEast (sic) 
(ONE) has been aggressive in developing a regional science strategy which is dominated 
by intermediary institutions trying to help new firms get to market (cf. Chapter 5, figure 
2).  Within the university, the business development managers and the Equity Committee 
both represent institutional forms which aim to exploit the technologies whether through 
a licensing deal or forming a spin-off. 
In terms of external institutional forms, ONE has been active in promoting the idea of 
centres of excellence as new institutions which promote university/ USO/ spin-off 
interaction.  The centres of excellence were intermediary institutes which channelled 
seed-corn finance to new ventures from either regional universities of other businesses.  
Alongside this, a regional venture capital organisation was capitalised, called Northstar, 
to provide gap and first round finance to local businesses.  Two centres of excellence 
have been particularly successful in establishing themselves with respect to Newcastle 
University, and one has a member of the BDD team on their board (Douglas Robertson, 
Northstar).  Another centre of excellence was working both with a university spin-off, 
and a spin-off of theirs, in joint ventures, and has established a significant physical test 
site within the region, as well as providing funding for equipment purchase within 
Newcastle University. 
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Within the university, the Business Development Managers were an attempt to create a 
system which could organise and assemble a functional network of linkages with 
business, and to some extent they were successful.  They did help to open up the 
university to companies that were not already working with the university, although it is 
not necessarily the same as saying the university did not have the capacity to deal with 
them previously.  The BDMs appeared to increase the capacity of the technology transfer 
officers to deal with business, and to increase the total amount of commercialisation 
activity flowing through the university.  Each of the BDMs did spend significant amounts 
of time in the early stages of the tenure of their posts building up relationships with 
potential future collaborators for the university.  It is possible to draw up for each of those 
in the core BDD technology transfer team a set of connections to other innovative and 
entrepreneurial actors, and they were clearly key actors in mediating the territorial 
knowledge pool.  This is dealt with in more detail in the following chapter, although the 
seeming reliance of the network on this limited group of individuals, at most seven, also 
raises issues concerning the sustainability and durability of the network, and the extent to 
which it can be regarded as having been materialised into something more durable. 
Spin-off and third party companies have also been involved in the development of 
engineering consultancy services in Newcastle University.  During the period of the 
research, a number of disparate activities were reorganised into the so-called “Stephenson 
Group”, named after their shared building24.  One of these services, the Resource Centre 
for Industrial Design (formerly the Regional Centre for Industrial Design, Potts 1997) 
was established in 1995 using European funds to extend the commercialisation of an 
existing  Engineering Design Centre to small firms in the region.  It originally functioned 
through a £12k annual charge for members, and following winning continuation funding 
from the physical sciences research council (EPSRC), evolved into a more open service 
organisation.  Although none of the original members of RCID were spin-off firms, a 
                                                 
24 Which was in turn named after engineer and entrepreneur Robert Stephenson (Stephenson Centre 
brochure, 2004) “Robert Stephenson (1803 – 1859), an MP and North East entrepreneur, was one of the 
founding fathers of the railway age. He, with his father, created the first locomotive factory in the world 
where the Rocket, the first passenger  locomotive, was designed and built. Major projects led by 
Stephenson included the construction of the London to Birmingham Railway Line.”   
Available at http://www.stephensongroup.ncl.ac.uk/Brochure/Document%20Library/StephensonCentre.pdf  
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number of spin-offs and third party firms were involved through RCID, in co-operation in 
the Regional Cluster project.  Again, it is important to stress that a lot of the collaboration 
preceded the spinning-off activity; in one case, an RCID member was doing a Teaching 
Company Scheme with a company, and then ended up getting involved with mentoring as 
they spun-off the company, via the Research Council business plan competition which 
provided the start-up impetus for them.  The USO was in this case involved in the 
network but as a recipient of the benefit, rather than its’ initiator. 
6.3.3 Building a cadre of regional entrepreneurship mentors 
The third element of the knowledge pool was in providing knowledge about access to 
other assets, not necessarily those in the knowledge pool, as it were, but to a set of assets 
which are more generally accessible by those in the region, and others in the knowledge 
pool are able to signpost others to them.  By assets, we mean significant resources, such 
as venture capital investments, or new technologies, or significant new sales 
opportunities.  The Cambridge example is regularly cited as a place where the abundance 
of finance means that good ideas make it easy to obtain funding.  Conversely, the North 
East of England is often regarded as a place where such assets are not readily available, a 
sparse environment for entrepreneurship and innovation (Benneworth, 2005).  The 
question is whether the knowledge pool can compensate in some way for the dearth of 
such resources and help regional firms to access other resources elsewhere. 
One example of this in action was with one company proposal which came into the 
Equity Committee, on which the Vice Chancellor sat.  He had already established a 
spin-off company and led it through a successful syndicated venture funding round.  He 
recognised with one of the proposals that it would require an investor with an unusual 
interest in the field.  He had such an investor as a friend, and as a consequence of Equity 
Committee, the firm was able to identify a an investor and non-executive director for the 
spin-off. 
One group of mentors active within the region were successful regional entrepreneurs, of 
whom it must be said there are not a great abundance in the North East.  One individual 
who had sold his own company and made a significant profit for his investors, some of 
whom were based in the region, and subsequently sat on the board of a number of 
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regional companies to reassure venture capitalists that their funds were being well 
invested.  Three of those firms with which he has been involved are spin-offs, two from 
Newcastle and one from Northumbria University.  His presence has been associated with, 
but not necessarily the cause of, a number of investments from the lead investor. 
A number of the third party firms were themselves spin-offs of local companies, 
particularly fine chemical and pharmaceutical firms, as well as local utilities firms, both 
activities with high levels of development activity, and some research work.  Some of the 
connections and linkages between individuals came from networks built up in these 
companies.  Two particularly important networks from the perspective of the spin-outs 
came from the former British Gas activities at Killingworth (cf. Benneworth, 2003) and 
also the Northumbrian Water Research and Technical Centre at Longhorsley, west of 
Newcastle.  Alongside this, there are lots of individual knowledge connections from 
individuals in a range of firms with each other, which influenced the operation of the 
knowledge pool.  What this does show is the importance of other forms of knowledge 
network beside the university to the knowledge transfer process, and the operation 
of the knowledge pool. 
6.4 Problems and issues in the creation of territorial innovation assets 
Although the narrative in the previous section outlines the construction process whereby 
territorial assets were built, there were clearly problems in the regional creation of 
territorial assets.  In a less successful region, it is intuitive to expect that there would be 
problems arising because of a shortage of other regional assets, but it is clear that there 
were other kinds of problems emerging which were material to the functioning of the 
territorial knowledge pool.  Third strand activity does sit uneasily alongside teaching and 
research activities at a micro-scale, in the way that there is tension within individuals 
caused by the efforts involved in balancing teaching and research work loads.  These 
small problems in a number of cases caused larger problems.  Moreover, it is also clear 
that the interactions between the different parties in the process was not always 
constructive.  In some cases, where research groups became start-ups, then they could be 
neutral, but in other cases, where they recruited staff from one another, that could cause 
severe problems which were not a positive labour market effect. 
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6.4.1 Problems in the creation of territorial assets through spin-outs 
There were a series of problems faced in developing territorial assets, involving different 
combinations of the various actors involved in the territorial knowledge pool.  Firstly, 
there were issues with attempting to create new intermediary institutions, particularly 
when internal mechanisms came into conflict with external mechanisms.  There had 
clearly been some conflict between one of the centres of excellence and the university 
around the Strategy for Success.  So whilst the presence of two organisations might 
appear as providing redundancy and institutional thickness, it could be argued that it 
inhibited the development of a successful nanotechnology centre in Newcastle.  INEX 
was heavily dependent on convincing central funding agencies (HEFCE and DTI) that it 
was a plausible project, but the fact that the RDA were pursuing their own centre of 
excellence, which INEX sat outside, made it more difficult for INEX to prove its 
plausibility.  Although INEX did succeed in attracting funding, the conflict between the 
intermediary organisations was clearly a problem for building regional capacity. 
The second problem was that the university commercialisation system relied heavily on 
the presence of the particular members of the business development team, rather than 
there being some process through which companies and inquiries moved.  This meant 
that progress from the company’s perspective was not always either smooth or rational.  
One company director described it rather poetically as:- 
“there are good intentions in the university, but the effector arm of the university 
arm is flawed … nothing happens, the committee speaks but there is nothing to 
administer the committee’s wishes.  I’m not dealing with anybody ... the directive 
is from the intellectual property committee to draw up a contract, but that isn’t 
being implemented, and … that’s because there is no vehicle for implementing the 
intellectual property committee’s commands.  So they speak into the wind”. 
The third problem was that there tended to be a divergence in understanding the nature of 
the relationship between the university and spin-off company, between the various parties 
around what it meant to be a spin-off of the university, particularly around the issue of 
informal exchanges of assets, and properly pricing those exchanges.  The stake a 
university holds in a spin-off is in recognition of its past investment in intellectual 
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property, and so university staff argued that this ought not to lead the university to treat 
the company preferentially in any way, and to ensure that public money was not 
subsidising private profits and creating a false market.  This created conflicts between 
USO managers and business development staff which undermined the trust in the 
relationships.  USO managers appeared to think that the success of spin-offs was a direct 
benefit for the university, so they should be given favourable treatment because they had 
already contributed to the university, and so had an ‘entitlement’ to preferential 
treatment.  Conversely, business development staff were concerned that although there 
were benefits for the university, USO founders did not realise that the university 
shareholding was recognition of the granting of university property rather than a 
statement of future behaviour.  There were then incentives for misunderstanding which 
had the potential to build mistrust between the partners.  
In many cases, the consequence of this was that business development process involved a 
series of hurdles to ensure that USOs were dealt with properly.  From the point of view of 
the USO founders, this appeared to create a continual stream of hurdles to academic 
entrepreneurs; issues such as charging for space, access to car parking, and ownership of 
library cards were regarded by the interviewees from all sides as being both contentious, 
but also badly handled by the university, in particular in terms of the negative feelings 
they generated from the USO towards the university.  It could be that this is a kind of 
adolescent angst from USOs in the North East being forced by an absence of other 
property opportunities to remain too long in the university ‘nest’, but regardless of its 
cause, it was a problem for the universities, and led entrepreneurs to try to avoid having 
to deal with the university over such minor issues. 
Fourthly, there were a series of issues that because the USOs were formed from unusual 
sets of resources, in particular involving research staff who had not always been involved 
in a commercial environment, some of the firms behaved in peculiar ways.  One spin-off 
company, for example, was criticised by a number of interviewees for failing to behave 
like a ‘real’ firm in developing a finished product, rather than an almost-completed idea.  
There was a perception across those interviewed that although academics were frequently 
good at generating ideas, as a group they tended to be much less capable at turning those 
ideas into something usable and protectable that a BDM could try to sell.  The issue of 
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profit also caused problems; where companies were run to make profits, then this created 
friction and mistrust between university and company, because the university felt it 
needed to ensure that the firm did not spirit away its’ property.  Where the companies 
were not run to make personal profits, but were run to bring funds back into professors’ 
laboratories (for example), then there was the risk that the consultancy ‘tail’ could wag 
the academic ‘dog’; there were at least two cases of professors having to do loss-making 
or unproductive consultancy work to fund the staff within their USOs, which then clearly 
has an opportunity cost for the university. 
The final problem concerned the relationships between SMEs, USOs and universities.  In 
the naïve model, they are assumed to operate unproblematically, but it was clear that 
there were issues which hindered effective co-operation, which did not all derive from the 
peripheral position of the region.  Certainly, the third party small firms did have 
difficulties in persuading collaborators of their size and significance, and because 
Newcastle University tried to license only to large firms, local SMEs did not benefit from 
easy access to technologies that they could not easily obtain from external suppliers.  The 
other issue was that there was clearly a movement of resources between the various 
groups in ways that were not always positive. Although two spin-offs benefited from the 
BDMs working for them in a formal capacity, this clearly reduced the BDM team’s 
overall capacity to increase deal flow.  There were stories that some spin-offs, although 
not those interviewed, had absconded with university IP or developed unfavourable deals 
(cf. chapter 7).  There were also issues with spin-offs and other firms suffering from their 
relationships with the university, not always intentionally, but because the university as a 
large employer was able to offer certain things, such as promotion or doctoral training, 
that small firms cannot easily afford.  Although at a meso-scale, this could be regarded as 
a set of ‘untraded interdependencies’ to those firms and university teams suffering the 
loss of key staff, there was no overall positive effect because of the etiolated state of the 
scientific labour market in the North East of England. 
6.4.2 Solutions and learning activities in the Newcastle techno-economic network  
These problems were not insurmountable, but they did reduce the overall scope of the 
benefit which spin-out companies were able to bring to the region.  Certainly, the 
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intuitive notion of the university creating swarms of these new businesses which went 
boldly out into the region and transformed the technological basis was ill-informed.  It is 
clear from this that the knowledge-pool in the region such as was created by the spin-off 
activity was extremely dependent on the continuing effort of the university, and required 
a great deal of energy to produce the results.  When that effort was expended, then there 
would be big successes like Novocastra, which produced a rash of activities in its’ wake 
that seemed to be a genuine improvement in what the region could offer to external 
agents, as well as extending the scope of the regional research base within the university 
(as demonstrated by high RAE ratings for the Pathology department). 
Part of the continuing effort is indicated by the high degree of reliance of the activities at 
the time of the research on the business development team within the university.  The 
idea of a regional knowledge pool is suggestive of a range of companies involved with a 
variety of academics, and although that situation does exist around Newcastle University, 
the USO activity existed to one side of this broad thrust.  The Business Development 
Managers did have a lot of knowledge about their own sections and speciality areas, and 
had a dense network of relationships with external firms, which they used in introducing 
firms to the university spin-off activity area.  Involvement by third party firms with 
spin-off activities was likewise a lot more energy intensive than merely giving in an 
industrial research contract to a research team in the university. 
This suggests that the knowledge pool around USOs is quite tightly bounded, with a very 
strict set of rules for access to that pool, and relatively limited replicability and reusability 
of the assets.  This at first seems to suggest that spin-offs have a relatively limited impact 
on their regional environment.  However, as we have seen, the spin-offs around 
Newcastle were actively putting resources back into the university, including cash, 
knowledge and staff, which were in some cases being exploited by other firms.  
Consequently, although the operation of the knowledge pool is not as straightforward as 
the naïve model suggests, and depends heavily on the accessibility of all the knowledge 
within the university, not merely that ‘between’ university and USO, there are examples 
of USOs contributing to the regional environment. 
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So what does this revised, segmented and bounded territorial knowledge pool look like in 
the case of Newcastle University?  In effect, that means there are two territorial 
knowledge pools.  One of these is largely within the university, and is that used in 
establishing new spin-off firms.  However, there is a second area where spin-offs bring 
resources back into the university, these are invested in the research groups, hard 
infrastructure, and business development activities, and these activities then benefit local 
companies.  This second knowledge pool is much more loosely bounded and is much 
more easily exploited by other firms in the region, so INEX was host eight firms who 
were not nanotechnology-spin-offs, other firms were working with research groups 
whose professors had funded those groups with spin-off funded research, and regional 
companies also benefited from the ideas and contacts of the business development 
officers.  We attempt to represent this in figure 5 below, which shows that indirect access 
to the knowledge pool is the more significant potential impact on the regional economy, 
namely that the USOs create resources which other elements of the university ‘render’ to 
make them more easily appropriable by other regional firms. 
Figure 6 The disparate nature of the apparent relationship between USOs and the 
territorial knowledge pool around Newcastle University 
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83 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Of course, what figure 5 shows is a set of archetypal research relationships around the 
university and the USOs at the time that the research was undertaken. The key issue for 
this research is the extent to which they have become more general territorial assets, more 
generally repeatable and reusable by other innovators without necessarily incurring the 
initial start-up costs.  In the case of Newcastle, the high effort involved with the spin-offs 
means that it is problematic to regard the direct benefits of the USOs to represent a 
territorial knowledge pool; there is little direct free-riding that can be done by other firms 
on the basis of Newcastle University’s experience with its spin-outs.  The key locus for 
the knowledge lies in these intermediary institutions which appear to push the economic 
benefits of the spin-outs and generalise them.  The institutions are not solely the 
consequence of spin-off activity, and in the majority of the cases, the spin-outs are more 
dependent on the institution than vice versa.  But the spin-outs appear to have contributed 
assets which have facilitated making those activities better at supporting regional 
activities, and possibly therefore to have densified the regional techno-economic network. 
6.5 The nature of the territorial knowledge pool: towards more explicit 
mechanisms 
The fundamental message from this chapter is that spin-offs can contribute to building a 
knowledge-based economy in a peripheral region, namely Newcastle.  Of course, there 
are questions remaining about the scope, stickiness and sustainability of the particular 
economic activities, but the spin-offs contributed to the development of enlarged activity 
networks. These networks contributed to making some local firms more competitive, at 
least as far as improving their performance in the innovation process.  It is possible to see 
knowledge generated through university research activities being implemented in local 
firms, providing them with external innovation resources, thereby improving their local 
innovation environment.  What this chapter has not been thus far able to establish is the 
broader significance of these changes in improving the political-economic situation of the 
region, in making it more powerful in its relationships with other places, and making 
itself more of a place to be to perform particular types of knowledge economy activities. 
It appears that the territorial assets which materialise are in three main forms; firstly are 
the solid infrastructure which provide access points into the university, USOs have been 
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part of the business case for INEX, and the reorganisation of the campus is creating space 
for spin-outs as a way of ‘bringing the city into the university’.  The second are the new 
institutional arrangements within the university to provide better access for regional firms 
to knowledge held within the university, which can in turn be subdivided into the 
‘routine’ and the ‘special’ access points.  The routine access points are what are 
traditionally thought of as boundary spanning functions, things that help bring academics 
and firms, with their very different world-views, needs and demands together around 
particular collaboration activities.  The special access points during the research was 
effectively the business development managers, who enrolled businesses into the 
university in ways that contributed to the university’s core mission.  There were far fewer 
firms who had this really close relationship with the university, but some of those firms 
were spin-offs, particularly those which had had an amicable spin-out process.  The third 
set of assets were the relationships that they had with other individuals who could also 
provide resources for small firms, and who were held in the region by their connection to 
the region.  This third class of contribution remained the most basic, the least 
territorialised, and the most ‘tacit’, whilst the sold infrastructure and routine 
boundary-spanning functions were the most regularised and codified of the activities. 
One way in which in the case of Newcastle University substantially deviated from the 
conceptual framework we established was in the sequencing of events, and the 
subsequent direction of resource flows.  In the basic model, there was the assumption that 
the first process was spinning out the companies, and that this then led to new 
relationships which represented a densification of the techno-economic network.  In the 
light of the various findings presented in that chapter, that particular perspective feels 
somewhat naïve.  Indeed, in many cases, because spin-offs was the ‘new’ activity, and 
researchers had been engaged in technology transfer and other kinds of outreach activities 
previously, they benefited in spinning out companies from these past relationships, so the 
direction of flow was from the past experience into the spin-out competition.  In the 
research council business plan competitions, for example, problems, mentors and moral 
support were drawn in each case from companies with which the university (BDMs and 
academics) already had an existing research relationship. 
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The other interesting point relating to the direction of the flow of knowledge is that there 
was not a simple flow from the university into third party firms and the spin-offs.  In a 
number of examples, the firms were in some ways more sophisticated than the 
universities themselves, and took their findings back to the university, to ask for help in 
understanding the problems they faced as part of developing a commercial solution to 
those problems.  In giving the problems to the university, this expanded the university’s 
domains of research; a number of academics used their students to explore the 
generalities of these problems and consolidate them into a more formal research stream.  
Thus, the development of new activities within the university was predicated on flows 
from the third party and spin-off companies.  As one professor, also a director of a 
spin-off, noted:- 
“The company will pose a question to me, as research director, ‘that represents a 
30% loss of productivity over the entire year, what can you do about it?’ And the 
answer has turned out to be very, very interesting …  There are two things.  
Firstly, how can you devise solutions, and I tend to go to the DTI and ask for 
funding to explore whether we could devise such a method … arguing that this 
would increase productivity by 30%, increase profit, lead to growth, and then so 
many more people would be employed, We’ll try and do that with them usually as 
the first thing I do. … Then you go to the scientific literature and you ask, ‘is 
there any scientific or any knowledge or mechanisms for measuring [what 
controls productivity]?’ … Finally, you can then devise a programme of pure 
research to try and get at that mechanism. 
“My understanding of the mechanism of what is going on follows the realisation 
that it’s important, not the other way round… It’s not the accepted paradigm for 
university research, universities like to think that doing blue skies research spins 
out into commercially viable processes.  My experience is that you find something 
that works but you don’t know why it works, finding out how and why it works 
gives you new scientific information, and that can then lead into new things, 
which is why it is a dynamical relationship”. 
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Newcastle University have taken a particular approach to its spin-out activities which has 
given what one BDM refers to as a Rolls-Royce system, but which fits into Clarysse et 
al.’s (2003) classification as supportive and to Pirnay et al.’s (2003) schematic as 
codified/ academic.  Thus, the overall scope of the activity has deliberately been 
relatively limited, with small numbers of proposals coming forward, and the university 
emphasis being on identifying the appropriate pathways for exploitation.  Much of this 
activity is contained within the university itself, negotiations between academic founders, 
business development staff and senior managers.  However, this has created a flow of 
resources into the university which have enabled it the better to fulfil its’ regional role, 
supporting the development and population of a range of its’ regional engagement 
activities.  Of course, some companies – particularly the research group start-ups – have 
gone out into the wider economy and left a territorial footprint.  However, this 
contribution appears to be less significant, in terms of the number of interactions involved 
with regional industry, than the contribution to making the culture of the university more 
open to regional engagement.  It is to this issue of the university’s regional mission, and 
making the university more accessible as an innovation asset to regional partners, that 
this report now turns. 
 
87 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
7 University spin-outs opening up the university 
In the previous chapter, we considered how the spin-outs affected the routine of the 
operation of the territorial knowledge pool in the region. In 6.5, we noted that one issue 
which determined the territorial effect was the porosity of the knowledge pool to outside 
agents.  There were examples historically in the university where despite repeated efforts, 
third party firms had not been able to access particular university resources (cf. 
Benneworth & Dawley, 2005).  Likewise, in this current research some spin-offs felt that 
following the spin-off process, they were unfairly, or at least unhelpfully treated by the 
university.  In this section, we look at how the process of promoting spin-outs at an 
institutional level has contributed to making the university more accessible as a 
knowledge resource, in order to be able to say more meaningful things about the 
territorial scope of the knowledge assets within the university.  In order to do that, we 
look at the impact of a shift from a culture (that we could perhaps typify as ‘benign 
neglect and prioritising licensing deals’ to ‘actively promoting spin-offs’) has changed 
culture and practises within the university.  To do this, we consider the changes outlined 
in 5.3 and 5.4, which set out how the university had sought to reorganise its strategic 
orientation towards commercialisation, and how these changes affected the routines, 
practises and cultures of those involved in those activities. 
In the literature, we noted that there were a range of knowledge communities literatures, 
such as community of practise and networks of practise that could conceivably be of use 
in conceptualising this process.  In the analysis of this chapter, we extent the concept to 
consider a more general Newcastle University Commercialisation community (of 
practise) extending beyond the formal ‘team’ community of the business development 
director.  We extend this to include the ongoing role of spin-outs in shaping the 
community of practise, in affecting the policy framework and strategic orientation, and in 
opening up the university to outside users.  We begin by giving a basic narrative for the 
evolution of the business development directorate as a ‘community of practise’ in the 
period immediately preceding the research, and identify some of the key routines, beliefs 
and practises of community members which emerged in the course of the fieldwork.  We 
then turn to look at two of the main struggles within the community precipitated by 
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USOs, how crisis has precipitated changes in those behaviours and mores, and then 
finally turn to consider whether these changes, associated with spin-outs, have had a 
beneficial or a negative territorial effect, in terms of the accessibility of knowledge 
resources within the university to outside actors. 
7.1 The Business Development Directorate as a community of practise 
As noted above, the Business Development Directorate was something new that was 
quite deliberately created as part of a wider attempt to change the culture of the 
university, and to begin to mainstream some of the entrepreneurial and commercialisation 
processes which had been developed in the late 1990s.  These (almost certainly unfair) 
old conceptions of the university as “risk averse”, a “barrier to innovation”, and “poorly 
managed” appeared to be used by key actors throughout the institutional change process 
as a reference to try to ‘ground’ what was being done, and create a broader rationale for 
the changes.  The context for the period of change was extremely difficult for the 
university; the restructuring and associated redundancy programme made many of those 
in business development feel that they were being asked to take on new roles which 
exposed them to people who had a negative perception of the BDD as part of a more 
general negative perception of the institutional reorganisation through which Newcastle 
University was then going. 
Because the creation of the BDD was an attempt to rework the culture of the university, 
in this section, we take three different perspectives of the change process outlined above, 
how the university was prepared to accept the BDD, how the BDD was created, and how 
links were developed to use BDD as an exemplar to support other changes in the wider 
culture in the university. 
7.1.1 Changing the old culture of the university: creating a space for ‘business 
development’ 
The first element of clearing a space in the university culture came through an apparent 
discursive dismantling of the “old regime”, and formally defining business development 
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as something that the university did25.  Part of this came about under the previous Vice 
Chancellor, creating a team with the capacity to bid for and win funding to pay for 
structural change in the university.  Thus, the Business Development Managers, who 
were to become a key component of the BDD community, were appointed on the back of 
a funding stream applied for by the Regional Development Office during the Wright/ 
Hamnett regime.  Alongside the HERO bid (which delivered the BDMs) other elements 
of the old ‘risk averse’ regime were discursively dismantled, that is to say particular new 
policies and decisions were implemented in parallel with public statements from senior 
managers that these changes represented a change in university culture.  One example of 
this is that the university mission statement was extended to include a formal regional 
development mission, and the university also actively took credit for a number of very 
successful spin-outs, including Mindware (qv). 
With the departure of Wright as Vice Chancellor, it appears that the university continued 
this idea of discursive dismantling of the ‘old regime’ by deliberately appointing 
someone to lead a process of vigorous change.  In appointing Professor Edwards, the 
appointment committee chose someone that had experience of their highly successful 
high growth own spin-off firm.  However, even before the arrival of Edwards and the 
more or less synchronous arrival of the BDMs, it is important to note that the core of 
what might be considered a new regime had been built up starting with the ‘Regional 
Development Triumverate’ (cf. 5.3) around the Regional Development Office.  Senior 
members of the RDO, for example, were available to meet with the new Vice Chancellor 
before his arrival as part of the induction process, and they articulated a clear position for 
the role of business development and regional engagement in the university, which 
informed the Vice Chancellor’s own deliberations and strategy development on taking up 
his position. However, because of the desire of people to dismantle the old regime, 
interviewees certainly stressed the change elements of the story rather more than the 
                                                 
25 Although it is important to state that in truth what happened was better depicted as closer to a 
consolidation or mainstreaming.  It is important not to over-state the idea that the old regime was that of 
Professor Wright – as we say in the next section, important changes were initiated during the 1990s. 
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continuity.  This had the effect of making it artificially appear that the arrival of the new 
VC was the key event which determined the shift in university culture. 
There was during this period a parallel process of tangibly dismantling the old regime, 
and a key element of this was a problematisation of the old university management 
discourse.  The previous university management system had been rather informal and 
bottom-up; a number of interviewees made reference to the ‘Monday Morning Meeting’ 
of deans and the senior management team as the key decision making forum in the 
university before the introduction of the new governance arrangements.  What the 
university called its business plan was in reality a collected set of plans for the services 
and academic departments, and commercialisation activity operated on a case-wise 
business.  Because of its’ informality, such a system was very difficult to formally 
dismantle; it was replaced with new activities, and the new activities, and the associated 
pain of change, were legitimated by problematising what had previously gone on as 
unsuitable for a university with Newcastle’s aspirations, that is to say as a research 
intensive Russell Group university with a strong orientation towards academic 
entrepreneurship. 
What is interesting, is that it was the past that was problematised in the community 
discourse, rather than any particular period or person, and indeed there was some 
disagreement within the BDD group as to when the problem started and was solved26.  So 
one interviewee did identify the problem as being part of the old regime in which the 
Vice Chancellor was unable to force the academic governance structures (in particular 
Senate) to accept the need for particular activities in this new third stream outside the 
core mission of teaching and learning with which Senate members were comfortable:- 
“There are many examples of commercial opportunities that were brought by 
particular members of the academic community to the vice chancellor and the 
bursar, for investment - spin-outs for example – which ended up being turned 
down as incompatible … the Vice Chancellor even then had the perspicacity to 
                                                 
26 Of course, this is a synthetic disagreement we have created by juxtaposing contradictory quotations from 
the three month interview period; the research did not involve creating situations where different 
interviewees could actually disagree with one another. 
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identify that there was an emerging agenda around commercialisation … but it 
was not his leadership style to force it onto the wider university community”27. 
A member of the university who had been in the university since before the arrival of the 
BDMs noted that it was with his arrival that things had begun to change, that is to say that 
his appointment by the Vice Chancellor was a key part of setting in train the events that 
led to the appointment of the BDMs, and hence the change in the university’s attitude:- 
“My perception is spinning out businesses into the regional economy, or indeed 
anywhere, was one of the more conservative parts of the university’s, umm 
approaches”. 
One of the more recent arrivals observed that as late as 2000, there were still problems:- 
“Most of the spin-outs that were being talked about that time, or had been 
developed or were formed, were not being aggressively developed as companies. 
They were quite nice vehicles with quite nice technology, but no one had said, 
‘how do we get this to be the biggest and the fastest growing’ ?” 
Another long-term staff member saw that the problems had been running for a long time:- 
“Of course, back in those days, it was very risk averse, as I’m sure I have told you 
before, umm, a lot of people were dead against the idea of any sort of spin out at 
all, the thrust was to be licensing” 
One of the business development managers agreed with this diagnosis, and indeed argued 
that the risk aversion had continued during their period of tenure:- 
“First of all, the university was scared by the idea of having a bunch of people 
walking round representing the university, without very close academic 
‘management’. It was very, umm, risk-averse, it still is risk averse, admittedly less 
than it used to be, but it’s terribly risk averse” 
                                                 
27 This is actually a composite from two quotations – there was a second meeting with one interviewee to 
discuss the findings, and the interviewee indicated that what appears above was a more articulate way of 
setting out their beliefs on the situation. 
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In the quotations above, it is interesting that all the interviewees paused significantly 
(umm-ed) before describing their problematisation (e.g. “umm, risk averse”) which gave 
the impression that this was not necessarily an accepted view of the whole group, but 
their reading of the situation.  This may also refer to the fact that it was in the past, and 
they were uncertain of precisely the details which justified why they thought it was risk 
averse (see 7.2.1 below). Alongside the conceptual dismantling of the old regime, and 
more particularly, problematising it within the discourse of an entrepreneurial university 
there was a process of constructing a new set of institutions and attracting new actors to 
solve the problem of the old arrangement, and make the university more fit for its 
purpose as articulated in its mission.  This, business development managers were 
recruited, a new VC was appointed with entrepreneurial experience, NUVentures was 
subordinated to Equity Committee, and the Bursar was given a line manager (the 
Registrar).  A target of 12 spin-offs per year was set for spin-offs, with the understanding 
they had to be proper companies rather than just shell companies. 
It is important not to overstate the stability of the new commercialisation approach or its 
disconnection from what had been achieved already by the time of the arrival of the new 
Vice Chancellor.  The old arrangements were slowly dismantled from within by the 
Regional Development team, who noted in the course of the interviews that they had been 
given huge latitude to build up a third, entrepreneurial mission by Professor Wright.  The 
old arrangements were gradually replaced with a different set of arrangements, and the 
new situation was never fully stabilised; thus, the new arrangements were heavily 
dependent on the particular individuals involved at the core of the team, and a lot of effort 
was expended by the university in attempting to regularise commercialisation routines 
(cf. 7.1.3 below).  The key members of the BDM team from a spin-off perspective were 
in a continual state of flux; as entrepreneurs themselves, they were continually appraising 
new opportunities which were potentially of interest to them as entrepreneurs as well as 
service providers.  Thus, one BDM left in late 2003 to take over as MD of one spin-out; 
another spin-out company bought out the time of another member of the team, and a third 
member was absent from the team for one year as the consequence of two consecutive 
secondments.  This instability meant that commercialisation and spin-out activities were 
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not necessarily something which were fully embedded into the university, and as we see 
in 7.3.1, had difficulties in working back to change the overall university culture. 
7.1.2 Dealing with the new environment: creating new work routines 
Having created a clamour for a set of institutions to make the university more 
commercial, by problematising past activities, and having subsequently started to 
establish those institutions and activities, the second element of the community involved 
creating a set of working practises and routines for the various members of the teams.  
The first issue was that the Business Development Managers were arriving in a relatively 
new environment and had to fill the institutional space which had been vacated for them.  
There seems consensus amongst the BDMs that they were given relatively free reign in 
the first period (2000/1-2003) as part of an attempt to let them infuse the university with 
their entrepreneurial potential.  With the arrival of Douglas Robertson, attempts were 
made to regularise the activity, so the BDMs were moved into permanent contracts, they 
were formally welded into a single team with the TTOs and attempts were made to 
routinise the services they were delivering.  One interviewee noted a significant 
discrepancy between what he expected and what he found his workload to be.  Expecting 
one third sales, one third marketing and one third multi disciplinary working across 
platforms and faculties, what he got was 20% sales, 5% marketing, 25% cross- and multi-
disciplinary work, and then the rest, a bit less than half, has been sorting out how the 
university does the business interface. 
This is indicative of the fact that much of the work of the BDMs was in trying to create 
institutional solutions to problems; the BDMs as people were not a solution, but an 
intermediary form on the way to a more permanent, possibly more regular, professional 
and routine set of business interaction solutions.  An allied problem was the fact that the 
business development team members were themselves extremely entrepreneurial 
individuals, and their presence within the university was never going to be either 
permanent or stable.  Thus, although the university could offer permanent contracts to the 
BDMs, they were unable to offer them the exposure to risk that involvement with a 
company created.  It is interesting that since the research was undertaken, at least three of 
the BDMs have subsequently involved themselves with spin-offs, and two BDMs are 
94 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
themselves directors of a new company which is not a spin-off, but is using the university 
to prove a concept prior to seeking venture funding. 
The second issue was the unification of the two disparate groups (the HERO-BAC BDMs 
and the TTO people) into a single team providing differentiated services.  The risk of 
creating space for a business development group within the university was that it would 
end up stigmatising all those involved in the delivery of services under the old 
arrangement, and the arrival of the ‘clean pair of hands’ in 2003 was associated with a 
departure of some of those managing the old arrangements.  There was a degree of luck 
that the two teams, Business Development and Technology Transfer, had already begun 
to work together, in part because of the convoluted management arrangements for the 
North East Centre for Scientific Enterprise (qv), but also because of the resource 
constraints the group remained under.  A number of interviewees noted that the core 
business development team were continually under-resourced, that meant that they had to 
share out their workload continually to ensure that any kind of progress was made.  An 
argument could be made that even though the university managers had agreed the terms 
for the funding for the HERO posts, there was concern in the university of creating too 
many free agents, who were inherently risky and difficult to manage.  This argument 
seems supported by the fact that although Business Development Directorate did grow 
rapidly, the numbers involved in those ‘lone wolf’ business development activities, the 
core business development team at the time of the research, did not grow anywhere near 
as rapidly, whilst those providing more standardised services did. 
The third element was the way they attempted to promote academic entrepreneurship.  
One interviewee likened the situation to “Eastern Europe in 1992” upon their arrival in 
2001; there were no formal market or commercial mechanisms, but everyone was excited 
about the potential opportunities that existed as a consequence of those changes.  The 
problem was that the pathways to market for academic ideas was very different between 
different technological sectors and departments, and so it was difficult to produce a single 
market pathway.  Some of the BDMs developed their own specific models and concepts 
to try and structure diversity within commercialisation activities, developing such 
concepts as were known as the “High Volume Pipe” or the “Digital Development Zone”.  
The business development team members also segmented individual academics into 
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different groups depending on the propensity for and openness to entrepreneurship, again 
attempting to make sense of an extremely diverse and complex environment.  There were 
some high profile successes, and in their own terms, by a process of experimentation and 
internal discussion, the BDMs were able to build a shared sense of what they were 
seeking to do, and develop some formal routines to solve the particular commercialisation 
problems the university faced. 
7.1.3 Reshaping the institutional configuration: generalising entrepreneurship 
The prevailing management discourse within the university at the time of the research, 
changing the university culture because it was insufficiently entrepreneurial, influenced 
and led to the creation of the business development team.  However, the business 
development team were a service within the university, and a central part of the aim of 
the new culture was that entrepreneurship was to be encouraged within all academic 
schools, to meet faculty targets for third strand income generation.  The BDMs were 
introduced as a project, to revolutionise the university culture, identify problems, barriers 
and ultimately solutions.  However, they were never conceived of as a permanent 
solution; as the original HERO-BAC bid argues, they were part of a cultural change 
within the university which will 
“establish processes that will change the culture throughout the academic and 
administrative staff of the University.  This will encourage a move away from 
individuals and small groups liaising independently with businesses to an 
environment where contact with the wealth-creating sector permeates the greater 
critical mass of staff” (HEROBAC bid, 1999, p. 7). 
This was realised in the activity of the BDMs, who were somewhat time limited in the 
post because of their entrepreneurial interests elsewhere.  Where the BDMs and TTOs 
were least time limited was when their own entrepreneurial impulses could be co-
ordinated within the university establishment, and their own experiences and strengths as 
entrepreneurs could be harnessed to carry academic proto-entrepreneurs towards the 
market.  There was a change in the nature of the work that was being done in the team; 
after the initial flurry of activity there was a shift towards more routine activity which did 
not need or indeed interest those at the level (ALC 5) of the BDMs.  There were thus two 
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drivers for routinisation of technology transfer activity, the onward movement of the 
BDMs and the solidification of particular activity strands which could be delivered by 
more junior staff, at which point there could be said to exist a ‘system’ for technology 
transfer and commercialisation rather than people active in technology transfer.  This was 
also driven by the reorganisation within the universities, and in the HEIF 2 bid, the 
decision was taken to move the BDMs back to the faculties, and to appoint new staff at 
lower levels (4 at ALC 3, 3 at ALC 2) to work alongside (fewer) new strategic business 
development staff. 
At the time of the research, it was difficult to identify tangible changes that the 
HEROBAC staff had had on the overall culture of the university.  Certainly, the 
university was managed in a more entrepreneurial way, and entrepreneurship was 
prioritised to a greater extent within the institutional plan.  There was an increase in the 
number of spin-off firms, and there was a set of activities promoting entrepreneurship, 
such as the creation of the Research Beehive, and the running of seminars on various 
aspects of entrepreneurship.  But the evidence was not equivocal that it was the change of 
regime that had improved performance; many of the results that were seen were a 
consequence of previous activities, not least because of the time that some proposals took 
to get through Equity Committee.  In order to understand the nature, significance and 
extent of the cultural change, then, it is necessary to look more closely at the functioning 
of the community. 
7.2 Some key features of the community: repertoire, engagement, 
exercise 
In the community of practise literature, Wenger stresses that there are a range of things 
that give a community a degree of cohesion, a repertoire of shared knowledge, 
engagement between the team members, and common goals and activities. Although the 
various members we are discussing in this section were formally joined into a single team 
in 2003, it is interesting to consider some of the informal activities and mechanisms that 
contributed to the life of the community.  In the interviews with the core technology 
transfer group, there were a number of stories that were told by community members that 
seemed to play that kind of community-building and learning role, events which members 
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had not been involved in but which allowed them to draw inferences about the way they 
organised their working lives, and which hence became materially embedded within the 
life of the community. 
7.2.1 Why the university was risk averse: the ‘Manchester software company’ 
Another alternative explanation for the risk aversion of the previous regime arose 
repeatedly in the interviews with the wider BDM team, which was that some bad event 
during former period had ‘scarred the psyches’ of those involved in technology transfer 
activities, and that had become transferred through to those involved currently in 
technology transfer.  Very few of those in the current business development team were 
actually present at Newcastle at the time of the problem, but the problem had acquired 
status as a ‘myth’, which provided a very neat rationalisation of why the university was 
so risk averse.  One member of staff argued that there was a confidentiality argument in 
place covering the precise details of the problem which is why no one was clear about the 
precise details. 
The root of the myth was that in the past the university had invested in one particular 
spin-out company that had in turn developed a product and licensed software to a third 
firm; the software had failed, and the firm sued the university rather than the spin-off, 
which had no real assets.  This was seen to have left a permanent impression on those 
involved in technology transfer. 
“"Decades ago, literally, well, I’m told it was in the NUVentures era, anyway ... 
this is one of the university’s skeletons in the cupboard.  The university licensed 
some IP to a software company, which span out of the university and was a 
completely separate legal entity. It went wrong.  There was a bug in the software, 
it caused ... some consequential damages.  Now the company was a limited 
company, and there was probably no reason whatsoever for the university to have 
rolled over.  The university were not a subsidiary, we were a minor shareholder.  
However, they went for us and not the company because we had some money, in 
the end the university paid out hundreds of thousands of pounds in liability, for no 
good reason.  But it’s something that’s remained … ever since, which is the idea 
that every spin-out you create is a potential liability on the university.” 
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One metaphor that emerged during the interviews was on ‘burned fingers’, that particular 
senior members of staff had ‘burned their fingers on the ‘Manchester software company’ 
problem, and so avoided all risks of any form.  It certainly was a plausible explanation for 
a range of problems which the community had to address.  However, it was more than a 
plausible interpretation of events, its ambiguity allowed it to acquire a life of its own as a 
story; one interviewee even referred to it as an “urban myth”, and noted that he had heard 
two versions of the story, one where the university lost £60,000, and another where the 
university had lost £600,000.  As one interviewee explained, who had also been in the 
university for a long period of time (a decade):- 
“I think it was the legacy of a number of people having burned fingers on one or 
two spin-outs which hadn’t been undertaken particularly cleverly.  There was one 
in particular, and I never got to the bottom of it , but I think it was a software 
spinout, where the bugs hadn’t been ironed out, and I think in the end cost the 
university six figures to make good the damages it had done.  These burned 
fingers were exhibited whenever there were serious proposals to bring out another 
spin-off”. 
The myth showed a great deal of the properties expected of key stories within 
communities, that they provide a conceptual lens to interpret a particular situation, but 
that they are also continually reflected and updated by their life within the community.  
Thus one more much more recent member of staff articulated the myth in the following 
way, again, with uncertainties and ambiguities reflecting the ‘lost’ nature of the origin of 
the story. 
“Then, I don’t know what happened at Newcastle, but there was, I think, an issue 
maybe with some of the support for some of the spin-out activity, which was less 
than, umm, commercially tight, and I think the university got put off risk in a big 
way.” 
Our argument is that this story became an important ‘myth’ within the university 
technology transfer community.  Even those who had no direct connection to the period 
knew that there was this shadow over the university’s previous commercialisation 
activity, at least at some point in the past.  However, this myth also had implications for 
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opening up the university to outside interests, as the meaning of the myth was that the 
university was not approachable for small firms because of the risk of being sued should 
a collaborative activity fail.  As one spin-off manager themselves observed, this problem 
had tainted university experiences of commercialisation in ways that had very real 
implications for their willingness to get involved in further activities. 
“The university’s attitude was that they were scared of being involved in a 
commercial company, they had had their fingers burned a year or two before.  I 
don’t know how out in the open this is these days, but at the time it was 
something they did not like talking about.  They had a spin-off company had 
created some product, and the university had created a holding company in order 
to own the spin out, or at least to in order to create the spin-out company.  The 
spin-out company ended up getting sued, and the people suing them just bypassed 
this whole legal apparatus of an independent spin-off, and went straight after the 
university, and got a relatively large sum off the university.  So the university 
were terrified of any commercial link which could come back and bite them”. 
This was a myth that was in every day circulation within the business development team; 
we were not specifically probing for this story, but it was something which the business 
development people regularly brought up themselves, to the point where they were not 
sure who they had told it to.  As one business development manager related… 
“Now I believe I told you about the story in which in the past, the university 
rolled over and gave some money even though it didn’t need to.  Did I tell you 
about that? [Interviewer: No, I don’t think so] If not you, then someone else.” 
7.2.2 The risks of risk aversion: Mindware software  
Another important common piece of knowledge within the core team surrounded the 
spinning off of Mindware, a company which emerged from the Computer Science 
department in the late 1990s, and had managed to sell itself to a larger development 
company for $13.5m within three months of the launch.  The university had deferred 
deciding on whether to license the IP to the company for what was arguably an 
unreasonably long length of time, and Equity Committee apparently decided to allow the 
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firm to use the IP freely.  Recognising the high potential for a lawsuit against the 
company, which was developing risk tolerant software for failure sensitive applications, 
the university did not take equity in the company, because the potential rewards were 
seen to outweigh the risks.  Consequently, the university did not get a share from the sale 
of the company, and this could potentially have generated £1m of free cash.  The value of 
the story to the community came in the way that the story neatly codified what the 
problem with the risk aversion of the university was, giving tangible costs to that risk 
aversion in the Manchester Software Company story, and creating motivations to 
improve the situation.  The mythological status of the story was neatly encapsulated by 
one member of the broader team who told a story in which competing versions of events 
were present in the same narrative, in which every fact the speaker presents was in some 
way mythologised: (four wrong facts are highlighted in bold)- 
“The classic one was the one, I’m trying to think of its name, that was in 
Bluetooth technology, which was spun out and eventually sold, I think, to [a 
global computer firm], for - I think - €38m, and then set up down the Quayside. 
At one point it had twenty - no, ninety! - people working for it.  The university 
had refused to invest in [the company]” 
This story was not uncommon in the various staff members, even those who had been 
there at the time the process was taking place.  Interestingly in the quotation above, many 
of the ‘facts’ in the case are ambiguous, and the speaker creates a link between the 
particular story, and one of the subsequent activities undertaken by the university, that of 
creating a fund to invest in spin-outs.  Even one of those staff members who had been 
involved in the activity agreed that the university system had represented a barrier, and 
risk aversion was to blame for the subsequent opportunity cost of not taking the shares in 
the company. 
“the university was very, very nervous about the whole idea, so they tried to get it 
spun out without the university officially involved, effectively through the back 
door of the university.  Basically, the result was that the university didn’t take any 
equity, because it was seen that if they got equity they could accrue risks and the 
liabilities” 
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There was an interesting transmission mechanism of this story within the community, in 
that one of the new BDMs, arriving after the case of Mindware, actually went to speak 
with the MD of Mindware as part of his induction into the role.  What he inferred from 
the whole case was that the risk aversion because of the Manchester Software Company 
experience had undermined the university’s willingness to take a stake. He also 
emphasised the ambiguity and flexibility within these stories by being uncertain as to 
whether the original sale price was €5m or£5m, and for what price the new purchaser was 
itself eventually bought out.  Each of the speakers used this story in a very different way:- 
• the senior manager emphasising that cultural change had to happen,  
• one BDM argued that licensing deals were a better way to commercialise 
technology (and had subsequently pursued a number of such deals).   
• another member of the core team regarded Equity Committee as an 
improvement on the previous process (NUVentures) because it was in part a 
response to the Mindware ‘failure’, and 
• One academic entrepreneur had a misconstrued version of events, overvaluing the 
significance of the failure; “Not taking a share in [Mindware] cost the University 
tens of millions”, but that arguably motivated them to be more entrepreneurial. 
In combination, these various stories show that these common understandings with 
different interpretations came together as a ‘myth’, a story with the power to act as a 
potent rallying symbol for the idea that something needed to be done within the 
university.  It is this ‘idea that something needed to be done’ which was critical in 
mobilising a coalition for change in the university, and overcoming the natural resistance 
of the academic community which had hindered the crystallisation of the distinct actions 
of the senior management into an entrepreneurial university culture. 
7.2.3 Business Development Managers as a ‘group apart’ 
A third story which emerged very strongly in the core group, but also in the senior 
managers, was that the Business Development Managers were ‘a group apart’, that they 
were something new, and would play a transforming role in changing the university 
culture.  They were appointed to the most senior pay scale for administrative staff 
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(ALC5), and were appointed in a way that made them very close to the senior 
management in the university.  They were variously regarded by interviewees as being 
“tradable people with a high market value”, “a critical resource for delivering the 
university’s regional agenda”, “a fairly forceful set of characters” and “free agents … to 
work with whoever they want.”  Although the funding bid that went into HEFCE stressed 
that the intention was that these people would perform against a broad spectrum of 
activities, the particular element of activity in the bid which impacted on the spin-offs 
was the work of the business development managers.  The story was that their role was 
transformatory, to change the way that the university did business, to get good ideas and 
encourage academics to bring those ideas forward to the new formal institution, Equity 
Committee.  The outline of the story as told by members of the broader BDM community 
was that they went and did that, and then like heroes of cowboy films, when their job was 
done, they moved on, taking their entrepreneurial instincts to new pastures.  This onwards 
movement was a consequence of once the interesting problems were solved, they were 
increasingly encountering bothersome and bureaucratic difficulties, and were partly 
frustrated, and now they were starting to hand over their work to other more junior staff. 
BDMs noted that they were continually very busy, and that they were used as a ‘free 
resource’ rather than a ‘free spirit’.  One complained that much of their time was taken up 
in dealing with external partners, not least in helping the regional development agency 
with whichever part of their strategy was the most urgent.  They felt they were trying to 
develop university/ business networks, but systemic network building was continually 
being interrupted by the needs of responding to immediate requests, and also under-
resourcing within the business development group.  However, the way this featured in the 
way the story was told was that it was presented as a challenge to be overcome rather 
than a barrier to achievement.  By solving this barrier, the BDMs were solving the 
cultural problem with the university that had led to the risk aversion, and so preventing 
the recurrence of the Mindware mistake. 
“And then of course what happened was we unearthed a whole can of worms, 
really, ... there was people saying they hadn't seen anybody from technology 
transfer for five years, and ‘we've got this project and that project’, ‘help us with 
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this, help us with that’.  So almost immediately we were just swamped with things 
to do, and it was a bit of a challenge really.” 
One of those aforementioned challenges was the integration of the two formal structures  
(regional office and business development office) into one, and the story that was told by 
several members of the community in that area related to NECSE, the North East Centre 
for Scientific Enterprise.  The project was led by Durham who sought to learn from the 
experience of Newcastle University, who were seen to be best practise in university 
liaison.  The impact on Newcastle was that the technology transfer apparatus of the 
university had to provide staff to work with Durham University.  There were not enough 
staff in either the TTO or the HERO-BAC team, and the demands of NECSE placed 
incredible time pressures on both groups, that led to the forging of a common shared 
identity within the group. One BDM said that the team that emerged from this process 
styled themselves the “dysfunctional team meeting”, a play on the idea of a cross-
functional team meeting.  That BDM related how that this process of balancing work 
informally between the BDMs, a challenge that had to be addressed, had the positive 
consequence of building a stronger business development and technology transfer team 
“It also meant that he spent more time working with us and realised that we 
weren’t a bunch of idiots, and that we could be trusted, so it worked out that we 
ended up with these things called the cross functional, or as I think it became 
known, the dysfunctional, team meetings”. 
The view of their managers confirmed that they enjoyed this special status within the 
university, able to go out and pursue a range of different projects.  This meant that they 
were highly valued by their management, which was demonstrated by the conversion to 
permanent contracts despite the lack of a long-term funding source for them. 
“They were a key part of the thinking that we needed, some, some flagship 
projects. Certainly, once we embarked on that course, the BDMs became 
invaluable, in helping us to configure them on, a basis that we felt was 
appropriate, both in public sector terms, and also in commercial terms. Frankly, 
for instance, if you take Genetics Knowledge Park, that bid that would have 
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looked anything like as good as it did if a business development manager had not 
been involved”. 
There was also a feeling that their positions had evolved over their time in the university, 
and they had reached the limit of what they could reasonably achieve within the 
university context.  Whilst they had built good regional networks of contacts, arranged 
seminars and networking meetings, and steered USO proposals through Equity 
Committee, there seemed to be a shared sense among the BDMs that their position was 
evolving in a way on which they were not overly keen.  There was a common feeling in 
the BDD as a whole that there was a need to develop systems for USO exploitation, and 
that the BDMs had been successful in raising the profile of the ideas of spinning of 
businesses within the university.  However, there was some uncertainty in the team about 
whether or not they would continue as central actors into the future.  This reflected both 
an orientation within management that more routine workers and fewer visionaries were 
needed to deliver the new services being developed.  There was also uncertainty as to 
whether university management were uneasy that the BDMs were not directly under their 
control; as ‘free agents’, they were involved in all kinds of activities, and the technology 
transfer staff seemed to think this made management ambivalent to them.  On the one 
hand, they were recognised as valuable agents for change, but as partly external actors, 
there was some desire to try to take tighter management control over the way elements of 
their functions were performed.  This was suggested by moving the BDMs out to the 
faculties, reducing the extent to which they were autonomous voices, and increasing their 
parity with other faculty service providers. 
7.2.4 Concluding discussion: key stories in the technology transfer community  
The essence of the stories within the community that were related in the interviews tend 
to present a mythological version of their role as ‘technology transfer’.  There was a 
barrier, the university’s risk aversion, and it caused problems, the loss of £1m around 
Mindware, and they (the BDMs) collectively were the solution.  They were changing the 
university culture, making it more entrepreneurial, taking forward particular projects and 
developing new systems to generalise their activity.  In a sense, this story has parallels 
with the Magnificent Seven, where a despot rules over a kingdom, levying exorbitant 
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taxes, and a group of mysterious strangers arrive to free the citizens from their bondage, 
leaving in place a more just and productive system of government.  And like that story, 
the business development group story embodies the idea that once this change had been 
achieved, so academics in the university would be freer to go about the business of 
enriching themselves, their departments, the university and the region through 
entrepreneurial activities, as they did in the Novocastra days. 
It is a good narrative to describe the changes, and there are stories and evidence emerging 
of the ‘freed’ academics better able to establish businesses.  One team member cited Orla, 
Xcellsyz and Arrow as examples of companies formed under the new arrangements that 
were likely to benefit the university in the future in the same way that Novocastra had 
done in the past (£6m, 2 further spin-outs and a spin-in).  However, there remain a 
number of steps to take before it can be claimed unambiguously that the formation of the 
business development group represents a positive territorial outcome.  In order to do this, 
we extend the analysis to look at how more temporary members of the community, the 
entrepreneurs who draw on the university as a resource to promote innovation, engage 
with the core business development group. 
7.3 The role of spin-out companies in the evolution of the 
commercialisation community 
Traditional explanations of the role of technology transfer offices based on a linear model 
of technology transfer regard such offices as negotiating licenses for discrete pieces of 
intellectual property with external companies seeking to exploit the activity.  More 
nuanced models recognise that this model is very different to providing services to 
support the creation of new firms from university ideas.  In particular, there is a 
recognition that the creation of a new firm involved, in the case of a USO as much as any 
other firm, the assembly of a package of resources, and part of those resources, including 
the knowledge resources, may not be readily and freely available at the outset.  There is 
no clean break between being an academic and then an entrepreneur, and for a period, 
individuals may fulfil dual roles, in which they engage regularly with technology transfer 
officers or the Liaison Office.  In that sense, because of this regular engagement of 
entrepreneurs with the technology transfer activities, those entrepreneurs could 
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temporarily participate in the commercialisation community within the university.  This 
implies that part of the assets that the university offers to the new entrepreneurs are 
embodied within this community, but likewise would suggest that those temporary 
entrepreneurs play a role in the life and the evolution of the community.  In this section, 
we turn to look at how the spin-offs we interviewed did in fact interact with the core 
technology transfer team, and whether the BDMs and the much vaunted cultural change 
was creating such territorial assets which facilitated the spin-off process. 
7.3.1 The heuristic for temporary participation in the community 
The basic model for the operation of a community of practise around academic spin-offs 
is that there are a core of commercialisation staff, and then others temporarily participate 
in the community.  However, because they are involving themselves in spin-offs, by 
participating in that community, they move away, and leave, that community.  Despite 
that fact, they are temporary participants and can leave a mark on the operation and 
behaviour of the community.  The typical heuristic might be that a graduate student 
comes to work in a research group, then through the course of the doctoral research has 
an interesting discovery, which they seek to commercialise.  In the course of their Ph.D., 
they move from being outside the community, to peripheral, as interested entrepreneurs.  
At the time the decision is taken to commercialise, those people then become quite 
central in the community, as the business of the commercialisation staff involves 
managing these people as they progress through the spin-out.  Once the company has 
successfully been formed, and academics have a formal relationship with the new 
business, the entrepreneurs now move away from, and ultimately, outside the community. 
This framework did describe the activities of a number of the companies which formed, 
in which one of the main reasons behind the company was to provide employment for the 
post-doctoral worker.  There were only three companies which closely fitted this process, 
in which the academic remained within the university, at one remove from the firm, 
whilst the post-doc assumed much of the responsibility for the management of the 
company.  There were two other firms which formed in which post-docs were directly 
recruited into management positions.  There were other cases where well-formed research 
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groups started up directly in business, and other arrangements where in one case another 
university took the lead for the firm formation.   
With all these diverse practises and relationships, it suggests that it is hard to disentangle 
the role of the spin-offs on the core community of practise.  However, there are clearly 
three direct mechanisms through which spin-outs exerted an influence on the operation of 
the community of practise.  The first is that the spin-outs were a shared set of resource, 
experiences and common understandings that the business development managers had in 
delivering their job.  Although each firm was led through the process by a dominant 
BDM, other BDMs had experiences of the companies, and the issues they raised for 
university commercialisation.  In part this was because of the pressure the whole team 
found themselves under – they were forced to work with companies on a ‘first come, first 
served’ principle rather than having any kind of sectoral or skill specialisation.  Thus all 
the BDMs interviewed interpreted their actions and their consequences in the light of the 
university’s portfolio of companies.  Each of the BDMs and managers interviewed had an 
understanding of the particular set of companies; in some cases, like the Mindware or 
Novocastra ‘stories’ outlined above, they were particularly significant for their own roles.  
In other cases, they encapsulated other messages, such as three of those interviewed 
highlighted the risks of spending a lot of time developing companies that academics did 
not take seriously as money-making vehicles, but just ran as so-called lifestyle 
businesses. 
The second is that the spin-out companies represented a set of tangible problems that had 
been solved, and which defined in turn a set of capacities for the technology transfer 
community in the university.  In seeking to develop more generic mechanisms, each of 
the BDMs interviewed had come up with quite different mechanisms as a response to the 
different challenges of their particular disciplinary background, and in particular, in 
response to the difficulties they had faced with the previous companies they had been 
working with.  One of the BDMs, for example, classified academics in four classes 
depending on their willingness to engage with commercialisation activities.  That 
classification was based on particular individuals, and they then had developed an 
informal strategy based on the classification which was in turn based on the observation 
of commercially-minded (and non-commercially minded) academics:- 
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“The university splits into three groups.  Firstly, those people who are the usual 
suspects who are busy doing entrepreneurial activity … [names two people] … 
Secondly, you’ve got those people that are interested, and they are people who see 
it as an alternative to their current career to a certain extent and are looking to do 
something a bit different … ‘let’s try a little bit of third strand to spice things up a 
little bit’ … [names two people].  Then you have in my opinion 30% of people 
who are peering over the top of the brow of the ramparts, thinking, I’d like to play 
but I’m not certain I whether or not I want to be involved’.  As we speak, they are 
the current targets for what we are currently trying to do … [when prompted 
names one person]… 
“The first class, what you are mainly doing is you are slowing them down, in 
order to prevent them from making poor decisions, giving them what you consider 
to be good advice, and hopefully to guide them to good decisions …The second 
group, the ones who are involved but not running away, they need close support; 
they have lots of questions, they are academics and have inquiring minds, they 
want to know everything there is about the situation, so a lot of it is to do with 
explaining how processes work, maybe getting some research work done for 
them, some market research for them.  With the final group, what it involves is 
education, and making sure that they feel as though they can take the next step, 
put their toe in the water and get involved, although I do seem to be mixing my 
metaphors slightly!”. 
The third is that it was clear that the assumption that the temporary members of the 
community are the academics and entrepreneurs is not true.  In three of the 14 cases, for 
example, the academics had been senior managers in the business in quite a hands-on 
way for a period of time, far longer than the HERO coordinators had been at the 
university.  There is the question of the extent to which they had been participants in the 
community, but as the three had made deals over periods of time exceeding a decade, it is 
clear that there was a long-term element to the relationships with staff formerly in the 
TTO.  The other issue was that the commercialisation staff members were also 
themselves temporary; we have already seen that one BDM formally moved on to work 
for one of the spin-outs, whilst another BDM manager bought out a lot of their time using 
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spin-out funds.  Thus, although the heuristic assumes that the movement in the 
community is of academics and researchers, and it is the BDMs who are the permanent 
staff at the core of the community, in the case of Newcastle, that is not necessarily true.  
It is not clear however that these long term academic entrepreneurs within the university 
leave a formal imprint on the commercialisation culture of the core BDM teams; they 
were problematised in a number of cases by university administrators and managers, 
although in other cases they were consulted and enrolled into the university 
commercialisation culture. At the time for example that the BDMs were being 
introduced, there was an informal working group within the university dealing with 
commercialisation issues, and at least one of the spin-off MDs was present on that body, 
and so fed back their experience into the managerial attitude towards 
commercialisation28. 
7.3.2 The contribution of spin-offs to the community key features 
We have already begun to sketch out some of the key attributes of the current 
commercialisation community, in terms of its members, some of the key ways they define 
themselves and their environment through stories, and in terms of the dynamics within 
the community itself.  Thus far, the contribution of ‘spin-offs’ has been considered 
entirely passively, namely in the way that ideas of, experiences of and stories about spin-
offs were used by the core team.  However, we argue above that academics and others 
involved in spin-offs can also play a more active role in the community, leaving a more 
permanent imprint on the community, and ultimately on the attitude of the university 
towards commercialisation.   
One element of the contribution came in the way that the spin-out academics worked with 
the core business development teams to help them solve their problems, the more formal 
element of the co-evolutionary model we outline above.  In some cases, spin-off 
managers did feel that the BDMs consulted with them, but fundamentally were involved 
in enacting the university’s wishes.  However, in a number of other cases, there were 
                                                 
28 Although there was some scepticism in a number of those interviewed about the impact of that 
committee. 
110 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
closer relationships that contributed to the shared knowledge resource.  In some cases, 
these came about through involvement in Research Council Business Plan competitions 
(3) and SMART award bids (4).  One of the spin-off managers interviewed noted that the 
appointment of the BDMs made him much happier to form the spin-off, despite the poor 
treatment they had received previously; that formed the basis for a year-long involvement 
between the two in trying to negotiate and shape the formal bureaucracy of the spin-out 
process, particularly Equity Committee and the Heads of Agreement for using university 
staff to perform consultancy work.  Only in two of the fourteen cases had relationships 
between the university and the spin-off team degenerated to the state where there was no 
common learning process; even in one of the three cases where a large research group left 
the university, the spin-off team and BDM were working together to create ‘work-
arounds’ against the perceived weaknesses of the university system, which focused on a 
complex and informal compromise which was not ever fully written down.  One of the 
BDMs described the process of setting up a spin-off as a real learning experience because 
of the problems which had to be solved jointly between them. 
Secondly, there was the role of the spin-offs in extending the community beyond the 
formal scope of the university.  We have already seen that in the majority of the cases 
(11/14), the spin-off process involved developing a distinct team related to the lead 
professor to form the kernel of the company employees.  In some cases, the spin-off 
process involved bringing in outside mentors and consultants, changing the dynamics of 
the experience of the individual professor within the community.  In three of the 14 cases, 
this external expertise came in through the business plan competitions in which the 
professors had been involved.  In two of those, the companies had remained relatively 
small and had materially changed direction in response to the advice of their mentors, 
whilst in the most successful case, the core decisions were taken by a core group of the 
BDM and academic.  Likewise, with the two spin-in companies, where successful 
corporate executives moved into spin-off companies, this created tensions between the 
new managers, the professors and the BDMs, with the two spin-ins being reasonably 
successful in their own terms but not really creating a significant high growth new 
company.  
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A second component within this was of people who were involved in spin-off activity 
without ever being employees of the university, but who had some association with the 
university.  Obviously, Richard Maudsley was involved as Chair for Equity Committee, 
but the interviews revealed that there were individuals that were involved in various ways 
with particular spin-outs, in non-exec roles with the spin-outs, for example.  There was 
also no strong evidence that the third party firms were a strong influence on the 
commercialisation community.  Although there was a set of firms with whom spin-offs 
and the university were working, there was not really the sense that they were 
contributing to much more than representing a set of ‘problems’ to be solved by business 
development actors.  With one third party firm, for example, the firm had had a long set 
of dealings with the university, and so some of the solutions which the university had 
devised – such as the Biosciences Exploitation Platform – were a response to that firm’s 
relationship with the university.  Tellingly, however, when the individual responsible for 
the relationships with the firm moved on, the relationship reverted back to a much more 
formal set of relationships. 
This suggests that there remain problems within the university community in effectively 
building external linkages to learn from external commercialisation experiences from 
individuals outside the university.  Although the BDMs had a lot of commercial 
expertise, they brought this within the university by becoming employees of the 
university.  This suggests that the university organisational boundary is perhaps more a 
more significant barrier to the exchange of commercialisation knowledge than might have 
been expected.  However, there are mechanisms for introducing such external expertise 
into the university commercialisation community, albeit not necessarily by direct external 
mentoring of potential academic entrepreneurs, rather by bringing individuals into 
university ‘family’.  Although we did not specifically explore what makes the university 
regard individuals as elements of the wider ‘family’, which makes them more able to 
work in the commercialisation community, it does seem to involve meeting with senior 
managers in formal capacities, then being invited to serve on bodies like Council or 
Court. 
A final element to note is that the spin-offs themselves participated in some of the myths 
of the commercialisation community, sustaining and reinventing those stories in making 
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sense of their own experiences.  In 7.2.1 above, we relate how one spin-off manager used 
the ‘Manchester software company’ myth to make sense of their treatment by the 
university, which they felt was otherwise inexplicable.  There was a feeling that successes 
led to others attempting to succeed, as was the case with Mindware: 
“I remember Phil Harley saying after Mindware was bought for $13m, it was 
amazing how many people were ringing up his office, explaining what wonderful 
technologies they have, that also must be worth lots and lots of money.  So there 
are certain events which can trigger people on the ground to start thinking.  From 
my recollection of the way that one company evolved was that a particular 
professor went from saying ‘what I do is pure research, you know, five years 
away from commercialisation, blah, blah, blah’, and then the next minute he was 
the Technical Director of a spin-out company.” 
7.3.3 The limits of the ‘Magnificent Seven’ 
In this section, we have explored the broader participation in the commercialisation 
community outside the kernel of key actors whose main jobs relate to commercialisation 
and spin-off activity around the university.  What has become clear is that the community 
is more complex than purely comprising the ‘Magnificent Seven’, the seven staff 
members in the core business development community. This is augmented as a core 
group by some of the university senior management, not least the Deputy Vice 
Chancellor (ultimately responsible for the university’s corporate regional engagement), as 
well as some of the academic entrepreneurs within the university.  There were at the time 
of the research at least one senior manager within the University, Professor Malcolm 
Young, Dean of SAgE faculty (qv) who was also involved with a spin-off company (not 
interviewed in this project).  Some academic entrepreneurs are a key part of the group, 
shaping the development of the routines, particularly attempts to develop general models 
for commercialisation, as well as the more intangible aspects of the community, the 
myths and stories of the group. 
Around this core group, there was a set of peripheral actors linked to this core group, but 
much less active in shaping the community, they were affected by the community, and 
their attributes enrolled by the core members.  There were also two key extra-peripheral 
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groups involved with, but unable to really participate in the life of the community, those 
firms which fully left the university, and also the attempts made to introduce business 
expertise into the university by business mentoring, particularly for the business plan 
competitions; the barriers they faced were also faced by spin-offs who brought in external 
managers who came into contact with the core community.  Figure 3 is an attempt to 
represent this diagrammatically, although clearly it is a cut through at some point; 
individuals have multiple identities within the group, and also themselves move about as 
their roles and interests in commercialisation shift. 
Figure 7 A conceptual core/ periphery/ outside map of the university commercialisation 
community of practise 
 
What this diagram is useful for is in returning to the question of the porosity of the 
university boundaries, and how the territorial knowledge pool functions to make 
particular assets more accessible to firms particular in need of them.  The first point we 
would wish to make, illustrated rather than demonstrated by figure 3, is that the 
university is not of itself an ivory tower, and other external actors are involved in its 
commercialisation and spin-off activities.  What is interesting about their involvement is 
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that it is all to some degree “formalised” through a variety of mechanisms and 
instruments.  We have already highlighted the role of the University’s board of oversight, 
Council, in introducing external agents to the university, who then assume particular jobs 
within the community, such as the Equity Committee chair, or someone acting as a 
non-exec for particular university spin-offs.  We have also highlighted the role of spin-off 
companies themselves, in creating the myths (Novocastra, Mindware), perpetuating the 
stories in rationalising their own experiences.  Third party firms who are working with 
the university already on non spin-off commercialisation activity become involved 
tangentially in the commercialisation activity.  These boundary spanning activities are all 
mediated processes, that is to say that potential collaborators are identified, relationships 
built with them, and then consolidated until they are part of the university ‘family’, and 
then are able to assume a range of functional roles providing particular innovation and 
entrepreneurship services which leverage and valorise university knowledge. 
This idea of accessing the university community through a mediated process contrasts 
very neatly with the experiences of those who do not have similar intermediated access to 
the university.  In the case of the firms who left the university in a ‘total’ way (i.e. whole 
research group departure), this departure process seems to create a barrier with 
participation with the community.  The links that remain tend to be functional and 
bilateral, about dealing with left-over issues such as floor space charges or intellectual 
property, rather than the firm involving itself more actively in the life of the community.  
The second group, the external mentors, also seemed to have difficulties in accessing the 
community, excepting of course the person that they were mentoring; this created 
difficulties when that advice was at odds with the core commercialisation community 
staff, and meant that the university as a whole was not learning from the 
commercialisation experiences of external staff, except when they were hired in some 
capacity and brought formally within the university as employees.  This suggests that the 
most relevant barrier to the commercialisation community is not formally around the 
university, but around what we have called the ‘university external family’, the 
university, and the external agents with which it deals with on an informal basis. 
From the perspective of understanding access to the territorial knowledge pool, what is 
then of interest is the linkages and mechanisms by which individuals move into this 
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external family.  In the case of the external stakeholders, we have seen that there are often 
pre-existing relationships with the university in which the university believes that the 
individual has something to offer to a particular role, such as in Council.  These 
individuals are then given the opportunity to involve themselves in other particular areas 
which may give them a general role in the commercialisation community, which may 
also produce tangible outcomes in terms of providing assets for spin-outs.  For the third 
party firms, we have already seen in chapter 6 that it is other contacts that tends to drive 
benefits for spin-offs, and so the introduction process to the university is in significant 
collaborative research projects and ongoing research relationships with the university, 
which leave them involved in particular spinout activities.  Thirdly, spin-offs which retain 
some link to the university also participate in the community, through the activities of the 
particular entrepreneurial professors and their dealings with the core business 
development community. These are all very complex developments by individuals, and 
not directly amenable to simple analysis, because they are predicated on a range of 
desires by each party, both functional (such as for resources and knowledge) and 
ceremonial (e.g. prestige, friendship, intellectual challenge). 
7.4 Towards a network of practise: the extended community in the 
territorial knowledge pool 
USOs have clearly played an important role in the evolution of the entrepreneurial culture 
of Newcastle University.  As it was not been possible to interview the previous Vice 
Chancellor, it is important not to be unfair to his intentions, and it is clear that he laid in 
place many of the foundations which came together to produce the change in the 
university’s culture.  The problem appears to be was that despite a pursuing a set of 
regional development activities, the university as a corporate body had an attitude that 
was cautious and risk averse.  There have been a number of changes, and in the minds of 
those talking about them, there appears to be a clear distinction between the problematic 
past and the improved contemporary period.  That does conflate a number of 
contradictory facts into a rather simplistic narrative, and it should of course be stressed 
that each person seemed to tell a story in which there was a simple transition point.  We 
stress that this is quite distant from the reality emerging in the broader context of this 
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project, which involved the evolution of a commercialisation community of practise 
within the context of three or four different policy regimes which changed the overall 
direction of commercialisation practises within the university over a much longer period, 
arguably at least twenty years. 
But it remains the case that the impact of spin-outs directly on the culture and 
accessibility of the university has been very limited; we could characterise even today the 
spin-off community and its associated benefits and resources as a very exclusive ‘country 
club’, with extremely limited access, very high levels of service, and very little direct 
relevance to the wider economy.  In asking whether or not spin-offs have played a very 
important role in directly opening up the university to outside influences, it is clear that 
this is not the case; if anything, spin-offs have been predicated upon restricting 
involvement in the wider university governance system to a limited number of trusted 
university family who have elsewhere proved their bona fides as amicae academiae.  
This sounds a very critical judgement to make of the university service, but in the 
particular context of the North East of England, it could be that this ‘country club’ is less 
a ‘cathedral in the desert’ and more the beginning of a wider territorial upgrading 
programme, creating other actors who then are responsible for creating more general 
territorial benefits. 
To explain why some degree of aloofness and separation may be necessary for the 
commercialisation community, it is necessary to set out a conceptual model of the 
community.  The process model for Newcastle University’s commercialisation activity 
hinges on there being a core of business development managers, who have developed 
repertoires of routines and stories about their activities, who are central to the process 
whereby knowledge resources are opened up to outsiders who lack the resources to do 
that themselves (i.e. typically small firms).  This core group also involves from time to 
time academic entrepreneurs and senior managers in using spin-offs to further their own 
interests.  In assembling sensible companies to exploit university technologies, there is a 
wider group on which the commercialisation community draws, encompassing third party 
firms, external stakeholders and USO managers.  These external agents have to be 
brought into a position where the university ‘trusts’ them to act in the best interests of the 
university.  What we have found is that these actors have been engaged with through a 
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mediated process in which the university ‘finds’ them, then introduces them into the 
university governance system, where they are themselves able to influence, and 
ultimately improve, commercialisation activity. 
One possible explanation for this could be in terms of the external environment for 
innovation and entrepreneurship, which as we have already seen in the North East, is an 
extremely harsh environment, and the commercialisation community has the capacity to 
provide an extremely valuable service to a select group of firms.  Some of the evidence 
suggests that the reason for drawing hard boundaries between those who are trusted to get 
involved with spin-outs, and those who are not, is because of risks to the university of 
undermining the progress already made.  Building the community has certainly not been 
an easy process; it has involved a range of overlapping and mutually reinforcing events 
very a long term period, arguably two decades, to the point where there has been a clear 
systemic change in the university. These have included changes in senior management, 
the creation of new roles over a ten year period (Regional Development Office, then the 
HERO team), bidding for funding from external sources (HERO, HEFCE restructuring).  
The activity that they have produced does not necessarily easily sit within the university 
as a centre of teaching and research, as has been demonstrated by the prior abandonment 
of the Newcastle Technical Centre and NUVentures Ltd.  However, the situation is 
somewhat more straightforward than in Twente, where the university professoriat has 
extraordinary powers to frustrate initiatives of the senior management. 
However, the same risks exist within Newcastle as were evident within Twente (cf. 
Chapter 7, Working Paper 2), albeit at a lower level.  The changes have had to be pursued 
sometimes in the case of extensive opposition from the academic community.  
Embedding that activity within the mainstream of the university has involved building a 
successful community which is clearly central to the university’s mission, to the point 
that no one can argue that spin-offs or licensing deals are working counter to the 
supposedly core missions of teaching and research.  It therefore seems intuitive that part 
of the reason for the separation around the boundary of the external family could be to 
prevent elements of the very delicate eco-system being removed from the university. This 
would potentially precipitate a collapse of the community, and with it the university’s 
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capacity to spin-out companies, as well as the university’s ability to offer a high value, 
but very narrowly defined, territorial innovation and entrepreneurship asset. 
The extent to which this regional ‘crown jewel’ can be regarded as a territorial innovation 
asset is problematic.  Clearly, having a university with a capacity to spin-out a handful of 
companies each year is not intrinsically transformatory for the regional economy.  
However, this capacity is useful, and its’ sequestration and separation within a tightly 
bounded university family has territorial value, if those spin-off firms themselves have 
wider territorial impacts, and improve the position of the North East within a broader 
political economy in the way that external actors regard the region.  We have already 
seen that a number of territorial assets did solidify within the community, and then 
largely move out of them to become part of more general territorial service bundles 
offered by the university, INEX and BEP sitting alongside Knowledge House and the 
Stephenson Centre (cf. Klofsten et al., 2000).  These are distinct from the spin-off 
services and community in having quite a low threshold for engagement with by outside 
partners.  It is thus in the emergence of these generic service bundles that the most 
‘territorialised’ innovation assets are created, whereas by contrast, the services that are 
drawn upon within the community are indeed what one BDM repeatedly called “Rolls 
Royce deals”, significant for the university in cash terms but not necessarily in terms of 
regional development. 
In the broader densification conceptual framework we set out above, we highlight a 
number of further mechanisms in which these spin-offs can have such impacts.  The 
spin-offs and associated activities within the university may contribute to building 
particular niche sets of critical mass in the region, making Newcastle and the North East 
the ‘place to do something’, if not as impressive as being ‘the place to be’ like 
Cambridge, it at least resembles an improvement.  The spin-offs may also build their own 
territorial networks, so that other regional companies benefit from the effort expended by 
the university in its exclusive spin-off system, albeit at one remove.  The general issues 
associated with these two specific examples complete the analysis of the contribution that 
the spin-offs can potentially make to the system, and comprise the following two chapters 
of this report. 
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8 University spin-outs as active technology transfer 
A third way in which the literature outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that USOs improve 
their local innovation environment is through the direct provision of innovation resources 
to other innovative SMEs.  There have already in the previous two chapters been a 
number of examples of this kind of mechanism working in practise.  We have already 
seen one example of a spin-off working with a corporate spin-off collaboratively on an 
R&D joint venture facilitated with a SMART award. A second example has been a 
university spin-off working with an already innovative fine chemicals company as part of 
their strategic response to the challenges of nanotechnology.  In chapter 2, we suggested 
that the basic concept for this process was that the USOs would take ‘ideas’ out from the 
university, apply their ‘entrepreneurship’ to them, therefore making them available to 
local businesses, and thereby help to improve those firms productivity through the 
innovation process. 
The argument is that the USOs in the model could do this more effectively than 
universities because as companies they had to be closely aligned and responsive to their 
customers’ needs.  A heuristic for this process is given in the example where some of the 
consultancy companies were working to help local companies keep ahead of the 
challenges of competitive global markets, such as the threats (and of course 
opportunities) of nanotechnology for the chemicals industry. However, we have already 
seen in the two previous chapters that the naïve mechanisms we envisaged in chapter 2 do 
not work smoothly or straightforwardly.  In this chapter, we therefore begin to unpick 
some of the complexity surrounding the contribution made by Newcastle University 
USOs to technology transfer – and hence to the innovation and competitiveness capacity 
of firms - in the North East of England. 
8.1 Introduction  
In a sense, that the naïve model does not function straightforwardly is unsurprising, 
because spin-offs are frequently small companies themselves.  As we have noted, they 
have their own problems and limitations as new start-up firms, compounded by their 
reliance on resources at least partly held in the university.  As one observer noted  
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“I think one of the problems we get with the university businesses is because the 
people running them don’t have the business experience, and often are not good at 
articulating what they are doing in commercial terms, they end up, the whole 
thing ends up being very half hearted.” 
In reality, the third-party companies in the study that were best able to work with USOs 
were the ones that could compensate for the fact that the USOs did not always have a 
directly commercial idea, often by themselves being established firms with their own 
technology transfer activities and technology absorption capacity.  It is perhaps then 
unsurprising that the there is an exchange – rather than transfer – of knowledge between 
the USO and third party firm; at best the exchange is more or less equal, like Muller & 
Zenker’s notion of co-evolved knowledge.  Some USOs in the region had been able to 
establish themselves as independent companies who could co-operate with other 
companies in R&D activities.  However, at worst, the third-party firm may have to 
expend significant effort to transfer knowledge into the firm and/ or university in order to 
get a particular problem solved or absorb the knowledge held in the USO. 
In the specific case of Newcastle University, the issue is further occluded by importance 
of the dual role played by the academic professors, who were both articulating the 
problems faced by the USOs (as Research Director, for example) and then solving them 
within the university research team.  This does not always have to be the case, as is seen 
in the University of Twente, where there are far fewer entrepreneurial professors (cf. 
Working Paper 2, chapter 6).  In the case of Newcastle University, when a third-party 
firm deals with a professor, it is difficult to be certain which role the professor is 
enacting; although there may be flows of resources, we have already seen that in some 
cases there is a cross-subsidy between the formal company and research group elements 
which the professor jointly undertakes.  With some consultancy work, for example, it was 
clear that one purpose of operating through a USO arrangement was to avoid heavy 
university overheads whilst still accessing the professional expertise of the professor 
(rather than the consultancy expertise of a professional manager).  All these issues serve 
to cloud the mechanisms by which USOs from Newcastle University translate their 
knowledge - as actors independent from universities - into the North Eastern economy. 
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In this chapter, we attempt to address this by looking at the different roles that spin-offs 
can play in working directly with SMEs to promote regional innovation. We then 
consider whether there is evidence that the various activities associated with this are 
becoming generalised into a territorial learning competency. We envisage a variety of 
mechanisms through which this could potentially happen; USOs can work directly with 
other innovating firms to help them solve the problems they face in their innovation 
processes.  USOs might also be involved collaboratively in co-evolutionary innovation 
activities, and they might also represent demanding customers for other regional firms, 
thereby representing a vertex of the Porterian ‘diamond’ (qv). 
USOs can also work indirectly, and strategically, to help create the kinds of general 
collaborative activities which benefit other similar firms in the region, including both 
formal institutions such as cluster groupings or speciality groups, or informally, 
networking meetings and activities.  They can also work to ‘seed’ new regional activities, 
creating sequences of innovation outside the university, but also increasingly outside the 
scope of their organisational boundary, which can in turn reinforce the overall regional 
innovation system.  Finally, they can have a wider, cultural effect on what could be 
termed (after Lundvall, 1998), the regional ‘style’ of innovation, helping to make the 
region a place where particular high technology activities are done, and thereby 
increasing its attractiveness to outside investors  who further reinforce the status of the 
territory. 
USOs may not always play a lead role in the issues that are dealt with these analyses.  
The story of the rise of Silicon Valley, for example, is often told with reference to the role 
played by Fairchild Semi-conductors, which was a spin-off of Shockley Laboratories, 
itself a daughter of the AT&T telecoms firm, rather than Hewlett Packard, which was a 
spin-off of Stanford University.  Certainly, Fairchild Semi did ultimately produce a large 
number of spin-off companies, which contributed to the development of the high 
technology complex in the Santa Clara Valley.  The university subsequently adjusted 
itself to the emergent technology base, to increase the role they played in the regional 
environment.  The literature is ultimately clear; even if this point frequently remains 
unemphasised – that USOs do not have to lead the activities, they can still play a role in 
shaping them (cf. Kenney & Burg, 2000).  In this chapter, we look at each of these areas 
122 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
in turn, and then turn to consider whether they can, in toto, be considered as an 
improvement in the regional innovation system. 
8.2 Formal technology transfer between spin-offs and other local firms 
In chapter 6, we indicated that USOs were involved in a range of relationships with local 
companies which in turn often created, or supported, links between the firm and the 
university.  Alongside these indirect and intermediated linkages, there were a range of 
direct relationships between the USOs and other firms, which were not directly dependent 
on the university as the source of the advantage, and these in turn became other sources 
of advantage in the regional economy.  However, the clarity of this point is blurred by the 
fact that as we have seen, in 11 of the 14 cases under examination, the entrepreneurial 
academic had a dual role. This made it hard to distinguish whether the third party firm 
relationship was really with the university or the USO.  However, there were other 
important types of relationship between USOs and other third party companies which 
potentially were affecting the overall innovative capacity of the North East. 
8.2.1 Direct technology transfer from USOs into local companies 
In terms of the formal technology transfer between USO and other companies, there were 
relatively few direct examples of where this had been done successfully, without drawing 
directly on the skills sets of the entrepreneurial professors.  As we showed in chapter 6, 
the academic professors  were an important source of the knowledge held within the 
regional knowledge pool.  Most of the direct technology transfer was being done by the 
USOs who were directly involved in consultancy work (3 of the 14) and employed 
professional managers who were involved in the delivery of consultancy.  They had their 
own technologies or expertises, and they embodied it into the solutions they sold on to 
others, who could then in turn use it to improve the quality of their product.  More 
generally, there were a limited set of substantial examples of technology transfer between 
USOs and regional companies. 
In one case, a scientific analysis company provided data analysis to a software firm who 
needed concise and well-written analyses to provide a database within the software 
package they sold.  The third party firm in this case was a software firm who sold a 
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product which helped large pharmaceutical firms to co-ordinate the performance of 
identical laboratory experiments on different sites.  This was something which was vital 
for ensuring the comparability of data in large clinical drugs trials, and hence potentially 
had a potentially multi-billion dollar market.  The software programme provided ongoing 
prompts for the researchers to take particular actions as the experiments progressed: the 
role of the data provided by the USO was to explain what the interim results meant, and 
to shape further cues for the researcher, to ensure the experiment was performed to the 
highest level, before the software package centrally collated the results. The high quality 
of the material provided by the USO increased the overall quality and the success of the 
product, dependent on its’ capacity to standardise activity as its key competitive edge.  
On the basis of this successful first collaboration, they were in discussion with the USO 
to take out a more general license for the database system which would allow their 
product to be functional in a wider range of markets. 
Likewise, there were regional fine chemicals companies who had undertaken process 
development work drawing on USOs, and used this to improve their productivity levels, 
embodying the consultants’ expertise in higher overall output levels.  However, only five 
of the firms were working this way, selling their expertise to other local companies in a 
way that made sense to be described as ‘technology transfer’.  The apparent advantage to 
the clients in working with USOs rather than trying to license the technology directly 
from the university themselves was that the USOs were much more flexible than the 
university.  For the clients, who tended to themselves be relatively small firms, they could 
demand and enforce milestones and deliverables from the USOs.  They could do this in 
ways not possible within the university environment where client firms were often 
relatively small with respect to the university, and much commercial work was done by 
staff also funded by long-term research and teaching contracts. 
The result was that the USOs could then potentially became dependent on those clients in 
the way that a research group, underpinned by core teaching and research funds, would 
never.  This had the inadvertent effect that the USOs themselves then had to deal with the 
problems that emerged in dealing with the university departments, persuading occasional 
commercial resources (RAs and professors) to do this work, when failure so to do would 
primarily punish the USO (cf. 8.2.2).  Certainly, it is not true to say that Newcastle 
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University spin-offs were an unproblematic pathway into universities for firms who 
lacked a capacity to engage with the business development structure. 
A final example was the case of Mindware, who were involved with an international 
standards body, developing a key standard for electronic commerce.  As a spin-off of this 
they had been able to help other (local) companies deal with the standards as well as 
selling a piece of software which embodies those standards.  Their development of 
standards was interlinked with their connections back to the existing research base in the 
university. It is not clear how important these links were to firms directly; there is a risk 
of assuming that there were connections between both relationship sets, in particular in 
assuming that the third party firms wanted to work with Mindware to be able to more 
easily access technologies held in the university. There is some evidence that Mindware 
had built up its own knowledges independently from the university which were also 
valued by third party firms. 
These examples suggest that there is relatively little technology transfer directly from 
universities to firms in the manner of ‘forcing’ their technologies into existing firms to 
help raise the quality of the technological base in the region.  However, as we have 
argued, the fact that spin-offs are not transferring university technology is not a problem 
if they have built up unique knowledges which can be combined with knowledge in other 
regional companies to solve their innovation problems.  There is clearly a problem that 
USOs are themselves small firms, and this makes it more difficult for them to directly 
transfer technology into other companies.  To make a tangible direct difference, they 
would have to grow into large companies, but this has not really happened for the 
companies in the research. 
8.2.2 Collaborative interaction involving university spin-offs 
A second area where the USOs contributed to the firms in a positive way was in 
collaborative interaction and problem-solving.  This was, in reality, much more common 
than the formal technology-push transfer relationships dealt with in 8.2.1.  As with the 
case of university/ firm interactions, this often involved the transfer of significant 
amounts of firms’ expertise into the USO, often in ways that were not directly rewarded.  
One interesting example of the complexities involved in this collaborative process was 
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that there was a USO which formed as a consequence of the university paying a third 
party firm to develop a software tool for it.  The university then realised that there was 
value in the software tool, and the USO was subsequently set up as a joint venture 
between the firm and the university.  This neatly exemplifies the USO as a knowledge 
pool item, in the co-innovation process depicted on page 16.  The third party had shares 
in the USO firm, and was using it as a vehicle to sell on its’ IP (the software) alongside 
the university selling on its IP (the content). 
Other firms engaged university expertise by bringing professors into new spin-off 
companies; one construction company set up a company jointly with a professor to sell 
on the professor’s expertise in a targeted way.  This modus operandi was more successful 
than the professor’s previous foray into academic entrepreneurship.  The professor’s 
previous spin-off had been unsuccessful, because it had been set up and organised to try 
to direct prime consultancy to the professor, and deliver the rest using a full-time 
manager within the firm.  The manager’s role was to operate a base-load of consultancy 
work and pass on lucrative elements back to the university and professors.  This raised 
the dual risk that not enough work for the professional consultant would lead to losses 
that the professor had to cover, or the professor would have to do lots of extra work if too 
much work was taken on to ensure the consultant’s costs were covered.  As one such 
professional manager noted:- 
“I did have one difficulty last year, one contract they gave me, and it threw up 
these problems .  When you are building a business by subcontracting, the biggest 
hole is when you have nobody to do the work. And in one bad deal we did, 
unfortunately, when we decided to do a piece of work, we estimated how long it 
would take and we recruited a post doc, who had just finished his Ph.D. and was 
writing up and so wanted some income.  Unfortunately he didn’t finish the work, 
because the work proved more difficult than it looked and then we couldn’t 
replace him because there was nobody else available.  Contract work is a good 
story when it works, but it can also have its downsides, and the downside of this 
one wasn’t helped because we charged for something and then we didn’t get the 
result we hoped.  But I guess the embarrassment was then not being able to find 
anyone else.” 
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Certainly, dual funded staff (lecturers and post-graduates) were much less freely available 
to respond to the changing requirements of particular consultancy contracts, but this 
appears to be more a function of staff largely being dependent on delivering long term 
teaching and research outcomes than the existence of USOs as organisational forms.  
However, it is not clear that this would apply to research groups on fully reliant on 
delivering research contracts, unless they were dominated by large contracts that made 
them regard links with small firms as insubstantial. Activities like the RCID and EDC 
(qvs) which had remained within the university were providing the kinds of advice 
mechanisms to high technology start-up firms that consultancy spin-offs were also 
providing.  In the case of the three consultancy-type companies that span themselves out, 
it was clear that they did not spin themselves out to improve their value to clients; it was 
instead a reaction to the changing environments within university faculties.  
Consequently, care must be taken in ascribing the success of the technology transfer 
activity to the particular organisational form, the “USO”. 
There were also examples where USOs and firms had connections in ways that were not 
directly linked to the innovation process, but which seemed to be reinforcing their 
competitive strength and innovative capacity by building critical mass in the area.  One 
clear example is that there were a number of chemical, biologicals and biotechnology 
firms in the North East, including spin-offs, who interacted with each other.  There was 
evidence in some cases that the USOs were involved in bringing new technologies and 
ideas into those firms, accompanied by a parallel movement of knowledge back into the 
spin-offs.  The issue of whether this set of activities constituted a ‘critical mass’ will be 
looked at in some more detail in section 8.4.  A second example, not directly provided by 
the study, but raised in Benneworth & Hodgson (2004) is in the renewable energy sector, 
where universities had been involved in the formation of a number of the key regional 
companies, including Soil Machine Dynamics and The Engineering Business Ltd (which 
was a spin-off of SMD).  As established large engineering firms, they had been involved 
with a number of local second-tier suppliers, and had worked to bring them into the field 
of offshore renewable energy, which in the North Sea context, requires remarkably 
rugged construction (cf. Chapman et al., 2004).  A final example is that one of the firms 
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had engaged a local firm as a distributor for its’ products and technologies, so that 
company benefited from additional products and services. 
There was also the involvement of USOs around networks of contacts, particularly those 
involving staff from the former British Gas Engineering Research Station and On-Line 
Inspection Services (now closed cf. Benneworth, 2003).  This is perhaps unsurprising, 
given that the Research Station had employed at one point two hundred R&D engineers 
working in the broad field of gas pipelines.  One of the BDMs at Newcastle University 
had himself worked at OLIS in the late 1980s, and had a series of acquaintances with 
other people also from British Gas who were involved in USOs and third party firms.  
One of the third party firms working with one of the USOs was a spin-off from British 
Gas.  That firm had also built strong linkages with another regional research-intensive 
firm, whose research director had subsequently gone to work for a second USO as a lead 
consultant. One of his initial base load retainers came from a former OLIS employee who 
had moved to a large engineering consultancy.  The consultant also used the British Gas 
spin-off as one of four case studies in his Executive MBA.  The problem that this vignette 
raises was that the USOs seemed mainly to be exploiting existing contacts, rather than 
developing and renewing the particular network.  The Gas network, for example, was 
under threat from the fact that many of the ERS/ OLIS staff were approaching retirement, 
and the USOs and indeed the gas spin-offs themselves were not creating new 
entrepreneurial engineers who could deepen and sustain the network. 
8.2.3 Technology transfer between USOs and regional innovators 
Arguably the most significant issues to emerge in 8.2 were firstly the fact that the USOs 
were not always the active party in the advantage they provided to the firm, and secondly 
that there was very little evidence of them forcing new technologies to upgrade existing 
businesses.  A number of the spin-offs reported that they were working with companies 
who liked the idea of the cachet of working with a ‘university company’, which implies 
that the third party firms were using that USO characteristic to improve their own market 
position independently of the technology transfer process.  Despite the fact that the 
university does not allow its spin-offs to brand themselves with university trademarks, the 
spin-offs did become a route to access particular university-based resources, in this case, 
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prestige for people who would not necessarily have a direct link into the university.  
Because the university was primarily interested in large collaborative research projects 
with blue-chip partners, this made it harder for smaller companies, the archetypal 
“Scrotum Manufacturing” (qv) averred to by a senior university manager in chapter 5, to 
work with the university outside the formal structure of outreach activities like EDC or 
RCID.  Consequently, working with USOs provided a basis upon which these companies 
could access university technologies, given that the university regarded them as too small 
and unsophisticated to have a ‘proper’ university relationship, namely a licensing deal. 
The companies that were in this class were very small, sole traders or real 
micro-businesses employing a handful of FTEs.  As we have already argued in this 
section, there was a great deal of technology transfer from the client companies into the 
USO, and so although we have described the firms as ‘unsophisticated’, this relates only 
to the very poor treatment they experienced at the hands of university governance 
structures very poorly oriented towards their needs.  They often had unique or specialised 
domain knowledges which were vital to the development of new ideas, and which could 
also in turn stimulate new research, as in the case of the spin-off which emerged from a 
commercial relationship with a firm.  One such collaboration led to a publication in a 
journal in the client’s disciplinary field (business studies) which was entirely different to 
the background (life sciences) of the academic collaborator. 
Given that there were 14 spin-off companies interviewed, there were relatively few third-
party links that the spin-offs themselves believed were significant to them in terms of 
their own innovation processes.  This seems to suggest overall that spin-offs in the North 
East are not playing a strong direct role in getting new technologies into regional 
businesses.  They are providing some consultancy services for firms that are already 
sufficiently technologically sophisticated to articulate a set of demands.  The 
relationships exist because of the present of the firm, but it does not seem to be directly 
upgrading the technological basis of the region.   
In particular, it is not clear how this technology transfer process would operate in the 
absence of the spin-offs as organisational forms, were the staff to have remained active as 
a consultancy unit within the department.  This raises the question, to what extent the 
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particular organisational form ‘spin-off’ is responsible for the technology transfer? The 
commercial opportunities provided by the companies seem to provide the entrepreneurial 
professors with opportunities to learn about how to work with companies, and working 
with companies seems to stimulate new research areas for the professors (cf. 6.2.2)  They 
are an opportunity for smaller firms – too small to effectively attract the university’s 
attention – to work with the university, but this does not demonstrate that spin-offs are a 
better way of organising this interaction than outreach activities such as EDC or RCID. 
The spin-offs have a role, but it does not appear to be the direct and totalising change 
envisaged by theory, nor is that role unique and unchallenged within the university 
environment.  In terms of getting technology into companies, USOs and consultancy 
departments in the university appear more or less interchangeable.  Of course you could 
make a neo-Thatcherite argument that a truly Schumpeterian entrepreneur would benefit 
from being outside the university, that the university prevents the realisation of certain 
beneficial outcomes that USOs could provide.  In the next two sections, we therefore turn 
to look at these indirect, transformatory/ Schumpeterian impacts of USOs, before finally 
asking whether all this activity adds up to building niche strengths in innovation in 
domain-specific areas in the North East of England. 
8.3 Creating collaborative institutions and activities in the North East 
A second area where USOs potentially have the capacity to improve the innovation 
environment for other companies is in shaping the regional institutional environment in 
ways that create more assets, not only for themselves but for other companies.  In her 
famous Ph.D. thesis, “Sleeping with the enemy”, writing about the Twente Innovative 
Medical Products (TIMP) network (or cluster group), Rosalind Klein-Woolthuis (1999) 
noted that university spin-offs were central to the cluster group, and the contacts built 
during their shared time at university was central to the trust ‘asset’ on which the group 
was founded.  In a later and possibly more reflective analysis (2004), she argued that 
although Twente had many of these clusters organisation groups, they tended to remain 
semi-detached from the region, and did not hang together to improve the overall regional 
innovation system.  There is some evidence in the North East that USOs are involved 
with such collaborative institutions and activities; likewise, there is less convincing 
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evidence that they are ‘hanging well together’ in ways that is creating more generalised 
territorial advantages beyond the micro-scale networks. 
8.3.1 Direct involvement in establishing new entrepreneurial networks. 
One area where USOs can feature in explanations of assets building in support of 
innovation is as key actors in the kinds of networks that contribute to a place’s 
institutional thickness or richness.  There are a variety of roles that USOs can play: 
arranging these by the significance for regional networks, these roles vary from initiating 
those networks, through supporting and contributing to them, to finally them merely 
drawing somewhat parasitically on the networks inasmuch as they offer assets of interest 
to the USOs. The first point to make is that none of the USOs had been involved in 
initiating particular regional network activities; this contrasts with the comparator 
research in Twente, where  there were many examples of USOs getting involved in 
initiating collective activities to jointly address common problems with the innovation 
environment (cf. Working Paper 2, p. 8.3.1, p. 176).  One example, from Twente, that 
illustrates the comparative weakness of the situation in the North East was that a group of 
local companies in Twente had been facing the retirement of a professor with whom they 
had all collaborated in their own R&D, having variously funded research programmes 
and studentships, and recruiting masters’ students.  The University of Twente had 
simultaneously decided to use the retirement as an opportunity to cut costs by making 
that post redundant.  At the behest of one spin-off, the firms mobilised to assemble 
finances, and hired a new professor, within the framework of the “Stichting Mechatronica 
Valley, Twente” (The Twente Mechatronics Valley Foundation)29 (Working paper 2, p. 
182).   
The most obvious contribution that the USOs had made to networks which supported 
regional innovation and entrepreneurship assets was as part of the evolving and emerging 
venture capital market in the region.  Policy analyses have regularly revealed that weak 
venture capital markets in the North East of England contribute to the poor environment 
                                                 
29 <Stichting Mechatronica Valley Twente> <<http://www.mechatronicavalley.nl/>> <Accessed 14th 
March 2005> 
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for entrepreneurship in the region, and recently, the UK Ministries of Finance (HM 
Treasury) and Trade and Industry (DTI) have created regional venture capital funds to try 
to address this finance gap.  Spin-offs have been part of this process, primarily as users 
rather than as ‘shapers’, including using the new (publicly funded) regional seed capital 
fund.  In tandem with that, there has been an apparent improvement in the venture market 
in the region, in particular with the private local venture capital funds (such as Northern 
Enterprise Ltd) getting more involved in financing local high-technology investments. 
It is possible to make an argument that because after they emerged from the Equity 
Committee process, they were then sensible high technology investment opportunities, 
and so USOs had contributed to improving access to finance in the North East. This 
argument would then continue that that had in turn removed a general constraint to 
innovation faced by all high-technology start-up firms in the region, by encouraging the 
creation of a venture capital market.  How does the evidence sit with this narrative?  In 
total, eight of the 14 companies interviewed had brought in external finance, whilst six 
had not (including those three companies which had been formed within the university).  
There was a recognition in the North East that USOs had a problem in attracting venture 
finance, because research projects tended to stop some way short of producing the kinds 
of proven concept with protectable IP in which venture capitalists were willing to invest.  
As one interviewee noted,  
“Spin-out companies tend to have exciting technology, and tend to address new 
leads and new opportunities in the market place, and those are not best funded on 
a very small scale with a very small mindset.  You are almost better to walk away 
or do it properly, and that’s not what we do in the North East, we sort of do a half 
cocked job of everything, which sounds terribly rude.  All the people involved are 
trying to do the right thing, it’s just that the environment constrains them to not be 
able to.” 
Figure 7 below gives a diagrammatic representation of how the North East’s 
RDA-supported venture fund conceptualised the problems faced by USOs in exploiting 
their technologies for the benefit of the region.  Figure 7 was printed by Northstar (qv) 
which provides investment funds to both USO and other high-technology start up firms.  
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Although no firms in the study had accessed Northstar funds by the time of the primary 
research, by 2005, one third party firm had accessed those venture funds, and at least one 
firm was to later benefit from the proof of concept fund.  It could then be that in some 
way, spin-offs have had a conceptual ‘demonstration’ effect for regional policy-makers, 
to show that high technology firms can succeed in the North East.  In turn, their problems 
in attracting venture capital have spurred regional policy-makers to take action to develop 
the kinds of instruments which so far have been able to help one innovative third-party 
firm, as well as other firms with no direct link to USOs. 
Figure 8 The gaps faced by university companies in seeking finance to exploit research 
findings in the North East of England 
 
Source: NStar – continuum of finance: available online at <http:// 
www.nstarfinance.com/continum.htm> 
Three of the USOs had obtained investment from corporate venture capital firms, two 
from private businesses, and two from business angels.  One of the firms was particularly 
interesting, because it was a spin-off with three academic parents, which had located in 
Newcastle rather than near to either of the other parent institutions.  The other two 
parents, one from the south of England and the other from Spain, had helped it raise 
investment from the City of London and Spanish venture capitalists.  In this case, the 
university helped to bring investment funds into the region through the spin-out activity.  
There was some indirect evidence that past successes with spin-offs were conditioning 
investors to be more confident that the North East was a place in which high technology 
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firms could succeed and be sold on at a profit. However, to some extent, USOs were 
beneficiaries rather than initiators or causes of this situation. 
It is of course more contentious to argue that this is an improvement in the overall 
environment for finance, but figure 7 appears to be evidence that there is a recognition 
that policy makers had begun to recognise that there is a gap for all firms in the region, on 
the grounds that there were viable investment opportunities which were having 
difficulties in attracting funding.  In turn, this might make it one step towards changing 
all investors’ attitudes to investing in the North East of England, something which is 
important given the strong herd instinct of venture capitalists identified by other writers.  
It was observed that the process of investing in USOs through things like the USO 
seedcorn fund was creating unique knowledges which were more general knowledge 
assets for the region:- 
“There isn’t enough money in the North East, but in that case, wouldn’t it be 
better syndicating.  There must be venture capital organisations in London who 
are trying to find good opportunities to spend money who would benefit from the 
depth of knowledge and research that someone like the particular North Eastern 
funds have.” 
It would of course be interesting to see if those external investors who came in syndicated 
alongside the lead local investors were in turn having their attitudes towards investing in 
the North East changed, but answering such a question is outwith the scope of this 
particular research project.  Of course, the evidence above is not compelling that there 
has been a change in the venture capital market precipitated by USOs and activities, but 
there are some indications that USOs are part of a more general development of regional 
venture capital in ways that is beneficial to regional SMEs. 
8.3.2 Contributing to institutional thickness: USOs, academic entrepreneurs and the 
knowledge economy.  
We have already questioned whether USOs are vital to technology transfer, and wish to 
identify potential areas where spin-offs could use their entrepreneurial orientation to set 
up activities not possible within the confines of a university.  A second issue is that USO 
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founders were not getting involved in supporting and sustaining existing networks, 
something sometimes referred to in the UK as “public life”.  USO staff had not developed 
strong public lives in ways that had created and reinforcing these new knowledge 
networks.  In his 2001 memoirs, Herbert Loebl, a renowned North Eastern entrepreneur, 
noted that the activities he achieved through his public life were arguably more important 
than the company he had helped to found in improving the economic potential of the 
North East; he had worked on a group for ECOFIN, at the time the special advisory group 
to the European Council of Ministers, and had been involved with the development of the 
Structural Funds, from which considerable resources were later to flow to the North East. 
Looking at two other examples of entrepreneurs who have also engaged in similar public 
lives, it can be seen that one feature of them is that the managers there build up a set of 
public positions in tandem with the growth and success of their particular company30.  
Chris Thompson, managing director of Express Group, was on the Regional Innovation 
Steering Group 2002-3, he was a board member of the local Training and Enterprise 
Council, was involved with the establishment of the Manufacturing Challenge network 
group, and at the time of the research was on the board of the regional seed capital fund, 
Northstar (qv).  Mark I’Anson established Integrated Micro Products in the late 1980s, 
which was bought up by Sun in 1996.  Before the buy-out, he had already developed a 
series of public life engagements interests, in particular because of IMP’s status as a rare 
high technology business in the former Steel town of Consett.  He had become involved 
with the Derwentside Industrial Development Association, as well as the British Steel 
Corporation which provided finance to new business ventures in old steel areas.  On the 
basis of this, and his successful stewardship of a venture capital funded company through 
the NASDAQ to buyout, he became regarded as an ‘investor friendly’ non-executive 
director for local firms, including one spin-off company.  As their web-site observes :- 
                                                 
30 These two examples are taken from past experience to illustrate the general ‘public life’ issue in the 
North East, rather than being derived from interviews in this or any other CURDS project.  It was brought 
to our attention later on in the drafting process that both the individuals named are involved in research 
projects within IPP, but this information was deduced from readily available documents in the public 
domain and on the internet. 
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“After graduating from Cambridge University, Mark began his career in computing as a research 
fellow at the Open University. Leaving academia Mark and a colleague further developed these 
ideas and founded Integrated Micro Products. Over 15 years Mark grew this to a several hundred 
person business, floated it on the US NASDAQ stock exchange and was ultimately acquired by 
Sun Microsystems. Within Sun Mark was responsible for the Telco Platforms Group and provided 
leadership in Sun's telecoms and Internet strategy development. Since leaving Sun he has 
continued to develop his business career and is Chairman of Nexpress Group Ltd, a computer 
remarketing company and ESB Ltd, a developer of business applications for mobile devices. He is 
also a non-executive director of Non-Linear Dynamics, a leading developer of proteomics 
software. Mark is also involved in a number of business development organisations. He chairs the 
Derwentside Industrial Development Agency, a local business start- up and support agency, and is 
a director of The Alchemists (Northern) Ltd, which is a government backed body charged with 
maximizing the potential of the North-East's highest growth businesses.” 
The one academic entrepreneur who seemed to have made the leap from being an 
academic entrepreneur to a ‘spin-off guru’ was Professor Christopher Edwards, the 
Newcastle University Vice Chancellor, who had experience of working with venture 
capitalists.  Because he had successfully managed investments in his company, and had 
very successfully and managed to produce a return for his investors, this meant that he 
enjoyed a network of contacts in the world of finance upon which he could draw.  He was 
also a board member of ONE, the regional development agency for the North East of 
England, (in an ad hominem capacity, not representing the university) as well as the 
Regional Science and Industry Council.  It was not unusual for university senior 
managers to be involved in those kinds of regional activities, particularly in Newcastle 
University where regional engagement was, at the time of the research, managed by a 
very senior individual, the Deputy Vice Chancellor.  One senior manager not interviewed 
as part of the project, Professor Malcolm Young, Provost of the Science and Agriculture 
faculty, also had a spin-off company, Enrotis, and he became involved at the start of 2005 
with developing a science case with the City Council and RDA for the “Newcastle 
Science City” submission from the region to the Treasury (cf. Chapter 9). 
By comparison, the principals from those spin-outs which sold up (Mindware, 
Novocastra) had not built up such personal portfolios of other appointments on the basis 
of their experiences in charge of USOs, upon which to capitalise after the sale.  
Admittedly, the Mindware team became concerned with running the development 
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laboratory for its new owners then restarting the business, inevitably leaving them little 
time free to devote to part time public life activity.  The Novocastra principals reinvested 
their funds in areas of research of interest to them.  Almost none of the spin-offs had 
employees who were building up the kinds of curriculum vitae during their time running 
the spin-off which included participation in regional activities.  There was one example 
of such activity from one academic entrepreneur, who was invited by the UK Minister of 
Science, Lord Sainsbury, to sit on a stakeholder committee for the development of the 
European Framework Programmes.  However, this particular activity seemed to derive 
much more from his role as a senior academic than as someone involved in the 
commercialisation of university research. 
Three complementary explanations emerged in the course of the interviews for this low 
participation rate in the kinds of organisational, activities and networks which could have 
improved the regional innovation system.  The first, and most intuitive explanation for 
this, was that being an entrepreneurial academic meant that the individuals had no time to 
do anything but cope with their academic workload and business demands.  As one 
academic entrepreneur noted, the demands of the job meant that there was less time 
available for core academic tasks, much less for engaging in the development of new 
regional collaborative activities. 
“Running a spin-off is terribly time consuming, so it means that, although I don’t 
do much for the firm when I’m here in the university, I’ve always got plenty of 
other things to do. This means that I don’t do any of the academic kind of things 
which I was formerly doing at home.  I am spending all my time running this 
business.  Well, of course, I’ve got one hobby, singing, and I haven’t stopped that, 
but what has stopped is the academic work I previously have done at home”. 
Besides a lack of time, there was a second complementary explanation for the lack of 
reported participation in public life. We have already noted that one of the characteristics 
of USO activity around Newcastle University was the idea of the ‘academic professor’, 
one individual jointly managing a set of research activities which spanned the firm and 
research group.  For the two non-university entrepreneurs outlined above, public life 
provided a means to build external networks which allowed the individual to condition 
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their local environment in ways which was directly beneficial to themselves as part of 
creating broader regional assets.  Clearly, these local networks were less important for 
academic entrepreneurs than local entrepreneurs, because as professors managing 
research groups, they were dependent on building status and position in global and 
international peer networks through which to access continuing research funding for their 
peer reviewed research activities. 
They also provided a complementary set of activities in the case of pure entrepreneurs, 
providing a change from the routine of particular business roles.  In the case of the USOs, 
the mix of being a professor and entrepreneur together provided a balance of interests for 
individuals which entrepreneurs sought to achieve through involving themselves in the 
public life of other companies.  One individual was clearly very keen on both halves of 
being an ‘academic entrepreneurship’, the practical side of developing and using 
techniques along with the academic discipline of writing about those new techniques. 
That might perhaps explain why there was no necessity for individuals involved in USOs 
to actively seek the varied other challenges of public life. 
“I have always been a keen writer, and I’d published quite successfully out of my 
Ph.D., thesis, and even when I’d been working overseas, I’d published a couple of 
things on stuff I had done while I was working there.  I just loved writing, and I 
loved developing new techniques.  Overseas, necessity was the mother of 
invention, and I had been developing these fieldwork-based techniques, and so I 
thought, ‘bugger it, I’ll publish it, why not?’ So I was still publishing abroad, and 
I got in the habit with my Ph.D. and I never really stopped.  And that helped get 
me the job, I’m sure, but then I found the same skill that makes me a good writer 
of papers also makes me a good writer of proposals. It’s probably been my key 
skill, I’m not really an experimental scientist … I love it, it’s like playing Cluedo, 
but better, it’s like outdoor Cluedo, you know.” 
The third explanation was that the companies were themselves relatively insignificant, 
and they did not require individuals to solve ‘big problems’ – such as arranging external 
finance – which were in demand elsewhere such as managing a NASDAQ-quoted  
company.  It has already been noted that there was a perception that academics in the 
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North East did not try to ambitiously assemble finance packages to properly capitalise 
spin-out companies, so entrepreneurial professors were not building up reputations as 
effective commercial managers which might have led to invitations to involve themselves 
in other activities in the region.  Of course, this was not true for a number of the firms 
who had managed to raise venture finance, and it is possible that in the future, their 
experiences with venture capital might make them “venture capital investor-friendly” 
individuals who could mentor and support other local start-ups, as had the two cases of 
regional entrepreneurs already outlined. 
8.3.3 Concluding discussion 
The main mechanisms for regional improvement in this section appears to suggest that 
where there is an academic entrepreneur model of entrepreneurship for USOs in a region, 
then not all the assets that the academics build up around them pursuing their goals are 
either locally available or locally valued/ valuable.  This suggests in turn that the USO 
activity is less beneficial for the region than might be expected.  One issue is of course 
the sheer workload of the academic entrepreneurs, but there also seems to be a suggestion 
that personal characteristics of some of the entrepreneurs, in particular a lack of vision to 
properly capitalise their spin-offs, means that the USOs do not have a Schumpeterian 
capacity to transform their regional environments.  As was previously noted, one 
interviewee argued that “all the people involved are trying to do the right thing, it’s just 
that the environment constraints them to not be able to”. 
But that is perhaps a little unfair on the academic entrepreneurs.  There are clear 
examples of where university spin-offs have raised finance and transferred technology 
under particular sets of conditions, and at the same time, USOs have been built up as real 
fast-growing high technology firms, independent from the university.  The different types 
of company seem to correspond to some degree to the type of knowledge flows, with 
consultancy activities actively pushing technology into existing businesses, and the high 
technology start-up firms involved in building up venture capital and other 
entrepreneurial-type networks.  The former evidence seems to suggest that promoting 
USOs where there is an academic entrepreneur model in dominance, as there is in the 
case of Newcastle University, will not lead to the development of cluster activities and 
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organisations31.  It is possible to conceive of university spin-offs in the North East that 
would in the future build strong regional networks to support their own success, or whose 
managers would become ‘gurus’, but none of those companies or activities had been 
found so far in this particular study. 
8.4 USOs as initiators of new regional sequences of innovation 
A third contribution which USOs could make to their regional economies is if they 
become strong centres of regional growth, as in the aforementioned case of Fairchild in 
Silicon Valley.  It is possible for firms outside such core regions to also become such 
centres of growth, as we already found with the firm Joyce-Loebl in the North East; 
although it created over forty spin-off firms, three of its daughter companies were also 
strong centres of further growth moving forward into new technological fields 
(Benneworth, 2004c).  The university has a number of such high technology spin-outs, 
and it is conceivable that they might have likewise become strong growth nodes for the 
regional economy.  However, in chapter 6 we have seen that only two Newcastle 
University spin-offs have produced daughter companies, and only one of those was 
included in the research (the other being Soil Machine Dynamics and its daughter, The 
Engineering Business; cf. Benneworth & Hodgson, 2004). 
It is of course arguable that there has not been the time elapsed for new strong growth 
nodes which had the time to demonstrate their strength by producing significant numbers 
of spin-off companies. With Joyce-Loebl, the real spin-off activity was concentrated 
between 20 and 30 years after the firm itself was founded.  Likewise, Musson (2005) 
observed that the real stimulus for spin-outs from Ferranti in Manchester was when the 
company went bankrupt decades after its original founding. By contrast, the oldest 
spin-out company in the sample, Seabait, is only 19 years old.  However, there may be 
other elements of new growth nodes already evident, particularly in terms of how the 
spin-offs are interacting with the growth prospects of existing sectors, and the role of 
                                                 
31 Anecdotally, there was a start-up from Newcastle Business School which did not follow the academic 
entrepreneurship route, and that company is currently on the board of the Service Network, a group 
promoting collaborative interaction between knowledge intensive business services in the North East of 
England. 
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USOs in configuring institutional support for new sectors in ways that support economic 
growth. 
Because there is no clear proof that USOs have been initiators of new sequences of 
regional development in terms of creating daughter companies, in this section we focus 
on two smaller areas where there is some evidence that new economic growth nodes are 
being created, which involve university spin-off activity. One area where university spin 
offs could potentially have a significant impact on the region is in supporting processes of 
regional adaptation and renewal in existing strong industries under competitive pressure.  
Although regional economic development narratives regularly decontextualise the 
emergence of new sectors from the places in which they emerge, technological change as 
a driver of economic development brings about its consequences as much through 
changes to existing activities as through creating new sectors from nothing.  Economic 
decline is in part a consequence of a failure of regional firms to adapt to new market 
conditions and opportunities, an issue which emerges strongly in the history of the North 
East set out in Chapter 4.  Consequently, spin-off companies provide one mechanism to 
avoid renewal by facilitating the adaptation process. 
The problem underlying such an analysis is that adaptation is inevitably incomplete and 
ongoing, making it very difficult to evaluate the extent, significance and value of 
particular changes.  We therefore look at a diverse range of activities to try to gain 
different perspectives on the impacts of USOs on this adaptation process and finally 
attempt to bring them together in a coherent narrative about the role of USOs in 
facilitating technological adaptation in a particular sector.  In this section we look at two 
examples of how USOs have been involved, firstly with supporting the emergence of the 
biotechnology sector in the region, and secondly, with the formation of the INEX centre 
as a dedicated resource for promoting nanotechnology R&D exploitation in the region. 
8.4.1 The role of USOs in creating a new regional growth sequence in biotechnology 
In this section, we look at the role of spin-outs in facilitating the adaptation of the 
chemicals and pharmaceutical sector in the region.  The North East has long had a very 
strong chemicals sector, home at one time to the giant firm ICI (Greco, 2003), and 
supported by a pharmaceutical industry built on inwards investment.  This has come at a 
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time that traditional bulk chemicals and generic pharmaceutical manufacturing across 
advanced manufacturing economies is being squeezed by low cost Far East Asian 
manufacturing.  New product innovation in pharmaceuticals is dependent on securing the 
approval for new chemical entities (NCEs or drugs) by regulatory bodies, principally the 
American Food and Drugs Administration.  The purpose of the trial is to demonstrate that 
the drugs is safe, and produces the desired therapeutic effects without disproportionate 
side-effects.  Drugs companies are compensated for long term investment required to 
secure approval with a temporary monopoly – a patent – which permits only the 
manufacturer to sell the drug for a fixed time period.  The key competitive driver for 
pharmaceutical companies in advanced economies is in exploiting these monopolies, 
putting a premium on bringing products to market more quickly.  Biotechnology allows 
more and better drugs to be developed and trialled faster, thereby allowing a much longer 
period of super-profit taking in the patent-protected period.  These rich rewards for 
accelerating drug discovery and cutting time to market has also encouraged companies 
that have not traditionally had a strong orientation towards chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals to move into exploiting biotechnology and pharmaceutical markets.  The 
biotechnology ‘revolution’ has encouraged increasing numbers of these companies in the 
region to build competitive advantages around biotechnology broadly defined 
(Benneworth, 2004b); in the North East, regional software firms have emerged with 
expertises in bioinformatics. 
Biotechnology is an industry that has emerged in the UK as a consequence of long term 
public sector investment in agriculture and biotechnology, primarily in the South East 
(Blair, 1991; Wicksteed, 2000).  However, there has also been a lot of regional support 
for the development of a biotechnology sector in the North East, albeit from the regional 
development agency rather than from national scientific funding councils.  ONE 
identified as early as 1999 that there was something worthy of the name of a 
‘biotechnology cluster’ in the region; although attempts to form a regional biotechnology 
association had been unsuccessful in the early 1990s, by the late 1990s, an industry 
leadership group, named “Biosci North” had been launched to promote the sector in the 
region. In 2001, the American-based Chemical Speciality journal listed its top twenty 
global innovators in Speciality Chemicals, and three of the twenty had an R&D base 
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which relied heavily on assets in the North East of England (Thomas Swan, Avecia, 
Rhodia Chirex).  ONE’s and Biosci North’s interests subsequently converged in 2003 
with the creation of CELS, the North Eastern Centre of Excellence in the Life Sciences, 
as part of the “Strategy for Success”. 
The main criticism that has been levelled at regional development agencies is that in 
moving towards cluster-based concepts of economic success, they have all adopted 
similar high-technology clusters with little regional specificity (such as life sciences or 
nanotechnology).  Benneworth & Whitehurst (2002) identified that all English regions 
had identified some form of biotechnology cluster for their region in their (1999) 
Regional Economic Strategies.  This called into question the meaningfulness of particular 
supposed biotechnology clusters; to try to establish the significance of the biotechnology 
sector in the region, we firstly disaggregate it into a set of elements which seem to 
suggest that there has been a positive development of some kind in the region. 
The first element in establishing the viability of the sector in the region has been the 
development of a stable institutional framework to promote and leverage public sector 
investment in a way that makes the region a ‘place to do biotechnology’.  Within that, 
CELS, the public sector organisation attempting to promote biotechnology in the North 
East, were quite clear that USOs had only a peripheral role to play in building a strong 
biotechnology sector in the region.  CELS’ focus at the time of the research was in trying 
to attract a private pharmaceutical R&D investment or create a large regional institution 
that would give the region some kind of critical mass and global profile in a niche area of 
biotechnology.  As one of the then-employees of CELS noted:- 
“I think it’s fair to say that we have got a sense that if we want to achieve our 
goals and our mission and achieve the Strategy for Success goals and mission you 
are not going to do it by helping a score, a hundred, two hundred SMEs alone. 
You can help them and that’s part of it but I think to get to become a global player 
in a Biotech market we’ve got to scale up.  That’s why things like centres and 
institutes and initiatives come in to play.” 
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8.4.1.1 USOs and the BioNE2T network of excellence 
Newcastle University has historically long been interested in supporting biotechnology, 
especially R&D.  As one of the first recent moves within Newcastle University’s 
approach to regional engagement after the “Manchester software company” failure (qv) 
Newcastle University bid for, and won, DTI funding for a so-called Bioscience 
Exploitation Platform company, Bioscience Partnership Ltd.  This was formed in 1998, 
with the intention of jointly commercialising research from Newcastle University, the 
University of East Anglia and the Babraham Institute.  When Newcastle University were 
bidding for funding for their BDMs under the HERO-BAC programme, life sciences was 
identified as one of the university’s strengths, and a business development manager in the 
field of life sciences was duly appointed to lead that area.  The EPSRC funded a 2 year 
networking and collaboration project within the university, BIONET, which was 
subsequently adopted and extended by CELS under the title “BioNE2T”. One of the 
business development managers appointed in 2000/01 was involved in creating the 
BioNE2T organisation as a means of collectively mobilising biotechnology actors in the 
region.  The BioNE2T organisation was principally an academic networking organisation, 
consolidating regional strengths and attempting to make the North East ‘a place to be’ for 
particular speciality biotechnology research.  
An very practical example of the geographical re-imagining that this process has 
subsequently involved was in the title of a paper given by Dr Miodrag Stojkovic at a 
BioNE2T Stem Cells event.  Dr. Stojkovic was the first UK academic to be granted a 
license to undertake human stem cell cloning, and headed a research group which 
apparently had a great deal of commercial potential because of its unique and 
unreproducible skills in dealing with the practical problems of therapeutic cloning. The 
paper was entitled “Human embryonic stem cells: Made in Newcastle-upon-Tyne”, and 
was presented to the “Regional Progress in Stem Cell Biology” working group, 7th 
February 2005.  The significance of the paper title lies in the fact that it is in this case an 
academic performing the act of geographical imagining, making the case that the 
uniqueness of their knowledges made Newcastle a place where cloning was done, almost 
an obligatory “point of passage” for therapeutic cloning. 
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But what is the role of USOs in BioNE2T in this process of reimagining Newcastle as a 
Biotechnology City, if indeed any?  As related though the interviews BioNE2T was 
conceived of as an academic network, to do for the academics what Biosci North had 
been intended to do for the firms in the region.  None of the USOs interviewed mentioned 
BioNE2T as something with which they were involved, with the exception of Orla, but 
this was clearly because their CEO had been involved - in his previous employment at the 
university - in establishing the organisation.  However, there was some engagement 
between BioNE2T and the USOs.  BioNE2T and CELS had between them between them 
provided some funding for Ph.D. studentships in academic research groups, who could 
arrange both university funded stipends along with industrial support.  The requirement 
for two additional sources of funding meant that an ‘academic entrepreneur’ was an ideal 
provider of both those assets; through the academic entrepreneur there are connections 
back to the university to access departmental and faculty studentships, and through the 
company there is the opportunity to access industrial partnerships.  In the last round of 
awards before this report was drafted, there were a total of four studentships offered, of 
which two involved sponsorships from spin-offs from Newcastle University, and whose 
academic supervision was provided by members of the academic entrepreneur’s research 
group.  Of these two, one was sponsored by Novocastra and one by Xcellsyz, 
(Novocastra had also had one similar studentship in the previous funding round).  The 
studentships involved some degree of cofinance and network building between the 
university, firm and BioNE2T, as the funding rubric made clear. 
“The student will be expected to have a placement within the company for a 
period of between 6 and 18 months. It is anticipated that ownership of intellectual 
property rights will be negotiated between the University, Industry and CELS. 
The student will be required to produce a progress report, every six months for 
CELS and the industrial partner. BioNE2t can provide assistance in establishing 
industrial links.”32 
                                                 
32 <BioNE2T industrial studentships> < http://www.bionetatcels.com/grants_funding/bionetstudentship.php 
> <Accessed 16th March 2005>  
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The cofinance needed to be of the order of £4,500 from CELS, £4-6,00 from the 
industrial partner, and £11,000 from the university for each year of the project.  In return 
for this, there was intended to be considerable quite a lot of interaction between USO, 
student, university and CELS (hosts of BioNE2T).  Although the USOs were not leading 
the development of the network, they were involved in the life of the BioNE2T network, 
such as in this case, by contributing tens of thousands of pounds to training new 
research-active post-docs for which they would not expect to see the full benefit. 
8.4.1.2 USOs as symbols of a plausible North East bioscience industry. 
USOs were also enrolled in a symbolic way by a variety of actors who wanted to make 
the point that the region was a place to do particular versions of biotechnology.  The 
regional newspaper group published a special report on pharmaceutical and chemicals in 
the North East on Spring 2005, and they enrolled USOs to argue that the North East was 
an acknowledged centre of excellence in pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and they argued 
that “there are many world class speciality and fine chemical companies based around the 
North East ... the region is home to leading edge biotechnology companies such as 
Novocastra, Xcellsyz, Angel Biotechnology and Nonlinear Dynamics” (North East 
Vision, 2005, p. 37).  This discursive enrolling is made by a number of organisations who 
are each trying to legitimate the concept that the North East is a place to do 
biotechnology. 
One of the regional bodies for whom that legitimation was a significant concern was the 
Centre of Excellence for Life Sciences (CELS, qv), to establish its own legitimacy rather 
than merely being another regional “me-too” cluster organisation pace the Benneworth & 
Whitehurst critique.  In seeking to establish itself as a Centre of Excellence, CELS 
needed to establish that there was a rational technological and scientific basis for a strong 
regional biotechnology industry.  There is evidence that CELS enrolled the USOs into 
this process, despite the fact that they realised that USOs would not of themselves 
transform the regional industry. 
One way this was done was in assembling all the companies involved in biotechnology 
into a single list to suggest a ‘critical mass’ of regional activity. By early 2005, as this 
report was being prepared, of the fifty firms in the region identified by BioNE2T in their 
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regional company directory, 15 of them were university spin-outs, and around half of the 
USOs came from Newcastle University, the vast majority of the rest coming from 
Durham University.  This represents a considerable increase on the levels of activity 
reported on earlier analysis work done on the biotechnology cluster in the region.  The 
DTI Biotechnology cluster mapping working group (1999) identified 18 biotechnology 
firms in the North East, and the Angle Technology report, (2001) identified 25 firms, as 
active in biotechnology in the North East of England (cf. Benneworth, 2004b).  The full 
breakdown of companies and their origins, identified by BioNE2T,  is given in table 5 
below:- 
Table 5 Regional biotechnology firms listed by BioNE2T, by firm origin, March 2005 
Origin of firm Number Origin of firm Number 
University Spin-offs companies 15 Inwards investment 10 
Newcastle University USOs 8 Unknown origin 2 
Other university USOs 7 High technology start-ups 6 
Corporate spin-offs 12 Not in North East (inc 1 NU USO) 4 
Joyce Loebl spin-offs 4 Hospital spin-out 1 
Source: http://www.bionetatcels.com/ , authors’ own calculations 
USOs have been similarly enrolled into the political process of ‘making a place for 
biotechnology’ in the region, one such place being the International Centre for Life 
(ICfL).  ICfL was a controversial project developed by the Tyne and Wear Development 
Corporation to create a flagship high-technology biotechnology activity in the region 
around the fields of genetic engineering and gene sciences.  The idea emerged in the mid 
1990s, out of a criticism that Newcastle University was not doing enough to 
commercialise its research and to support biotechnology companies in the region.  The 
original Centre for Life concept envisaged bringing together the university’s research 
capacities around Human Genetics, along with regional companies, and a theme park 
focusing on the public understanding of the science (PUS) of human genetic.  The Centre 
was able to attract one high-profile regional biotechnology firm, Applied Imaging onto 
the precinct campus.  The idea was to use the PUS theme-park to underwrite the 
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incubator units.  Newcastle University bid for and won an £8m Joint Infrastructure Fund 
(JIF) bid to integrate a number of research teams into the multi-disciplinary Institute for 
Human Genetics with a fully equipped and state-of-the-art laboratory. 
Despite these early successes, the project was not unproblematic, not least because it was 
difficult to balance the implicit cross-subsidising within the project. In particular, there 
were problems in attracting other biotechnology firms, and throughout its existence it was 
criticised for providing expensive office space rather than meeting the needs of regional 
R&D and laboratory based firms.  Biosci North, for example, took office space there, as 
subsequently did CELS, and indeed the RDA.  In response to this criticism, senior 
managers at the ICfL did put effort into attracting USOs to fill their incubator unit; 
currently, at the time of writing, of their seven commercial tenants, four are Newcastle 
University spin-offs (although only two of those are in the life science field).  The 
significance of the Centre for Life is in part as a consequence of the ways it has shaped 
the attitudes of external parties to biosciences in the region, and this is dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 9. 
8.4.1.3 The emergence of high science content biotechnology innovation 
A third area is that there is evidence that the quality of the industry in the region is 
improving, in terms of the development of a high-technology sector with strong 
involvement in particular NCE pipelines.  In previous research (cf. Benneworth, 2004b) 
we had identified that there was already a strong biotechnology cluster around what we 
termed in that paper “Low Science Content Biotechnology Innovation” (LSCBI), drawing 
on expertise in associated domains outside the drug discovery pipeline, principally 
chemical engineering and computer software.  At the time that the research for that paper 
was undertaken, there was arguably only one High Science Content Biotechnology 
Innovation (HSCBI) firm in the North East, Sanofi Laboratories.  One distinction 
between LSCBI and HSCBI relates to its’ position in the pharmaceutical product 
pipeline, a ten-plus year process which takes ideas from basic science to approved new 
chemical entity.  HSCBI firms occupy positions within the pipeline, from basic 
biochemical research through to drug discovery, clinical trials performance all the way 
through to the approval of new drugs by drugs regulators.  By contrast, LSCBI firms 
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either support the pipeline (such as laboratory? factory engineering upscaling services) 
or take discrete pieces of biotechnology knowledge and bring them quickly to market 
(like paternity testing kits or innovative clinical and diagnostic supplies).  The regions 
which have had the highest profile and most visible biotechnology industries have tended 
to be dominated by HSCBI, such as Cambridge or Silicon Valley, and the North East has 
suffered from a perception that it is technologically backwards in comparison to such 
areas33. 
However, looking at the regional firms cited by BioNE2T and reproduced in table 5 
above, it does appear that there is beginning to be the emergence of the kinds of HSCBI  
that characterise successful high growth regions, and that USOs are a key part of this.  
Four of the eight Newcastle University spin-offs who were also listed within the 
BioNE2T organisation were involved in HSCBI, as direct contributors to the drugs 
pipeline.  There is only one other firm in the BioNE2T list in the North East who is 
actively involved in the drugs discovery pipeline, although a significant proportion of 
other firms are involved in innovation in pharmaceutical manufacturing.  There is also 
one Newcastle University spin-out, Arrow Therapeutics, which is not based in the region, 
but which is also involved in the pipeline, which helps again to make the case that 
Newcastle University is a place where medical scientists are producing ‘good 
biotechnology’. This science in turn makes good ventures from a funding perspective - 
meaning that in practise that those ventures feed directly into clinical drugs chains.  
Because the university has a medical school in which its departments are highly research 
rated and internationally renowned, it is not hard for the university to raise further finance 
for the commercialisation of particular ideas. 
8.4.1.4 Producing a regional dynamic: how this all hangs together 
The final element by which USOs contributed to the growth sequence, and the adaptation 
of chemicals and bulk pharmaceuticals into knowledge-intensive high value added 
                                                 
33 However, the successful sale of Novocastra, the purchase of Joyce-Loebl by Applied Imaging to access 
their imaging technologies, and the successful listing of Non-Linear Dynamics demonstrate that this LSCBI 
can be extremely lucrative and contribute extensively to building a strong regional technology base for the 
sector (cf. Benneworth, 2002). 
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products was through the direct interactions between USOs and other regional companies 
highlighted in 8.2.  In part through the work of CELS and BioNE2T in promoting 
networking, but also as a consequence of longer term relationships, there were some 
interactions between regional companies in ways that added to the total activity in the 
region.  There were regional supply chains around the pharmaceutical sector, so spin-offs 
were selling particular high value inputs to pharmaceutical and fine chemicals companies.  
In one case they were doing this as part of the development of a new product by a fine 
chemicals company, supporting their regional innovation process. 
There were also other interactions between them that helped to consolidate the sector; the 
board of Orla is an interesting example of how different activities can come together to 
produce tangible outcomes, which address the specific North Eastern problem of a sparse 
entrepreneurial environment.  All this information is drawn from the website of Orla, 
(http://www.orlaproteins.com/)  The scientific founder (the entrepreneurial professor) and 
the first manager were joined on the board of directors by three other people:- 
• one had been involved with Newcastle University through the previous 
Biosciences Exploitation Platform programme (qv),  
• one was a shareholder representative for the venture capitalist investors, who had 
been brought in as co-funders for a science council exploitation award, and  
• the third was an employee of a company which had been bought out by a large 
biotechnology firm who also bought out a regional biotechnology firm that span 
out of an existing North Eastern fine chemicals company. 
This assembly of a team of mutually-known contacts would not be unusual in a narrative 
of successful biotechnology activities in Cambridge or Maryland USA (cf. Benneworth, 
2004b).  The point is that board has been brought together in a less successful region, in 
which there is a sparse entrepreneurial environment, characterised by the absence of the 
kinds of people who are able to convince potential investors that they are a sound 
investment proposition.  This board drew together contacts from a range of activities in 
which the university and USOs were involved, including the BEP, the BBSRC business 
plan competition and BioNE2T.  These activities may be more or less responsible for the 
actual outcome – but that should not detract from the significant consequence that the 
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barrier of peripherality was overcome. A strong management team was assembled which 
managed to attract significant amounts of venture finance to allow for aggressive growth 
and building a market leading company (albeit in a specialised niche).  The key question 
here is to what extent is that actually an improvement in the innovation and 
entrepreneurship environment, that is to what extent are the benefits on which Orla (and 
other companies have drawn) more generally available. 
Having presented a diversity of activities, this raises the more general question of to what 
extent does these activities come together to represent an improvement in the regional 
situation, generalising the availability of entrepreneurship assets and creating a more 
dynamic and self-sustaining set of activities in biotechnology.  In figure 8 below, we have 
attempted to bring some of the elements together to suggest that there has clearly been an 
adaptation around biosciences at a micro-level, and that universities have been a part of 
this.  In figure 8 we show  the development of linkages between three elements in the 
biotechnology sector in the region.  When the last research was undertaken (c. 1999), 
these three elements, as with the whole regional sector, was highly fragmented.  Since 
then, a range of linkages, both traded and untraded, have built up; this is in part a 
consequence of public sector support which has involved universities and their spin-off 
companies. 
Starting from three companies, Thomas Swan, Novocastra and ACS Dobfar, the growth 
impulse has come into contact with further Newcastle University commercialisation 
activities, and has in turn gone on to produce a ‘blossom’ of activity.  It is impossible to 
clearly state what is a consequence of which activity, not least because one of the 
antecedent companies was itself a university spin-off.  What figure 8 also does rather 
neatly is to begin to link up what was emerging around the ‘commercialisation 
community of practise’ in 7.3.3 with the improvements to the regional innovation 
environment, albeit at a micro-scale.  The various activities which have emerged and 
solidified all correspond to elements within the university extended family.  The 
university commercialisation community identified in figure 8 corresponds with the 
extended university commercialisation family identified in figure 6, and therefore this 
helps to build a connection between the internal improvements made to the 
commercialisation practises of Newcastle University, and their corresponding 
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consequences for the regional economy and the adaptation of the pharmaceutical industry 
in the region. 
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Figure 9 The role of spin-offs in supporting a regional innovation sequence around biotechnology 
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8.4.2 Producing the infrastructure for an innovation sequence: the case of INEX 
Another area where the university has been involved in trying to develop critical mass 
around the university, and exploit it for regional benefit, is in the field of 
nanotechnology. We have already noted in 5.4 that one important facet of the 
university’s commercialisation activity at the time of the research was the Institute for 
Nanotechnology Exploitation.  The case of INEX is an interesting example of how an 
infrastructure can be built up to create a sequence of investments which support the 
emergence of a new industry.  Markusen (1999) is particularly critical that analyses of 
the emergence of high technology complexes around Boston and Silicon Valley fail to 
indicate the importance of public investment to the emergence of those sectors.  Thus, 
an institution which attracts significant government R&D investment to the region 
could potentially be supportive in the future of the emergence of nanotechnology 
companies as nanotechnology moves into the mainstream of the economic structure. 
The nanotechnology sector has emerged as a discipline with the convergence of the 
phenomenon with which the sciences of chemistry and physics could deal; as physics 
became interested in dealing with ever smaller objects, increasingly at the ‘nano’ 
scale, so super-molecular chemistry, as chemists developed new substances such as 
Buckminsterfullerene, also became interested in those objects with sizes of the order 
of 10-9m (one nanometer or nm).  Wide scale research was enabled with the invention 
of scanning tunnelling microscopes in 1981, which used a magnetic needle to scan the 
surface of materials producing analyses of the surface with a resolution in 
nanometers.  As with the impact of the electron microscopy on biotechnology 
(Rasmussen, 1999), the development of the STM as a research tool enabled a huge 
amount of research activity to take place which had previously been constrained by 
the lack of effective vision systems at the nano-scale.  Although Professor Richard 
Feynman is usually credited as founding father of the concept, the field really started 
to take off with the diffusion of scanning tunnelling microscopy in the 1980s; a cluster 
of significant milestones emerged in the late 1980s as the idea of nanotechnology 
became increasingly more feasible and as a practical and ultimately commercialisable 
field:- 
• Dr. Eric Drexler published his influential book, Engines of Creation (1986),  
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• IBM research engineer Don Eigler produced a photo of the company name 
written in Xenon atoms on a supercooled Nickel plate (a ‘letter size’ of 6 nm), 
(1989) 
• The journal Nanotechnology was launched (1991). 
Nanotechnology has the potential to act as a disruptive technology, to precipitate an 
economic paradigm shift, but there are also a range of nearer to market opportunities.  
Whilst much of the initial impulse for the discipline came out of a desire to allow 
continuing miniaturisation and increasing computing power in accordance with the 
so-called “Moore’s Law”, there are a huge range of other markets potentially affected 
by nanotechnology, in recognition of its power as a disruptive technology.  In 2003, 
for example, the largest investor in nanotechnology was the cosmetics company 
L’Oreal, ahead of the more intuitively high technology companies such as IBM, 
Eastman Kodak and BASF (Niosi & Reid, 2004).  However, much nanotechnology 
remains a long way from market and dependent on the pace at which complementary 
technologies are developing. 
The commercial sector therefore is therefore polarised into small companies 
attempting to exploit small pieces of near to market nanotechnology, alongside global 
corporations seeking to shape technology development to ensure that their core 
businesses – and profitability - are not undermined by disruptive paradigm shifts.  As 
part of this dependence of competitive nanotechnology on the public science base, 
governments are investing heavily in nanotechnology programmes to promote their 
own competitiveness.  In 2004, China invested $1bn (c.£600m) in nanotechnology, 
and the US-federally funded National Nanotechnology Institute invested $3.7m 
(£1.9bn) in the field out of total global nanotechnology R&D investment of $6m 
(£3.2bn) (Niosi & Reid, 2004).  The EU have made around £1bn available for 
nanotechnology R&D through their Framework programmes, and the DTI have made 
£90m available over 6 years to support commercialisation of nanotechnology (so-
called applied research). 
Newcastle University has made a serious and sustained attempt to involve themselves 
in the pursuit and valourisation of nanotechnology, culminating in the establishment 
of the Institute for Nanotechnology Exploitation (INEX), which as we have noted, 
provided a set of physical infrastructures to the university and for spin-off companies.  
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However, the creation of INEX was also a significant process; it was assembled from 
unusual funding sources, because it was a major capital investment, and involved 
integrating Research Council, DTI Innovation, European and Regional Development 
Agency funds.  The driver for the creation of the centre was the appointment of 
Professor Ken Snowdon in 1996 to a development chair in nanotechnology by 
Professor Andrew Hamnett, a Pro Vice Chancellor who, as a chemist who had built 
his own scanning tunnelling microscope for his research activities, was well aware of 
the potential for nanotechnology to have a profound impact across a range of 
disciplines.  The appointment was made in the Department of Physics, specifically 
with the brief to build a research community with linkages across cognate researchers 
in physics, chemistry and other departments with an interest in nano-scale research.  
On the basis of his early work, a funding bid was prepared for the Joint Infrastructure 
Fund in 1998, a central government fund developed to support large investment 
projects in universities. Although the bid was not successful, it demonstrated to senior 
managers in the university that there was a growing university expertise in 
nanotechnology, and this convinced the university to invest more funds in developing 
the activity, initially as a research activity. 
By 1999, One NorthEast, the RDA for the North East, had come into in existence, and 
one of their first investments was to provide funds for Newcastle University to 
develop a nanotechnology laboratory, in recognition of its’ potential importance to the 
regional economy as a disruptive technology.  This provided the first investment, 
which was then supplemented in early 2001 with funding under the University 
Innovation Centre fund.  This was provided from the DTI for universities and 
identified commercial partners to work to exploit particular research strengths; 
nanotechnology at Newcastle University partnered with BAE Systems to establish a 
UIC in nanotechnology.  These funds then provided resources to match European 
Structural Funds because of the clear relationship between nanotechnology and 
innovation promotion and cluster development.  The funds were spent on 
redeveloping one building, the Herschell Building, as a nanotechnology centre 
complete with laboratory and manufacturing capacity, office units and incubator 
space, thereby providing the infrastructure for a research centre in nanotechnology. 
This was initially completely managed by Professor Snowdon, although after the 
research work had been completed, the research centre, the scientific arm called, 
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Institute for Nanoscale Science and Technology (INSAT), was split off from INEX to 
be separately managed from the exploitation activities.  In August 2004, after the 
completion of this research, a further £3m of DTI funding was announced for INEX, 
from the government’s “micro and nanotechnology manufacturing initiative”.  It is 
important to emphasise at this point that the creation of INEX was not funded purely 
on the basis of scientific excellence, but on the grounds that good science in parallel 
with a sound commercialisation infrastructure would lead to improved economic 
outcomes of clear national benefit (the DTI interest being the national economic 
benefit). The UIC project and the nanotechnology manufacturing initiative were both 
clearly awarded to promote exploitation rather than basic research; ONE provided 
early funding because there was the potential for that research to have an economic 
impact.  By making the case that Newcastle University was “well positioned” to 
exploit its’ nanotechnology research base, funding was won for the development of 
this large nanotechnology research centre within the university fabric. 
The North East as a region only became firmly interested in nanotechnology as a 
region in the wake of the Arthur D. Little report in 2001, although there was some 
debate about the extent to which ADL was merely a means of giving independent 
imprimatur to a previously decided-upon set of fields.  The consultants’ report to the 
RDA recognised that the investment thus far in INEX made it a potential focus for 
economic growth, despite the fact that up to that point, there had been relatively few 
commercial outputs from the public investment.  There was a hiatus between the 
publication of the ADL report and the formal pre-launch activities for the “Strategy 
for Success”, which emerged early in 2003. By that point it had been decided that 
there would be five free standing “Centres of Excellence”, one of which would be in 
the field of nanotechnology.  The relationship with the existing University Innovation 
Centre within INEX (which also included some activities within Durham University) 
was by this point somewhat unclear; as figure 2 shows, the idea was that the 
nanotechnology centre would form a bridge between the research base and funding 
opportunities for emerging activities, immediately creating an overlap with the idea of 
EXploitation as articulated in the INEX mission. 
This led to problems when the nanotechnology centre of excellence was formed in 
2003.  The centre, called Cenamps, faced the dual problem of lacking either a 
physical infrastructure or financial resources to invest in university-based research.  
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Durham University had invested their UIC funds in a new nanotechnology building 
and clean rooms on the Science Park site, and consequently the two university 
activities dominated the available nanotechnology activities in the region. Given the 
clear overlap between what other centres of excellence were doing in terms of 
commercialisation, and what INEX was doing in nanotechnology exploitation, there 
were clearly potential for a lot of problems and wasted resources were Cenamps to 
duplicate what INEX had been established to do.  In particular, the risk of running 
two parallel institutions was that Cenamps would undermine any claims to excellence 
in commercialisation to be made by Newcastle University.  This was clearly very 
risky for INEX, because as we have seen, the potential for Newcastle University’s 
excellent valourisation infrastructure to produce economic rewards from 
nanotechnology formed a key driving force behind the support that INEX had already 
received.  However, these were resolved with Cenamps choosing to adopt a subtly 
different approach to its’ task to the other “Centres of Excellence” who themselves 
had more tangible assets to offer34. 
Having done that, the Institute (INEX) as a concrete phenomenon (was) then 
transformed into a ‘model’ for exploitation of academic research.  This transformation 
process through which INEX became ‘exemplified’ was driven in particular through 
the way that a Danish researcher, Jakob Vestegaard, compared INEX with a 
Copenhagen business park (Vestegaard, 2003), and later with Swedish and Finnish 
experiences. The model was elusive, but hinged on performing research in ways that 
promoted exploitation from the start, rather than after the research had completed.  
This view was also echoed by one member of the Business Development Directorate, 
although he had arrived at that view independently of the success of INEX. 
“If you take a market oriented approach, you will tend to focus on the end-
point of the research process and pick things up when they are produced.  
Whereas my view of the world is that you have to actually work with the 
research teams through a fairly long process of equipping them, umm, to think 
about their research with the blinkers off, at the point they are starting their 
                                                 
34 A project manager was appointed from the Advanced Materials Research Institute, the University of 
Northumbria node of the UIC project, and clear divisions of labour were established between the 
various elements, attempting to build them into a single commercialisation network for nanotechnology 
opportunities in the North East of England. 
158 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
research and at the point they are doing it.  And not thinking you do the 
research and then you pick up whatever comes out of the end as an exploitable 
product and see if you can shift it.” 
The Vestegaard explanation also resonated with the way that the Deputy Vice 
Chancellor explained the so-called ‘Newcastle model’ for commercialisation.  
Goddard is involved with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, a multi-national organisation representing the advanced economies, 
whose projects are autonomous from government, but which represents a key 
conceptual space within new managerial and governance practises are development.  
The concept of the Newcastle model, validated through INEX, has been used in recent 
discussions around the impact of higher education on regional development.  In a 
range of his presentations to academic and practitioner groups, such as in his 
presentation in 2004 to the European Regional Knowledge Based Innovation 
Network, the case of INEX was raised repeatedly, the point made that it had been 
validated by Vestegaard, and in turn used to support the idea of a Newcastle model. 
“The Newcastle Model (after Vestegaard) The vision is not to transfer certain 
research results with particular commercial potential from the university to the 
regional economy, rather it is to make the university itself an active player in 
the regional economy.  A fundamental difference between this and the 
traditional model is that the latter is tailored to help commercialise research, 
whereas the Newcastle model seeks to build an institution that is capable of 
producing commercialisable research.  The traditional model is tailored to help 
new entrepreneurs commercialise research-based technologies, while the 
Newcastle model seeks to make entrepreneurs of students and 
commercialisable technologies of research” (Goddard, 2004) 
The idea has been to use the infrastructure to support new entrepreneurs in the field of 
nanotechnology, recognising that new nanotechnology companies are likely to be 
high-science content organisations, some of whom will indeed have near-to-market 
applications.  The heuristic for how these companies were intended to form around 
INEX was as the consequence of a Ph.D. process which encompassed both scientific 
and commercial developments, also recognising the need for commercialisation to be 
an integral part of the research process.  The model for research process was therefore 
that there would be a piece of commercial research which would be managed by a 
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Ph.D. student and involve a number of master’s students.  All student progression 
would involve the development of theses which would solve the technical problems 
but also contribute to the development of a business to exploit the idea.  This was 
represented in one particular INEX brochure as a new model for doctoral research in 
which academic research was performed in a team, but a key part of the qualification 
also involved a business development activity which was intended to lead to new 
spin-outs.  At the time the research was undertaken, this model, shown in figure 9 
below had not been operating for long, so there were no spin-offs that had been 
formed, although there was one which one interviewee claimed might subsequently be 
forming. 
Figure 10 The INEX model of nanotechnology exploitation through high-level 
research 
 
Source: Snowdon, 2003.  Available online at 
<<http://www.inex.org.uk/page.asp?pageid=132>> 
Indeed, since the research was completed, one such company was successfully 
formed.  Molecular ID Systems was formed by a research team who had been led by a 
Newcastle post-doctoral researcher who had been recruited from Ireland, and 
developed two blood test devices, one to provide hospital bedside diagnosis of 
bacterial infections as well a second for the detection of rogue bacterial contaminants 
for security scanning systems.  The firm was formed out of a team who won a 
business planning competition held internally within Newcastle University.  The 
victorious team subsequently proceeded to the regional finals for university student 
business plans, where the team won an award for the best Science and Technology 
proposal.  The process was particularly interesting because one of the Masters 
students involved in the team was an American, Michael Sinkula, who had a 
background in investing in nanotechnology.  He co-authored in 2003 what was to 
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become a widely cited article on the commercialisation of nanotechnology in Nature 
Biotechnology, Paull et al. (2003).  He had come to Newcastle University to write his 
Master’s thesis on DNA analytic techniques.  After the Master’s research, Michael 
returned to the US to continue working in the venture capital industry having 
established the company in the North East of England.  The process also demonstrates 
the mutual overlap, enrolment and interaction between the various assets being 
created; several members of the team to establish Molecular ID Systems were also 
identified by BioNE2T as being active in the field. 
As with the case of biotechnology in the region, it is very difficult to establish from 
these anecdotes that something of significance has been created; each of the various 
elements outlined above suggests that progress has been made.  However, because 
there has not been a rash of spin-out companies from INEX, it is much harder to claim 
that INEX has made a tangible improvement to regional innovation networks.  What 
can be said is that with respect to the position a decade ago, the infrastructure for the 
exploitation of nanotechnology in the North East and Newcastle University is very 
much improved.  This infrastructure has been actively built by bidding a collaborative 
community of researchers performing excellent nanotechnology research, but 
emphasis has always been placed on the imminent economic value – and on occasion, 
the realisation – of that research.  One of the pathways to realise that potential value is 
through the formation of spin-out companies, and the commercialisable research in 
INSAT and INEX has led to the formation of at least one company, Molecular ID 
Systems, as well as a number of other spin-offs around Durham University related to 
the UIC. 
There does appear to be genuine external recognition that what is going on in 
Newcastle University is truly world-class in the research field of nanotechnology, 
even if there is not a great deal of commercial nanotechnology R&D in the region.  
There seem to be the foundations of a stronger innovation and commercialisation 
system coming together, and even better, with the development of so-called “bio-
nano”, the kinds of things that Molecular ID Systems are involved with, assets are 
building between a growing biotechnology sector, and the nascent nanotechnology 
activities.  There appears to be a mutual reinforcement between the two fields, mainly 
at a fairly basic level; biotechnology firms are located in the INEX incubator suite, 
and BioNE2T is helping nanotechnology as well as biotechnology academics and 
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firms with their networking activities.  Over the course of the research, 
nanotechnology around Newcastle University appears to have taken a set of steps 
forward, and spin-off firms have been an element of the forward steps. 
As with biotechnology, and with supporting technology transfer more generally, 
USOs have been beneficiaries rather than shapers of that success; INEX promised that 
it could commercialise and create spin-offs in 1998, and was believed by ONE in 
1999 and the DTI in 2001.  The spin-offs we interviewed had moved to INEX in 
2003, and the first true INEX spin-off, following Vestegaard’s ‘Newcastle model’ 
came in 2004.  Each of these suggests that there has been a step forward in densifying 
the system, each bringing the reality of the North East as a place to do 
nanotechnology a step closer.  Of course, the situation has not been fully stabilised 
with the North East unambiguously established as “the place to do nanotechnology”.  
It is important to recognise that real progress has been made in promoting 
commercialisation in nanotechnology, even if that has not led to the rash of 
nanotechnology companies that have been seen in other places.  By comparison, 
MESA+ at University of Twente, in the comparator study, had produced spin-offs 
which had themselves produced further spin-offs.  However, in reality, although 
MESA+ was only created in 1998, its antecedent institute (MESA) was created in 
1992.  Consequently, the comparator seems to suggest that INEX might now be on the 
cusp of producing new sequences of innovation, although that would require further 
evidence to substantiate that hypothesis. 
8.4.3 Concluding discussion 
One of the key features about the contribution of USOs to regional innovation 
activities in the North East is how comparatively reactive the USOs have been.  In all 
the cases shown, the USOs have mainly been recipients and beneficiaries of the 
advantages rather than creating new knowledge assets which have regional economic 
development benefits.  However, we have already argued that USOs and universities 
do not have to initiate activity themselves to be significant, rather what is important is 
the way they orient themselves towards new activities as well as supporting the 
renewal of more mature industrial sectors.  In both the areas, the pharmaceutical 
renewal sequence, and the creation of activity in nanotechnology, USOs have played a 
role in supporting the development of knowledge based activities, although not 
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necessarily in ways that would have been anticipated from the literature review.  The 
first implication is that in a peripheral region like the North East of England, the 
high-cost commercialisation activities within the university have become points of 
stability which attract the attention of investors in ways that attract the kinds of 
investment that produce a broader sequence of innovation.  The second implication, 
arising from this ‘attractiveness’ quality, is that USOs have a symbolic value in the 
UK science political-economy, as evidence of university competence at 
commercialisation, which can in turn act as the trigger for large scale scientific 
investments that can act to promote regional economic development. 
The first area where the broader network picture begins to emerge is in the importance 
of stability in the university commercialisation activity.  In 7.3.3, we observed that the 
university used the idea of a close family of relationships to create a set of links with 
trusted external partners that allowed certain difficult things to be achieved.  This was 
specifically in response to the fact that particular things could not easily or routinely 
be achieved in the North East, but instead required a great deal of effort, and 
incubation, within a sheltered environment.  In this section, in 8.4.1, we have seen the 
benefits of this sequestration in terms of providing a space of stability, and the 
important role of USOs of regulating access to the trusted university family space.  In 
this section we showed how particular regional development assets have built up 
drawing on stable assets in this space; this has compensated for the instability and 
sparseness of the surrounding entrepreneurial environment.  It is these regional 
development assets, the successful and diversifying regional companies, not the USOs 
directly, which have had the broader economic development effect, contributing to a 
renewal of pharmaceuticals and chemicals in the region, rather than a decline or 
‘adjustment’, in the language of Chapman et al., and created a field of biotechnology 
innovation assets.  Diverse activities outside the university have been mediated into 
the university, and as we saw in 7.3.3, the USOs have been a critical route for firms to 
participate in this broader family.  Although in figure 5 we describe the contribution 
to the regional knowledge pool as ‘disparate’, bringing together the model for the 
operation of the commercialisation community of practise and the biotechnology 
renewal sequence, we argue that this has contributed to something more systemic than 
figure 5 suggests.  In figure 11, we combine the two diagrams 7 and 9 to demonstrate 
how this suggests that the idea of a point of stability might operate.  Because the 
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university has created a relatively closed system in which innovation and 
entrepreneurship can be pursued, this has allowed a blossom of spin-off and 
associated activities which have upgraded the position of the region within the wider 
biotechnology production system from a low-science content to having some high-
science content activity.  Looking at the same networks through the two lenses allows 
the mutual reinforcement of the two outcomes to be seen, and to highlight some of the 
necessary robustness required in a peripheral industrial region. 
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Figure 11  The role of the university external family in incubating and stabilising the sequence of innovation at Newcastle University  
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The second area is with building a new activity on the basis of a number of 
individually insignificant elements that are brought together to create a significant and 
convincing case for attracting external resources, and the attraction of those external 
resources in turn fulfils the original belief in the significance of those activities.  
These could be regarded as ‘multi-agent projects’, that is that a range of agents pool 
their resources, and produce something that could not be achieved by the individual 
actors acting alone.  It is probably worth highlighting at this point one key asset 
offered by the university, and that is the stability that is conferred on these activities 
because of the way Newcastle University has established itself as at one remove from 
the rather hostile environment for innovation in the region. 
This idea of a ‘multi-agent project’ is a way of describing what was to become the 
INEX centre, because a number of elements came together, actively integrated and 
enrolled by management, but with the promise of producing significant economic 
benefits because of the competency of the university in research valourisation; one 
element of that commercialisation was past success in producing spin-outs, as well as 
working with industrial partners.  It also describes what both CELS and the ICfL have 
been attempting to do in positioning the North East as a place where good science can 
‘become’ dynamic companies that are worthwhile investment propositions, levering 
outside investment.  Both CELS and ICfL are using successful USOs to give 
legitimacy to their arguments, even where those spin-offs have not necessarily 
followed the track that those organisations are suggesting as the ‘North East biotech 
model’.  Both of those organisations are in turn are reimagining the region to try to 
win further Government funds to provide investment funds to support the process of 
remaking the North East in a material as well as imagined way. 
Of course, in this section we have not dealt explicitly with what is arguably the 
critical element of making the region a place to be, that is altering the perceptions that 
external actors have of the region, and the value they place on assets in the region.  
Winning government grants suggests that progress has been made from the situation 
averred to by Heim (1987) in the 1950s where Whitehall civil servants felt profoundly 
that a respectable scientist could never be asked to live in the North.  Moreover, the 
fact that there is some evidence of industrial renewal suggests that some external 
actors do regard what is going on in the region as relevant and important.  In the case 
of biotechnology, there have been a large number of corporate spin-outs from existing 
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companies; since this was indicated in Benneworth (2004), further spin-offs have 
been formed from existing chemicals and pharmaceuticals activities, Onyx Scientific 
spinning out from Rhodia Chirex, Angel from ACS Dobfar and Aesica as a buy-out of 
BASF. 
The Aesica buy-out is the activities which were originally the Boots pharmacists’ 
second manufacturing plant besides Nottingham; ACS Dobfar were a long time ago a 
Glaxo’s second penicillin plant besides Ulverston.  In both those cases, although they 
have been surplus to the needs of one firm, they have been bought and have retained 
their knowledge skills, and have led to future spin-offs.  The Chirex site was sold by 
Sterling Organics to Sanofi, who sold it to managers, who in turn sold it to Rhodia.  
Following that sale, Rhodia invested and turned the plant around, whilst two groups 
of managers formed new pharmaceuticals businesses in the regio, one being Onyx 
Scientific and other formed from two bankrupt businesses, WP Promation and Eldon 
Laboratories.  The retention of such activities suggests that there is a real stickiness to 
activity in the region, around knowledge-intensive manufacturing optimisation; 
innovation is essential to the routine manufacturing operations, and that is why 
periodically new businesses emerge out of these supposedly routine activities.  This in 
turn suggests that there are valuable local knowledges in the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology sectors in the region, and external actors value what can be done in the 
North East.  This issue of stickiness, and the external perception of the region, is 
something that we will return to in chapter 9. 
8.5 Newcastle’s USOs and the regional ‘style’ of innovation in the 
North East of England 
The various elements outlined in the three previous sections suggest that there has 
been an influence on the way that USOs have directly influenced regional businesses 
and their capacity to innovate.  USOs have been involved in some cases in providing 
unique knowledges, and in providing consultancy and innovation services drawing on 
the university knowledge base to firms who are too insignificant for the university to 
prioritise working with.  However, generally speaking USOs were not the active party 
in those relationships, and there was very little evidence that they actively pushed new 
technologies into existing firms and upgraded the regional technology base.  In part, 
this seems due to the predominance of the academic entrepreneur model of a 
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professor running a research group and USO; the spin-offs are very tightly focused on 
particular research or innovation activities and do not react well to outside 
opportunities, such as companies approaching them for assistance.  So is it possible to 
develop a broader narrative explaining the significance and the extent of the 
contribution of USOs to the regional style innovation?  Have they acted as vectors for 
entrepreneurial DNA, infusing the regional economy with a new vibrancy leading to a 
rash of new activities?  The problem in such analysis is that the answer is not 
clear-cut; although we have noted above that some influence has been limited, there is 
evidence that some more systemic and environmental/ cultural changes have take 
place which could yet prove to be part of a more comprehensive transformation. 
One disappointment certainly is that academic entrepreneurs have not become serial 
entrepreneurs of the kind who do leave a significant regional effect.  A number of 
regional entrepreneurs have in recent years reinvested proceeds from the sales of their 
companies in building up a second set of business empires, in areas related to the 
original business,.  Outside this study, research in the North East has highlighted the 
existence of a cadre of regional entrepreneurs who have built up groups of related 
businesses, such as the Express Group or Tanfield Group of engineering companies.  
None of the academic entrepreneurs have produced companies that have been sold, 
and used the proceeds and the knowledge of financial markets to produce a second 
iteration of companies.  However, it is important not to decry that a number of the 
spin-offs are significant businesses, whilst others have apparent significant future 
growth potential.  There does seem to have been a change in the university 
commercialisation strategy in which there may be high growth businesses which 
emerge at a greater remove from the university than with the academic entrepreneur 
model, and so which do produce people who ultimately become serial entrepreneurs. 
One argument that can be made with biotechnology and pharmaceuticals is that USOs 
have reacted to what is already a fairly dynamic environment, although one which is 
under appreciated because it is dominated by LSCBI, in process engineering and 
manufacturing optimisation.  In that sense, just as the USOs have piggy-backed on 
networks created by others, be it British Gas, BioNE2T, CELS and regional venture 
funding organisations, they can be said to reflect the North East’s style of innovation 
as much as changing it.  However, just as USOs participating in some of those 
networks has brought regional benefits, so USOs contributing to a regional style of 
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innovation is part of a process of updating activities and ensuring that the region does 
not become too old fashioned.  It is of course necessary to make the point that four of 
the biotechnology USOs interviewed were entirely innovative in terms of the North 
Eastern style of innovation in being active within the drugs discovery pipeline, 
something which was very rare in the region, and this may potentially offer new 
opportunities for new combinations of old, mature manufacturing knowledges and 
high-technology bio-science innovation. 
A key question to answer is whether the clusters of activity in nanotechnology and 
biotechnology that are taking place within the university family space are large 
enough to be considered significant influences on the regional style of innovation.  
What we can say is that the way that Newcastle University has built its 
commercialisation activity, as a high-intensity, “Rolls Royce” service, does seem to 
meet the particular needs of a peripheral environment, where the poor external 
environment militates against an open and freely availably system of innovation.  
Instead, the university has segmented some of its innovation activities within the 
university family, and created a parallel set of institutions to provide low selectivity 
and easy access innovation assets (around the Stephenson Centre and the formal 
outreach activities of RCID and the Engineering Design Centre). 
We have so far built a model of the territorial knowledge pool between universities 
and spin-offs; figure 5 shows the range of activities and assets which have solidified 
in the region and been drawn on by third party firms.  We have also built a model of 
the internal commercialisation activities within the university, compensating for a 
harsh and corrosive external environment by creating a space around the university 
populated by trusted innovators and in which unstable activities can be slowly settled 
and realised (figure 7).  We have in this chapter demonstrated that the stability offered 
by the university external family space has in turn been drawn on as an asset in 
pulling together various disparate activities into a convincing and coherent narrative 
of technological success in which the North East is reimagined as a place where these 
high technology activities can take place, and where they produce valuable economic 
rewards (figure 9).  The three sub-systems do therefore appear to be cohering into a 
sub-system which is delivering competitive advantage for the region.  The remaining 
determinant on the success and the significance of what has taken place in the North 
East is the way that USOs have been involved in reconfiguring the attitudes of 
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external actors to the region, and hence the power enjoyed by actors within the region 
as owners of desirable and exclusive assets.  It is to this external dimension that this 
report finally turns. 
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9 University spin-outs as partners in improving 
external political relations 
In the previous three chapters, although there have been positive outcomes produced 
by university/ USO/ firm interactions, there has yet to be the demonstration that this 
has improved the region’s situation within a particular political-economic framework.  
The North East is a peripheral region, and the economic problems it faces are at least 
partly relational; although the region suffers from having a sparse entrepreneurial 
environment, it also suffers because the environment is not as good – i.e. it is sparser 
– than other places.  Consequently, the final element of the USO improvement model 
we offered in chapter 2 was that one potential benefit from USOs would be if they 
improved the relative positioning and status of the region.  One framework for 
examining this is the so-called global production network, in which regions’ 
respective status is determined by their relationships with other regions with whom 
they have productive relationships.  A heuristic model for GPN relationships is shown 
below in figure 12. 
Figure 12 
 
Source: Henderson et al., 2000. 
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In previous sections, we have raised at various points the idea of the North East being 
n with a 
ography of 
made into the “place to do” particular activities (cf. 7.5, 8.4). We argued implicitly 
that things like enduring innovation-rich manufacturing in the pharmaceutical sector 
and the emergence of high-science content biotechnology innovation over the last five 
years implied that there had been an improvement in the relative status of the region.  
From being a “place to escape” during the plant closures from the 1970s onwards, 
now the North East appears to have become a “place to go” for some companies, 
entrepreneurs, innovators and academics in a number of niche activities.  We have 
seen that USOs and their achievements have been actively enrolled by regional actors, 
particularly RDAs, but also to a lesser extent, by the University (cf. figure 4) in 
making the case that these “multi-agent projects”  are themselves successful. 
In this research, we could (had we had more money) conceivably have spoke
wide range of external actors to see how effective the USOs had been in reshaping the 
way that those actors viewed the North East, and how that had changed the way they 
valued the region as a place to do particular things.  Because of the relatively small 
scale of the research project, it was not possible to do this, so in this chapter, we focus 
on one very particular set of relationships that have potentially been remade through 
the USO activity for which evidence was generated through the North Eastern based 
interviews.  We look at how particular examples of successful science in the region 
have been used to address a particular problem the region faces, its position within the 
political-economy of science and technology in the UK.  This is notionally aspatial, 
although government policy has recently shifted to emphasising the economic benefit 
of that research for “UK plc” in a spatially indifferent manner.  This in turn implies 
the promotion of research excellence wherever that excellence is located.  
This seemingly neutral discourse serves to hide the fact that the UK’s ge
science and technology has been actively created by decades of differentiated 
investment which have systematically privileged the south and east of the country 
(Buswell & Lewis, 1970; Heim, 1985; Charles & Benneworth, 2001).  Indeed, the 
Golden Triangle of London/ Oxford/ Cambridge is home to a large proportion of 
national R&D spend, and this pattern is continually reinforced through central 
government investment.  A policy that rewards what it assumes is ‘natural’ excellence 
therefore risks perpetuating this historically produced pattern of unevenness.  
Associated with the uneven distribution of activity is a spatial discourse of that 
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activity held by policy-makers, articulated in such spatial concepts as “Oxbridge”, the 
“Big Four”35 or the “Golden Triangle”.  The UK’s scientific pre-eminence is in some 
way assumed to be a natural consequence of research being concentrated in those four 
institutions, and that this in turn shapes the allocation of resources in ways that 
artificially reinforces the presumed naturally state. The problem is an inter-related 
assumption equating (rather than merely associating) concentration with excellence, 
and therefore seeking to promote excellence by promoting concentration. The 
corollary is that science spending which takes place with a spatial bias is a waste of 
resources and undermines the strength of the national science base, disregarding the 
reality that excellence does to some extent follow funding. 
Consequently, overcoming the subaltern position of the North East in the political 
                                                
economy of science and technology involves activity at a variety of conceptual levels, 
building local sources of excellence and the appropriate funding in tandem with 
challenging the spatial discourses of the Big Four, Oxbridge and the Golden Triangle.  
In this chapter we therefore look at how USOs have been involved in this process of 
changing the position of the North East in the UK’s political economy of science and 
technology.  Of course, although national/ regional relationships are important, there 
are other scales which are equally important to defining the ‘position’ of a region; 
even away from global networks of academic prestige and commercial funding, 
within Europe, the European scale (mediated through the Framework programmes) is 
very important for providing flagship investment funding to leading scientific 
institutions.  Moreover, in the UK, a new scale for science has recently emerged, the 
idea of the “North of England”, the three regions of the North East, North West and 
Yorkshire and the Humber. Each of these scales envisages a role for science in the 
North East, and improving the position of the region involves upgrading the position 
of the region at each of these scales at both the material as well as the discursive level 
(van Duinen, 2004). 
 
35 Oxford, Cambridge, University College London, Imperial College London who account for a 
significant share of the UK’s expenditure on science and technology.  Interestingly, the creation of the 
New Manchester University (from Manchester and UMIST) has created an institution that receives 
more from the funding council than any of those big four, and the Open University also receives more 
HEFCE grant.  However, in research terms, UK university research is dominated by those four 
institutions, and they also receive special treatment through things like the creation of the Cambridge 
MIT Institute in Cambridge University. 
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9.1 The political economy of science and technology policy in the UK 
It is common in analyses of the UK science and technology political economy to 
argue that there are strong – almost irresistible - centralising tendencies within this 
particular system (cf. Charles & Benneworth, 2001).  Although it is a convincing 
narrative, and is particularly useful for explaining science and technology investments 
and policies in the UK in the last two decades, our argument is rather that the 
centralising tendencies are merely temporarily dominant over a countervailing set of 
tendencies towards decentralisation.  In this chapter, we are trying to understand how 
a region can improve its position within the political economy; the narrative of 
“irresistible centralisation” performs an act of rescaling on different actors, making 
the national policy-makers seem ‘big’ and centralising ‘inevitable’, whilst crushing 
any and all efforts by actors in the North East to improve their positions and improve 
the aggregate regional situation (Amin & Palan, 2001). 
Although centralisation is currently in vogue, it is possible to see that there have been 
other periods in which decentralisation held sway, or at least that other activities 
encourage a more equal pattern of public R&D expenditure. Moreover, it is possible 
further to argue that the national political economy of science and technology is 
actually comprised of a mix of centralising and decentralising tendencies which co-
exist as a consequence of the professed spatial indifference of policy-makers.  These 
exist in a balance which determines the overall strength of the centralising tendency 
of the system of the day, but they do shift over time; although centralisation has held 
sway for the last twenty years, there are other features of the national political 
economy, not least the relatively uniform distribution of higher education, that 
militates against centralisation.  In order to bridge the gap from ‘small’ spin-offs, to a 
‘large’ political-economy, and explore how the small affects the large, we now 
disaggregate the two sets of tendencies, and identify some of the key levers that exist 
by which regional actors could renegotiate their position within the policy of science 
and technology and thereby improve the overall position of the North East of 
England. 
9.1.1 The divergent tendencies of the S&T political economy  
Although a strong developmental state never emerged in the UK akin those in 
Germany or the United States, the UK government has nonetheless been an important 
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investor in, and hence shaper of, national research and development expenditure 
(Keck 1993; Freeman, 1995).  In many ways, the Government has historically 
invested in ways that spread research activities across the country.  Nationalised 
industries and utilities were huge investors in R&D, and for decades, the UK Atomic 
Energy Authority was the country’s most R&D active body, public or private; 
telecoms, broadcasting, electricity, gas and water research were all undertaken by 
large publicly owned corporations and as their research activity grew in the 20th 
century, it diffused over the country.  The North East in its time had state-owned 
research centres in the gas, water and electricity fields (although they were all closed 
after privatisation).  Although almost all of these activities have subsequently been 
privatised and in many cases dismantled, it does demonstrate that there is not a simple 
centralising tendency in science and technology allocations. 
One of the great decentralising characteristics of UK science and technology is the 
geography of the higher education sector, in which the relatively even distribution of 
institutions - justified through providing universal access to higher level teaching - 
meant that research and development investment has long been spread out beyond the 
core areas of England.  The establishment of the University Grants Committee in the 
1920s channelled public funds into universities in ways that invested both in teaching 
and research capacity, one leg of the so-called ‘dual system’.  With all English regions 
at that time having established universities, Fawcett (1919) was able to remark that 
the English university system was remarkable for its regional characteristics.  He cited 
the inter-relations between the Faculty of Metallurgy at Sheffield University, and the 
metalwork sector in South Yorkshire that so caught Alfred Marshall’s eye in the 
1890s.  It is important not to regard this as merely a historical phenomenon, 
associated with the creation of the later Civic Universities (such as Bristol) in the 
1900s, or the Robbins-era expansion universities of the 1960s.  This process has 
continued to the present day, firstly with the 1992 Higher Education Act, giving parity 
between polytechnics and universities. 
Although many of these so-called new universities concentrated on their teaching 
activities, others made a successful transition into research institutions, most notably 
Bradford, Brighton, Sheffield Hallam and De Montford universities.  This process 
continued into the 21st century with the upgrading of a number of HE colleges into 
“University Colleges” along a pathway leading ultimately to full university status, 
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most recently achieved by Gloucestershire (2002) University for the Arts, London 
(Sept 2003) and Bolton University (Jan 2005).  As table 6 below shows, higher 
education spending is the most equally spread of the elements of R&D expenditure, 
and the North East actually outperforms the national average in terms of its HERD in 
GDP level. 
Table 6 Share of R&D expenditure in GDP, by major component and region, 2002 
Share of R&D expenditure in GDP Business Government  Higher Edc Total 
North East  0.43% 0.02% 0.54% 0.99% 
North West and Merseyside  1.78% 0.07% 0.38% 2.24% 
Yorkshire and the Humber  0.54% 0.09% 0.52% 1.16% 
East Midlands  1.80% 0.11% 0.40% 2.31% 
West Midlands  0.95% 0.07% 0.30% 1.32% 
Eastern  3.01% 0.31% 0.44% 3.77% 
London  0.65% 0.16% 0.72% 1.53% 
South East  2.21% 0.31% 0.41% 2.93% 
South West  1.84% 0.33% 0.28% 2.45% 
England  1.57% 0.19% 0.46% 2.21% 
Wales  0.52% 0.12% 0.51% 1.15% 
Scotland  0.88% 0.33% 0.80% 2.00% 
Northern Ireland  0.73% 0.07% 0.41% 1.21% 
United Kingdom  1.45% 0.19% 0.49% 2.13% 
Standard Deviations of distribution 1.87 1.99 1.05 1.30 
Source: Economic Trends (2004) 
The final point to make is that there is not one singular political-economy for science 
and technology in the UK, but there are several, relating to the nature of the political 
union in the UK.  As table 6 shows, Scotland invests far more of its’ wealth on higher 
education R&D than other regions, despite an otherwise below-par R&D system.  The 
devolved territories have long had their own research institutes, most notably the 
Scottish Agricultural research institutes, which as with Cambridge, became 
increasingly involved in life sciences in the 1970s and 1980s; mostly notably a 
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spin-off of the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh achieved a very high public profile with 
the creation of the first living cloned sheep, ‘Dolly’.   
“Scottish Agricultural and Biological Research Institutes (SABRIs), such as 
the Hannah, Moredun and Rowett Institutes, which are funded mainly by the 
Scottish Executive Rural Affairs Department (SERAD) and other centres such 
as the Macaulay Land Use Research Institute and the Scottish Agricultural 
College. In addition, there are other research institutes which are funded 
mainly, or wholly, by the UK Research Councils, including the Roslin 
Institute and the MRC Human Genetics Unit based at the Western General 
Hospital in Edinburgh. The Roslin Institute is, for example, a major 
international centre for research on molecular and quantitative genetics of 
farm animals, whilst the MRC Human Genetics Unit is at the forefront of 
international research into human genetics. The research base in Scotland also 
benefits from scientific and medical research undertaken within the NHS and 
the NHS Trusts, as well as from research in the arts and humanities undertaken 
by the National Museums, Galleries and Libraries of Scotland” (SHEFC, 
2000). 
Although ‘science’ is a matter in Scotland reserved to the centre, and powers over 
science have likewise not been granted to the Welsh Assembly, all three devolved 
territories do have their own Higher Education Funding Councils which are 
accountable to the devolved administrations. Via the dual support system, those 
administrations do enjoy considerable leverage to support investment in science and 
technology, Scotland from 2001 decided to support national-quality research centres 
more comprehensively than was the case in England36.  In Scotland in particular, there 
has been a particularly strong drive since devolution to consolidate these various 
elements (Government research centres, universities, firms) into a dynamic national 
system of innovation as part of a wider cultural and social rebirth of the Scottish 
nation.  This, and similar efforts in Wales and Northern Ireland, clearly represent 
decentralising tendencies with respect to the concentration of research around London 
and the South East. 
                                                 
36 The so-called funding of the 3a/4 departments.  In England, HEFCE attempted to allocate funds 
more broadly than the Government wished, and came under intense pressure from Ministers so to do, 
despite its supposedly arm’s length status (S&TC, 2004). 
177 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
9.1.2 Centralisation and the contemporary national system of innovation 
However, there were a number of factors which meant that public investment was 
building a framework with a strong tendency towards the concentration of activities.  
After World War 2, as the defence industry in the UK became an increasingly 
important customer for R&D, and an increasingly important supplier to Governments, 
defence R&D in the UK emerged as an important sector within overall R&D levels, 
second only to the USA in terms of its share in the national mix.  In the UK, defence 
R&D was located around the major civilian and military defence activities, 
predominantly located in the south and east of the country (Benneworth & Charles, 
2001).  Moreover, in the case of defence electronics, where the structure (and 
profitability) of the industry until very recently differed greatly from the civilian 
sector, defence research tended to crowd out civilian activities.  The defence 
expenditure played a strong role in producing strong regional systems of innovation 
which affected civilian applications.  Clearest of these is the emergence of mobile 
telephony company Vodafone in Swindon as an offshoot of Racal Electronics (which 
is now owned by Thales); Racal was a defence contractor who had been extensively 
involved in developing the EUROMUX mobile telephony system for the UK armed 
forces (cf. Charles & Benneworth, 2000 for an extended version of this argument). 
A second and associated characteristic was that government policies towards national 
competitiveness often led successful regional firms with their own R&D activities to 
be bought out by larger London-based corporations, who then under pressure from 
shareholders closed their outlying research base, and in some cases entirely 
outsourced their technology procurement, both outcomes proving very negative for 
the regional technology base.  This effect and its impacts, which emerged in the era of 
‘national champions’ in the 1960s and 1970s was exacerbated under privatisation.  In 
the case of the utilities, the imposition of heavy regulatory frameworks on the newly 
privatised utilities in gas, water and electricity discouraged long-term investments in 
infrastructure, and profit-taking means there were scarce resources for R&D.  By the 
late 1990s, these industries had largely abandoned R&D; in peripheral regions, there 
was an absence of other types of R&D to compensate for dwindling utilities 
expenditure. 
A third characteristic was the geography of the pharmaceutical sector: by the 1990s, 
pharmaceutical R&D represented one pound in every six spent on R&D spend in the 
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UK.  This was a function of the Government’s purchasing policies, in which 
pharmaceutical companies were guaranteed minimum drug prices through the NHS in 
return for maintaining manufacturing and R&D activities in the UK.  Again, those 
activities were concentrated in a very limited part of the UK, and so this policy, which 
strengthened the UK as a whole, brought with it very uneven intra-national allocations 
of R&D spend.  Although pharmaceutical R&D was important to the UK as a whole, 
as figure A below shows, there was very little in the North East of England which 
could be described mainstream pharmaceutical R&D expenditure. 
The two maps in figure A are reproduced from a Government report Genome Valley: 
The Economic Potential and Strategic Importance of Biotechnology in the UK, 
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/genomevalley/  
. 
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Government research laboratories were also located in the core regions, for a variety of 
reasons, but which served to reinforce the strength of those regions, and to encourage 
continued investment in them.  The UK Government invested very heavily in agricultural 
research in East Anglia from the 1920s onwards, although from the 1970s, the research 
activities became increasingly involved in biotechnology, ensuring that biotechnology 
was centred around the East of England (Blair, 1991).  A second factor highlighted by 
Heim (1987) was the importance of the negative mental pictures of the ‘north’ in the 
minds of post-war civil servants.  Loebl (2001) noted that expenses mileage rates for civil 
servants made journeys within a 50 mile radius of their offices (located in and around 
London) much more lucrative than those beyond.  Even by the 1970s, when the UK 
government made its last attempt to directly create high-technology firms, those two 
firms, Celltech and INMOS were located in the south of the country (London and Bristol 
respectively) despite attempts by regional authorities to persuade the Government to use 
these investments to support declining peripheral economies.  Most recently, the Met 
Office, with 1000 computer engineers involved in meteorology, announced the decision 
to relocate from Bracknell, along the M4 corridor to Exeter, rather than to the North East 
of England, which had lobbied central government to try to win this prime investment. 
9.1.3 Recent policies and the shifting balance of power 1980-2000. 
These two sets of countervailing tendencies meant that the British political-economy of 
science and technology has an inbuilt set of tensions which make it hard to clearly 
characterise the spatial outcomes the system produces37.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, 
science and technology expenditure generally came under a huge amount of pressure, as 
the government cut back on its’ expenditure, and recessions, instability and privatisation 
impacted adversely on private expenditure.  Under such conditions, which promoted 
                                                 
37 In Scotland, a quite different approach has been taken, with SHEFC and the Scottish Executive clear that 
they wanted to use the university sector to support the urban hierarchy across Scotland rather than 
concentrate university research in the central conurbation between Edinburgh and Glasgow.  However, 
recognising the reality that the UK government was concentrating around perceived excellence, the Scottish 
authorities recognised their own spatial ambitions for balanced science activities would have to meet 
national concentration requirements.   The idea was floated in 2003 to enter ‘Scottish Universities’ as a 
single unit of assessment in the RAE to maximise the resources they won from the centre which could then 
be distributed more equitably between the Scottish universities. 
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rationalisation of R&D activities, it is perhaps unsurprising that there was a concentration 
of activity.  Salford University most famously faced cuts of just less than one-third of its 
budget in 1981 in response to the incoming Conservative government’s new science 
budget, but there was also a gradual erosion of the dual system, as capitation funding for 
students fell by 50% (1980-2000). Given that much of the pressure for decentralisation 
was sustained by the dual system, these cuts to the stable income level placed many 
universities under pressures to increase volumes of teaching, which in turn undermined 
their capacity to bid for additional research funds (the second leg of the dual system), 
thereby reducing their research capacity.  
Certainly, the rhetoric in this period was that regional impacts had no role to play in 
making scientific decisions.  When the location decision was being made concerning a 
new capital investment in a particle accelerator, the DTI and OST were clear that regional 
policy concerns had no place in their deliberations regarding whether to site the new 
facility in the North West or the South East (S&TC, 2000).  This was of course part of a 
broader emergence of a strong discourse within government emphasising market based 
solutions (cf. DTI, 1998; 2001), which in turn implied that current situations were in 
some way optimal.  In the field of science and technology, this implied that those regions 
that had strong R&D bases did so on the basis of some ‘natural’ market advantage which 
the government could not hope to buck.  From the mid 1990s onwards, the 
Competitiveness White Papers were explicit that there was no specific regional role for 
universities.  The government have more recently also made clear that there is unlikely to 
be any significant spatial reorganisation of government R&D, currently the most 
unequally distributed component of R&D (cf. table 7 above). 
In figure 11b above, the effect of this on the ‘spatial discourse’ of policy makers is 
suggested, through a map from a biotechnology policy document in 1999.  The map is 
taken from a DTI report into the biotechnology industry in the UK, Genome Valley: the 
economic potential and strategic significance of biotechnology in the UK.  The picture 
shown in the map conforms largely with a ‘concentration in the Golden Triangle’ 
narrative given above, excepting the activities in the devolved territories, particularly in 
Scotland.  There are two concentrations of activity, one centred around London, and the 
other around Cambridge, with other activities associated with university research centres.  
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We have already shown in figure 11a that the North East was portrayed in this report as a 
place of manufacturing rather than research.  These maps together seem to suggest that 
the spatial frameworks frames the biotechnology interests of ‘the UK’ as being best 
served by continuing to concentrate public investment into these existing agglomerations 
of excellence.   Thus, improving the position of the North East involves building a set of 
activities that demonstrate to external investors, including HM Government, that the 
North East is a place where biotechnology investment can take place. 
This may take place within the existing spatial discourse: a commitment to national 
excellence can allow genuine excellence to be promoted outside the ‘golden triangle’ of 
London, Cambridge and Oxford.  The Regional Innovation Fund and Smith Review both 
provided tens of millions of pounds for investment in science and technology activities, 
disproportionately (entirely in the case of the Smith Review) to peripheral regions.  
HEFCE provided some £25m capital funding to pay for the reorganisation of higher 
education in Manchester, leading to the creation of the new University of Manchester, the 
institution which was in 2005 the recipient of the largest HEFCE grant.  The northern 
regions were encouraged in 2003 to develop science councils, and in parallel with a large-
scale regeneration project, a Science Council for the North was formed early in 2005 to 
provide a regional focus to science spending (cf. 9.3). 
Since 1999, increasing science spending has been a priority of the government, and just 
as falling real levels of science funding effectively forced concentration, increasing 
funding levels might likewise allow the promotion of diversity, pump priming of 
potential research excellence, and investment in activities outside the golden triangle.  
These various activities and opportunities seem to suggest that within the government’s 
rhetoric of national excellence and spatial discourses of the Golden Triangle, there are 
opportunities for local actors in the North East of England to demonstrate that they add 
national value.  In this section, we explore three other areas where opportunities have 
been exploited to improve the material and symbolic situation of the region.  The focus is 
on the role played by university spin-off companies in demonstrating that the North East 
is a place where scientific excellence can flourish, and investment in science and 
technology can produce material economic returns 
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9.1.4 Spatial assets influencing aspatial policy-making 
We have already argued that there is a strong spatial indifference to current UK science 
and technology policy, and the overall effect of this has been to reinforce concentration 
during periods of funding cuts, and restrict decentralisation during periods of funding 
growth.  Although there is a geography to the distribution of excellence, with this 
geography being dominated by the so-called ‘golden triangle’, this geography is not 
explicitly used in a normative way that allocates roles to places in perpetuity.  The 
problem is subtler, that the spatial discourse gives a mystical value to the Golden 
Triangle, so that regional activities outside this area are assumed to be of a low quality.  
Consequently, their perceived low quality means that they begin at a disadvantage in 
trying to win funding from the centre, and failing to win such funding produces further 
disadvantages into the future.  As a recent House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee report noted, this assumption that only investments in existing sites are 
“efficient” is somewhat contradictory. 
“There is nothing special in the soil of the so-called Golden Triangle.  If 
significant funds were, for example, made available to the new Bolton University, 
we have little doubt that it would attract the talent and create a research 
environment to rival the best” (S&TC 2004, p.7). 
The issues then arises of how universities and spin-offs can challenge that situation, given 
that they are small actors next to the Government.  Because science and technology 
policy is national in scope (however the nation is defined, whether England, England & 
Wales, or Great Britain), it is difficult for local actors to make the case that they need 
special treatment.  There was a case in 2004 that spin-offs were being halted by a change 
in the tax laws (Schedule 22 of the 2003 Finance Act) that created huge potential 
liabilities for academic entrepreneurs, and these risks had brought the formation of 
spin-offs in the UK to a virtual halt (from 228 to 12, 2003-04).  Schedule 22 was as much 
a problem for Newcastle, arguably more so because of the prior level of activity, than 
many other institutions nationally.  However, what brought the matter to the attention of 
the government was a director of a spin-off (not from Newcastle University) who was 
working as an industrialist for the DTI at that time.  Because the DTI has the spatial 
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concept of a national policy-maker, the science and technology policies it makes are 
“whole country” policies, so actors only receive special treatment if they can make the 
case that there is a broader problem underlying the issue by which they are plagued.  An 
obvious way to upscale the local problem into a general (‘national’) issue is to build 
networks with other actors experiencing similar problems and collectively lobby the 
policy-makers.  In the case of the process whereby the Schedule 22 problem was solved, 
what the DTI took cognisance of was of what was being said by university technology 
transfer organisations such as the Association for University Research & Industry Links 
(AURIL) and the University Companies Association (UNICO). 
Although AURIL and UNICO are national (United Kingdom) bodies, there are examples 
of where there have been regional mobilisations that have managed to create themselves 
as solutions to particular problems.  In particular, the White Rose Consortium has 
achieved a particularly high profile as a partnership of research-intensive universities in 
Yorkshire, arguably much higher profile with national policy-makers than the regional 
university association, the Yorkshire and the Humber Universities Association.  
Likewise, universities in Manchester have managed to mobilise the idea of “Manchester: 
Knowledge Capital” as a spatial concept implying that their collective activity is of 
sufficient magnitude and quality to create economic benefits in the knowledge economy.  
These mobilisations are of regional actors, but they clearly draw and enrol on external 
resources in mobilising.  Such mobilisations aim to make the case that they embody the 
principles of excellence, such as world class research links, industrial collaborations or 
participation in consortia. 
In this section, we explore two areas where networks involving USOs around Newcastle 
University have been involved in creating ‘bigger’ networks with the potential to alter the 
thinking of national policy-makers in ways that have specific spatial benefits. We firstly 
look (once more) at the case of INEX, and how local networks were used to build 
unambiguous excellence which persuaded DTI of its’ merit as a real “Centre of 
Excellence”.  We more briefly then consider how one government department was helped 
to develop explicit spatial policy concepts, when the November 2004 pre-budget report 
awarded “Science City” status to Newcastle..  We look at the roles played by spin-offs in 
the way that relationships between local actors and external policy-makers have operated; 
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and then consider what roles USOs can play in shifting political-economies of science 
and technology in modern knowledge economies. 
9.2 INEX: making the North East a place to do nanotechnology 
In 8.4.2, we gave the example of how the Institute for Nanotechnology Exploitation 
(INEX) at the University of Newcastle had been built up in a way that suggested that it 
had created external recognition of its excellence, and that its’ capacity for the formation 
of spin-offs was important in the way it had built itself up.  In this section, we look at 
how this local/ regionally network became (through circumstance) significant for others 
seeking to achieve their own goals, and thus raised its national standing in science policy.  
In particular, when the DTI faced criticism for the timidity of its support for 
nanotechnology, INEX was enlisted in a variety of ways to legitimate that central policy, 
in return for INEX being given extra grant funding.  Although INEX was built up in the 
region, its adoption by DTI as an exemplar of what can be achieved in nanotechnology 
has rewarded it in terms of further funds.  Admittedly, the example is insufficiently 
extensive to demonstrate that it has changed the way that UK policy-makers conceive of 
the North East as a place to do science.  However, it does demonstrate that under certain 
circumstances, regional assets can temporarily acquire a parity of scale with national 
policy-makers, shifting the balance of power within those relationships, and allow one 
step in a more general reworking of the political-economy of science and technology.  Of 
course a change to the place of the region would require many such steps, but the case 
does demonstrate that the inevitable centralising tendency of the centre is not inevitable, 
and can under certain circumstances be challenged. 
9.2.1 INEX: climbing the scales of significance 
In 8.2.4, we provided an overview of how INEX had emerged in the last decade as a 
consequence of emergent technological opportunities but also the decisions of senior 
managers within Newcastle University.  The physical scale of activity has increased from 
a single professor, to an active research centre and exploitation outfit with strong 
connections between the two.  However, another scale which has notably increased is the 
spatial extent of those who engage with the centre, and the terms on which they engaged, 
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reflecting an increasing consensus that INEX was a “Centre of Excellence”. From the 
interviews, INEX’s development can be differentiated through five steps through which it 
progressed, each stage providing prior conditions for the next, culminating in its’ 
emergence in 2004 as an extant physical facility populated by a research group, a number 
of companies connected to nanotechnology, and which had already produced one 
spin-out company.  The beginning point was the appointment of Professor Snowdon in a 
developmental chair with the remit to develop such a centre, and the five major steps 
from this starting point were:- 
• 1997/8: Drawing up an internal proposal for a multi-disciplinary institute cutting 
across existing departments and faculties as the basis of the unsuccessful approach 
to the DTI Innovation Unit for exception funding. 
• 1999: ONE provide Newcastle University with £420,000 for a clean room, which 
is matched up against European funds to pay for a redevelopment of the Herschell 
annex as a dedicated research centre. 
• 2001: The DTI designate Newcastle University as the lead partner in the UK’s 
nanotechnology University Innovation Centre (one of five such UIC’s funded) 
(c£4m of £7.2m award). 
• 2003: INEX are designated as a ‘key hub’ of the European Nanobusiness 
Association. 
• 2004: The DTI award Newcastle University a £3m grant under the Micro and 
Nanotechnology Manufacturing Initiative, the only capital investment made under 
the Applied Research programme. 
With each of those steps, the level of activity in the centre became qualitatively more 
significant, although increasing in volume does not necessarily of itself demonstrate that 
that growth indicates that region’s situation with respect to external actors has improved.  
What appears thus far significant is that at each stage there has been an apparent increase 
in the magnitude of activity within the region, firstly creating a virtual community within 
the university (bidding for DTI funding in 1997), then providing some physical 
infrastructure for that community (funded by ONE in 2000), then increasing the overall 
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volume of activity (the UIC in 2001), linking the activities to a broader international 
nanotechnology network (2003), then finally winning a large scale capital grant from the 
DTI (2004).  We have represented this change graphically in figure 13 below. 
Figure 13 The changing scale of the achievements of INEX, 1997-2004 
 
‘Research 
excellence’ 
1997 Physical 
infrastructure 
Source: authors’ own design  
Some of those steps have involved increasing the volume of local activity, but also in 
parallel with that have been steps which have increased the strength of connection 
between local activities, and between local and global partners.  Of course, these changes 
are only significant in this research if they help to rework local actors’ relationships with 
external actors in ways that improve the situation of the North East in the UK’s 
political-economy of science and technology.  To answer that question, it is necessary to 
consider how the North East’s competencies in nanotechnology have been used by 
external actors in their own policy debates and discussions. 
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9.2.2 Acknowledgement: meeting the needs of external actors 2000-2004 
One of the key features of the way that nanotechnology has growth within Newcastle 
University is that over the course of time, the relationship of the research centre to 
external actors has changed, most notably that the centre has become more important to 
those external actors in seeking to realise their own ends.  In this section, we rework the 
narrative in 9.2.1, with a much greater emphasis on the role played by the external 
partners in the development of the centre, in particular focusing on the calculus of 
exchange between regional and external actors, in order to set up a final part in which we 
consider whether there have been broader changes to the UK political economy.  In 9.2.2, 
what we will show is how over the course of INEX’s development, INEX’s meaning to 
policy-makers has shifted from being an ‘unworthy proposition’ (1997) to being 
something which validates their policies (2004). 
When the decision was taken to appoint a development chair in nanotechnology in the 
mid 1990s, the decision was taken purely internally to the university, at the behest of a 
PVC with sufficient expert knowledge in nanotechnology to know that it was a future 
growth area.  When Professor Snowdon was appointed, his overall mission was to build 
an infrastructure for nanotechnology research, a level of investment which could not be 
provided by top-slicing academics’ research programmes, but needed a dedicated 
investment from an external partner.  Consequently, his first task was to try to assemble 
an internal community within the university, which together could be represented as a 
coherent ‘bundle’ of scientific capacity.  By discursively creating this community, this 
community could then in turn be used to sell the idea that Newcastle University was a 
place where nanotechnology could conceivably be done. 
Snowdon pursued this at first internally by trying to persuade departments to engage with 
the idea of a central nanotechnology facility.  In doing that, he built up a knowledge of 
the university’s nanotechnology capacity.  That led to a bid to a central government 
investment fund for infrastructure, the so-called Joint Infrastructure Fund.  Although that 
bid was unsuccessful, and a lobbying team from the university were unable to persuade 
the ministry of the capacity within Newcastle University, the university managers 
retained faith in the potential of nanotechnology.  Further support was sought for the 
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same idea, a ‘hard’ infrastructure to support the existing potential ‘soft’ nanotechnology 
community in Newcastle38. 
The next step was taken through winning regional funding which did not directly require 
the proof of excellence against external competitors, but that the research base had 
potential to produce commercial outputs.  ONE, the regional development agency, was 
persuaded to provide £420,000 to equip a clean-room and incubator units within the 
university.  At that time, ONE and other northern RDAs had criticised the government for 
failing to invest in good knowledge economy propositions in peripheral regions.  The 
DTI had responded with a £10m Regional Innovation Fund to be spent on supporting 
commercialisation activity; ONE needed to show successful examples of the RIF being 
spend on high quality science commercialisation propositions.  The university lobbied the 
RDA very hard, and the strength of the internal commitment between the centre manager, 
university managers and academics to nanotechnology helped persuade ONE to invest the 
funds developing a set of incubators within a refurbishment of the Herschell Building. 
At the same time, Newcastle University formed a consortium bid with Nottingham and 
Durham Universities to apply for an Inter-disciplinary Research Centre from the UK 
research councils. Although that bid was unsuccessful, it reached the final shortlist of 
five, and did bring those nanotechnology activities (and infrastructure) which were at 
Newcastle to the attention of the DTI.  The fact that the RIF project (the incubator units) 
existed demonstrated that there was a proposition with some commercialisation 
expertise at Newcastle University.  The progress of the IRC bid to the shortlist stage 
demonstrated to national policy-makers the academic quality of what was on offer.  This 
attention led to the DTI awarding Newcastle University a University Innovation Centre 
award.  This programme was announced in a White Paper launched in February 2001 as 
part of a programme which signalled the end of austerity in science expenditure, and set 
out a programme for massively increasing the resources in the science base across the 
UK. 
                                                 
38 One interviewee avers to the importance of an unofficial meeting at which decisions over resource 
allocations were taken at this time (c. 1999) within the university to maintaining the university’s support for 
nanotechnology, the so-called “Monday Morning Meeting”. 
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Although the focus of this expansion was on rewarding excellence generally, there was a 
recognition that maximising the economic value of that research needed investment in 
exploitation infrastructure.  This white paper first raised the concept of a permanent third 
funding stream for UK universities to spend on industrial engagement.  The UIC concept 
was to identify university/ business partnerships which facilitated the transfer of 
knowledge between universities and SMEs.  £30m were allocated to the programme in 
2001, and five centres were funded; the North East UIC was in Nanotechnology and 
Microsystems and it received £7.2m.  This funding was significant for two reasons.  
Firstly, it was the second largest of the awards made, behind a communications and IT 
UIC in Bristol (£7.62m).  However, one interviewee claimed that its’ greater significance 
lay in the fact that it was at that time the largest DTI science and technology grant made 
in the region.  Although large DTI grants had been made to the region in the 1990s, they 
had been for things like the attraction of inwards investment (such as the £30m that went 
to the ill-starred Siemens investment) or the millions that went into the ongoing subsidies 
for the coal industry.  The UIC award was made by a government at the time under 
extreme pressure to demonstrate their commitment to manufacturing in peripheral 
regions, from which it drew its core votes.  However, it remained rationalised in terms of 
achieving national goals, raising innovation and productivity levels in the UK. 
The next step in INEX’s development came in 2003, Newcastle University, and INEX 
were invited to become one of the key European hubs of the European Nanobusiness 
Association.  This provided an external recognition and validation of the progress that 
had been made so far in Newcastle, although no new resources were associated directly 
with the status.  We have already argued that many regions were pursuing similar 
strategies around growth technology areas including nanotechnology.  Our argument is 
that this ENA award suggested that there were other external bodies who recognised the 
scope of what had been already achieved at Newcastle, and that others outside the UK 
regarded it as more than a ‘me too’ development.  Of course, there were other facilities in 
other English regions that were also included as key hubs.  In figure 14 below, we show 
the physical location of these twelve hubs, plotted on a map indicating the spatial division 
of science and technology within Europe, based on the so-called ‘Blue Banana’ idea.   
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Figure 14 The location of the twelve European NanoBusiness Association key hubs, 
2003, with respect to the European economic core (blue banana) 
 
Source CIA available at: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia04/european_union_sm04.gif, 
authors’ own annotation 
This map is useful because it does provide a broader narrative for the emergence of 
nanotechnology business in Europe, that it is focused around existing innovative 
agglomerations, but that new growth areas are emerging.  Much is known for example 
about the success of the Öresund knowledge agglomeration (cf. Maskell et al., 1999; 
Vestegaard 2004), and the past success of Nokia in accessing university research 
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strengths in Finland make the designation of Helsinki equally plausible.  Thus, the 
acknowledgement by EBA of INEX’s competencies does seem to ‘place’ nanotechnology 
within Newcastle, and to place Newcastle as an emerging nanotechnology region. 
The final step in this growth process was the awarding in 2004 of £3m to INEX to invest 
in nanotechnology infrastructure.  This was in material terms a very significant grant; the 
DTI allocated some £18m to projects across the UK, and the funding received by INEX 
was more than twice the amount of any other project.  This £18m is the first tranche in 
some £90m that the DTI has proposed to spend specifically on promoting the translation 
of nanotechnology from the laboratory into particular products.  What was  also 
significant was the map of nanotechnology manufacturing that this created – the most 
significant set of investments in this funding round were supporting the North East, 
whilst the traditional core areas were to receive much lower levels of funding39.  This 
seems to substantiate a rhetoric within government that they envisaged a future for 
regions such as the North East to engage in high technology manufacturing.  This is 
true not just for the case of the North East, where another large project was awarded to a 
fine chemicals company (Thomas Swan), but also that this investment was being used to 
support the chemicals industry in the North West, as well as renewal of the offshore 
engineering sector in Scotland.  This investment programme seems therefore to involve a 
bending of science and technology spending to achieve that particular vision for the 
geography of nanotechnology manufacturing.  The regional allocations are shown in table 
7 below. 
                                                 
39 These figures illustrate the importance of past science and technology regimes in determining current 
spending.  London’s only project, for example, is managed by the Paint Research Association, a former 
Industrial Research Association, previously subsidised by industry levies and privatised in the 1980s.  The 
majority of the West Midlands expenditure comes from two projects going to Qinetiq, formerly the Royal 
Signals and defence research laboratories at Malvern, Worcestershire. 
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Table 7 Regional allocations for the first round of the Applied Research programmes for 
the DTI’s micro and nanotechnology manufacturing initiative 
Region NMMTI investment 
North East  £8,963,501 
North West  £7,684,631 
East of England  £4,581,862 
West Midlands  £4,509,026 
South East  £2,870,036 
East Midlands  £2,684,454 
London £1,480,956 
Yorkshire and the Humber £1,424,513 
Scotland £1,192,583 
South West  £1,102,500 
Total UK £36,494,062 
Source: DTI Press Release, 23rd August 2004 
What is perhaps significant about Government investment in INEX is that it emerged in 
the wake of the Government using the success of INEX a number of times in the course 
of defending its actions against parliamentary criticism that insufficient was being done 
to promote nanotechnology in the UK.  In April 2004, the Parliamentary Committee for 
Science and Technology published a report entitled Too little, too late? Government 
investment in nanotechnology.  The DTI used the case of INEX, and of the North East 
more generally, to argue its’ case, effectively to try to legitimate and vindicate its current 
policy positions.   
In the DTI’s original memorandum to the Inquiry in 2003, INEX was cited as an example 
of an organisation successfully commercialising Research Council-funded research; this 
was used to argue that basic science research in nanotechnology was producing applied 
science benefits through spin-offs and licensing deals.  In DTI’s response to the 
committee, the DTI cited Orla Proteins, a Newcastle University spin-off resident at that 
time within INEX as an example of a nanotechnology spin-off that had successfully used 
regional venture capital funds; this was used to deny the committee’s claim that 
government rules for venture capital funds were preventing regional nanotechnology 
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SMEs from accessing those funds.  Moreover, they argued that a wider array of specialist 
centres (implicitly like INEX) were a more effective use of the £90m funds than doing 
what the committee suggested, spending all the funds on creating a single national 
nanotechnology institute at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in Oxfordshire.  In the 
Parliamentary debate following the publication of the report, the Undersecretary for 
Industry cited INEX as an example of where investment by regional development 
agencies in science had created assets that were globally renowned, specifically arguing 
against the charge that RDA science investment was wasting funds on consultancy 
reports rather than producing scientific outputs. 
A final sense of the importance of INEX as a means of justifying Government policy can 
be seen in the way that INEX was used by the Government in its’ response to EU 
Commission proposals to treble R&D investment in nanotechnology, whilst 
simultaneously concentrating on a limited number of European centres of excellence.  
Given that the UK Government had decided not to create such a UK centre of excellence, 
the UK’s proposals of spreading funding around a range of centres could potentially 
undercut future UK attempts to win nanotechnology funds from the Seventh framework 
programme.  The European Scrutiny Committee in the UK’s House of Commons (lower 
house) noted this contradiction, and invited the Science Minister to respond, where INEX 
was invoked in defending the Government’s policy.  The Minister’s argument was that 
the Government was supporting centres with a particular set of attributes which made 
them ‘world class’; “with good skill levels, appropriate equipment to meet the needs of 
industry, a strong industry/product focus, an identified business plan, and strong 
management”.  Moreover, INEX was explicitly identified as world class, and possessing 
these attributes, when the Science Minister argued that INEX was the first such “suitable 
consortia” to be supported by the Government. 
A sense of the importance of priority given to the investment by the Government is given 
by looking at the web-page on which the results of the first round of the Applied 
Research Programme were announced.  This web page is reproduced below as figure 15, 
and shows that although there were a total of 26 programmes, the INEX case was cited 
specifically as a centre for industry, albeit a centre based at Newcastle University.  All the 
other grants in the announcement were made as an award covering up to 50% of project 
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costs.  By contrast, the INEX award was for £3m investment funds for the development 
of an industrial centre without requiring a further match of funding.  All these together 
seem to indicate that by 2004, INEX seemed to be regarded as a successful venture , and 
that by supporting it, the government was also supporting the UK research base, thereby 
countering the perception in 1997 “of nanotechnology in Newcastle as an unworthy 
venture”.  Moreover, spin-off companies and commercialisation activity seemed to be at 
least a residual part of the value placed by the government in INEX, in its capacity to 
meet bring these technologies closer to market. 
Figure 15 The announcement of the £3m investment in INEX on the Number 10 Downing 
Street (UK Prime Minister) Website 
Source: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6259.asp
As the scope of what has been undertaken in Newcastle in terms of nanotechnology has 
increased, so its’ value to other actors in the domain of science policy has become more 
important.  National policy actors have regarded the idea of nanotechnology at Newcastle 
as plausible, and have more recently been willing to provide increased resources to 
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Newcastle, primarily to achieve national science and technology policy aims.  However, 
in the context of a spatially indifferent national system of innovation, changes to patterns 
of funding necessarily change the national political-economy of science and technology.  
Although clearly the case of nanotechnology has not overhauled the subaltern position of 
the region, it is possible to regard the changes that have taken place in a broader sense 
having reinforced the desirability, and hence status and position, of Newcastle and the 
North East of England within the nanotechnology political-economy.  In the closing part 
of this section, we explore the extent to which links can be drawn between successful 
spin-offs in nanotechnology, and an increased willingness of the UK government to fund 
nanotechnology R&D in the North East. 
9.2.3 Changes to the political-economy of science and technology in the UK? 
The main message emerging in this section is that it is possible to construct a science 
asset based on local resources, and then to increase the scale of the activity in ways that 
increases its’ attractiveness to external partners.  The INEX establishment was ‘born 
global’, in the sense of being built up from a virtual community of scholars with their 
own global research reputations (cf. figure 10).  INEX performed an act of ordering them 
into a coherent group which possessed research excellence alongside critical mass, 
infrastructure and an activity programme.  This ordering activity was initially entirely 
internal to the university, and then later, contained within the region, but this nevertheless 
produced a research exploitation centre with capacities which other organisations sought 
to draw upon to validate themselves.  More recently, this scale has been extended to the 
European level, through the EBA recognition, but there is some anticipation that INEX 
will benefit from increased EU investment in nanotechnology R&D in Framework VII, 
along with similar foreign centres such as IMEC in Belgium40.  Both EBA and DTI have 
enrolled the success of INEX, and stabilised the ‘INEX story’, one version of which is 
presented in Hansson et al. (2004).  Spin-offs have been part of this success, although in a 
                                                 
40 Spin-offs are a very important part of the way that the ‘IMEC story’ is told.  IMEC was funded by the 
Flemish Government as a consequence of increasing federalisation of the Belgian state after 1989, and 
provided a large scale research facility for micro-electronics.  IMEC has produced a number of spin-offs, 
and was exemplified as the ‘model’ technology push approach to promoting USOs (Clarysse et al., 2003; 
2004), in contrast to the low energy or selectivity models. 
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symbolic way much more than a material way.  Science and economic policy-makers in 
the UK regard spin-offs as good indicators of successful valourisation of research, 
something in turn upon which a significant amount of emphasis has been placed 41. 
The main limitation to what has been achieved is that the success of INEX has not 
increased the sensitivity of those involved in science policy decisions to the spatial 
implications of those decisions, and the capacity of science policy decisions to ‘create’ 
the spaces in which science is done.  The case of INEX seems superficially to suggest 
that there is not a regional science problem, if peripheral places like the North East can 
develop strengths in commercialising nanotechnology activity.  There remains a lack of a 
recognition within government of the role played by government investment in shaping 
the distribution of that expertise. The Parliamentary Science and Technology Committee 
explicitly recognised that there were problems in current expenditure patterns, as we have 
already quoted:- 
“There is nothing special in the soil of the so-called Golden Triangle.  If significant funds were, 
for example, made available to the new Bolton University, we have little doubt that it would 
attract the talent and create a research environment to rival the best” (S&TC, 2004, p.7). 
However, explicitly reshaping expenditure patterns seems a step beyond what is allowed 
in discussions of government expenditure.  Notably, in the report on nanotechnology, Too 
little, too late, they implicitly (and contradictorily) called for a centralisation of the 
nanotechnology manufacturing research programme funds into a single flagship national 
institution to be presumably based at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratories in the Golden 
Triangle town of Didcot (S&TC 2004b). 
One link can certainly be drawn, and that is the success of INEX has led to a change in 
the allocation of one set of science and technology funds, to the definite benefit of the 
region.  We have already noted that current science and technology excellence depends 
heavily on past investments, so these current investments may yet produce more 
                                                 
41 Indeed, there were some interviewees at the time of the research who expressed the opinion that they felt 
that the Government was likely to adopt third stream funding formula which took account of the numbers 
of spin-offs formed by universities.  In response to the Lambert Review of university/ industry 
collaborations, many universities expressed the opinion that too much emphasis was placed on spin-off 
deals, and not licensing deals. 
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significant future benefits, as INEX, INSAT and the associated researchers manage to 
acquire a larger share of national and European research funds.  However, this case does 
not demonstrate that there has yet been a more general shift in attitudes and assumptions 
within the UK science and technology policy community that might precipitate a wider 
political-economic change.  We therefore turn to look at how successes in 
nanotechnology and biotechnology commercialisation have themselves affected the way 
policy-makers think of regional science policy in the UK, and the emergence of a 
particular spatially inflected science policy, that of the “Science City”. 
9.3 Spatial concepts in the political-economy for science and technology: 
the “Northern Way” and “Science City” 
We have argued that it is very rare for university spin-out companies to be able directly to 
change government policy.  There may be some very successful businesses which capture 
policy-makers attention, and significant problems that raise more general issues may also 
provoke policy-responses.42  In the case of Schedule 22 of the Finance Act, its’ problems 
for spin-offs were highlighted by someone with close acquaintance of spin-offs. 
However, policy-makers in the UK are responsible for making policy for the whole of 
their territory, a consequence of the spatial indifference of much policy, including the 
vast majority of science and technology expenditure.  Consequently, policy-makers look 
to collective and representative organisations to provide answers to problems of a 
national interest.  The risk, as we have seen, is that this national interest is defined in 
terms of supporting existing excellence with future investment, so that uneven 
geographical patterns of R&D expenditure continue, with negative consequences for the 
capacities of particular places to compete in the knowledge economy. 
In this section, we look at the emergence of specifically spatial concepts within the UK 
science policy arena, and link these back to perceptions of the success of spin-out 
companies from the university of Newcastle.  From 2000, a number of RDAs became 
increasingly interested in they the scope they had within the UK arrangement to actively 
                                                 
42 For example the case of British Biotechnology plc, which became the subject of a Parliamentary Inquiry 
in 1998 when a failure of a single product to win regulatory approval led to a significant fall in share price 
which seemed to jeopardise the venture capital based business model for the UK biotechnology industry. 
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promote science (specifically, the science or research base) in their regions.  The North 
East and North West had both launched Science Councils, and One NorthEast had 
announced its’ five year “Strategy for Success” to create regional centres of excellence 
that would increase the size and the external significance of science policy in the region.  
The initial government response to this fitted with its’ commitment to national policies; 
indeed, in 2003 it announced that all English regions would have some variant of science 
councils to promote the economic benefits of the regional science base.  However, in 
2004, a potential opportunity emerged to encourage national policy-makers to develop a 
more regionally differentiated approach to science funding.  The so-called “Northern 
Way” set out a programme for the revitalisation of the Northern Regions based upon 
using Government expenditure in investing in existing strengths rather than compensating 
for failures. This document gave specific prominence to the idea that universities could 
act as motors for promoting creativity and innovation in their regions.  In November 
2004, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced – apparently entirely unexpectedly – in 
the pre-budget statement, that three cities within the Northern Way were being designated 
as “science cities”, and invited them to produce proposals for additional government 
investment in facilities which could increase the economic impact on their regions.  In 
this section, we look at the Northern Way and Science City processes, at what emerged, 
how they used past successes in producing spin-outs, and the creation of a new spatially 
inflected concept, the Science City, within the UK national science and technology 
political economy. 
9.3.1 Compensating for the Sustainable Communities plan: the Northern Way 
Science and technology policy is not the only policy arena in which there is a strong 
spatial indifference which expresses itself in a focus on problems of national significance.  
In the early 2000s, the Government had decided that congestion in the south and east of 
the country was acting as a brake on national economic growth.  This was a national 
problem in the sense that it was constraining the growth of London, which is seen of 
especial importance because of its’ status as a ‘world city’.  The concept of ‘world city’ 
had entered the UK policy discourse in John Gummer’s time at the then-Department of 
the Environment, around 1995.  The analysis had remained largely unaltered during this 
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period; London’s regional economy was a motor for the whole UK; strong business 
service clusters were underpinned by the presence of overseas organisations whose 
alternative locations would be cities in other European countries rather than elsewhere in 
the UK.  Viewed within this conceptual framework, problems of congestion in and 
around London were then clearly a problem for the rest of the UK. 
The solution to this emerged late in 2003, under the title of the Sustainable Communities 
Plan (SCP).  This had been developed by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister to deal 
with the urban and congestion problems undermining economic growth.  However, in the 
course of that policy process, it became clear that very different places had different 
problems, not least that provincial cities were suffering from large scale urban blight, 
whilst the problem around London was much more one of congestion.  In the 2003 SCP, 
£5bn were allocated to develop four new ‘growth poles’ (i.e. new towns) around London, 
aiming to directly relieve the congestion, whilst a mere £½bn was provided to deal with 
the problems of housing blight facing northern cities.  In tandem with this, ODPM invited 
the three northern Regional Development Agencies to submit their own proposals for 
“growth pole” solutions for their regions.  This is what became the basis of The Northern 
Way, an attempt to improve the contribution of the northern regions to the overall 
economy by building on their assets and removing the barriers they faced to growth.  In 
the summer of 2004, the idea was developed into a final report, presented to Government 
in October 2004, and duly noted.  One of the main assets that the Northern Way 
highlighted was its’ knowledge infrastructure, highlighted in figure 16 below. 
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Figure 16 The knowledge economy of the north of England as depicted in the Northern 
Way report, September 2004. 
 
Source: the Northern Way, 2004. 
The value of this infrastructure was regarded as its potential for helping the three northern 
regions to close an apparent £39bn productivity gap with the rest of the UK43.  Within 
this, a key mechanism by which the Northern Way report legitimated its’ claim to be 
                                                 
43 This was calculated as the difference between average GVA levels, and what the UK’s GVA would be if 
the regions below average GVA improved to the level of the average. 
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about “widening the winner’s circle” was that this infrastructure had the potential to drive 
innovation.  As the final report noted:- 
“The Northern Way will make a full contribution to this national goal and drive 
innovation across the North, by establishing the Northern Science and Industry 
Initiative. We intend to:- 
• increase rates of science and technology based business start-ups and spinouts; 
and 
• increase private sector and public sector investment in research and 
development.” 
Source: The Northern Way 
The publication of the Northern Way was followed very shortly afterwards by a cryptic 
announcement from the Chancellor in the Pre-Budget Report, November 200444. 
“To build on our new ten year science framework with its £2.5 billion investment in 
science and to make Britain the best place for R and D, … 
• as part of their £100 million technology investment programme, the northern 
Regional Development Agencies will promote ‘Science Cities’ for the North, 
starting with Manchester, Newcastle and York.” 
9.3.2 The role of USOs in developing and legitimating the Science City concept 
The difference between what emerged in Newcastle and the two other first-round science 
cities was that there were not already proposals in place in Newcastle in November 2004.  
What appears to have been the case is that the proposal was extended to cover Newcastle 
because Manchester and York each had approached the Treasury in seeking additional 
government funding to support their own plans for knowledge-based growth.  In 
Manchester, the “Manchester: Knowledge Capital” (qv) ideas had been developed since 
late 2002, as part of the development of a so-called core city prospectus for the city.  In 
York, the Science City York programme had been running for six years, as a partnership 
between the university and the city council, and latterly, the RDA, Yorkshire Forward.  
York University were looking for new funds to invest in the redevelopment of their 
                                                 
44 The Pre Budget Report creates a framework to focus discussions around spending allocations in the run 
up to the Budget proper, which tends to take place four or five months after the PBR. 
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campus, the £500m Heslington East expansion, and the Chancellor’s announcement 
provided a mechanism for this.  By contrast, there were no such ready-made off-the-shelf 
science city activities  in the North East of England.   
HM Treasury invited the RDA and City Council to work together to submit a proposal for 
the science city to be considered within the 2005 budget process (for announcement in 
April 2005).  A partnership was formed between the RDA and City Council, and included 
the International Centre for Life and Newcastle University (as the two current hosts of 
leading scientific and translational assets)45.  This informal group met a number of times 
to develop these proposals, which were published late in February 2005 with the intention 
that this would be early enough to include announcements in the 2005 Budget.  The 
partnership developed a concept for the science city that argued that the region had 
already been successful in developing a novel form of science commercialisation, and 
that was a specifically ‘urban’ form of activity, hence the need for the science city idea. 
“2.2 The Science City will be, therefore, the location for high levels of a number 
of related activities. These include scientific research and development, as 
normally undertaken in a University environment, and University based research 
in social science and arts disciplines that facilitate the development and utilisation 
of new technologies. It will also encompass translational research and 
development and technology commercialisation, including the incubation of new 
businesses. Supporting these activities will be specialist services, including 
venture finance, legal services and business advice.” (p. 3) 
However, this was not a free-standing theory, part of its’ value as a theory was that 
claims could be made that the actors involved had already delivered cognate outcomes.  
Clearly, one exemplar for where this had already successfully been achieved was at the 
International Centre for Life (qv).  The concept that was promoted in the Science City 
prospectus was an enlargement to the ICfL site, along with creating two analogous 
developments on two further sites following this spatial model of organisation.  These 
                                                 
45 One of the authors of this report was involved in the development of the report on the basis of the work 
that had been done in this project establishing the wider value of spin-off companies to peripheral regions.  
Part of this paragraph relates the experience of the author in participating in this forum. 
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two sites were the University central campus and the Newcastle General Hospital site.  
As the prospectus noted,  
“in one concentrated area there may be related research, development, 
commercialisation, teaching, business incubation and specialist service provision. 
The benefits to be obtained from the co-location and inter-action of such activities 
has been effectively demonstrated by the International Centre for Life. The 
Science City will build on this experience at a larger scale” (p. 3).   
One of the sites that was to be promoted at the City Centre campus site covered  
“Molecular Engineering, bringing together converging disciplines of Chemical 
Engineering, Chemistry, Physics, Engineering and Nanotechnology, including the 
DTI-funded University Innovation Centre” (p. 5).   
In this way, parallels were drawn in the role to be played by INEX in the redevelopment 
of the university central campus to that of the ICfL for the Discovery Quarter (the name 
for the expanded Life Park activities).  Likewise, the prospectus also envisaged a role for 
the university departments as kernels of the activities, providing High Science Content 
assets to interact with commercialisation expertise and translational facilities on a single 
site.  We have already noted that spin-offs have played a role in legitimating the activity 
at the International Centre for Life.  By hosting a number of bioscience spin-off 
companies, and other activities closely involved with biotechnology spin-outs, such as 
CELS and BioNE2T, ICfL was able to transform others’ perceptions of it from a failing 
property and entertainment venture into a serious, successful and productive science 
activity46. Likewise, INEX was cited to show that the city’s (or region’s) expertise in 
commercialising science was not just a one-off asset, related to unique biotechnology 
capabilities, but that in other cases where the university had a strong research base, the 
university also had a set of skills in commercialising that knowledge.  In making that 
claim, what was used was of course a simplified version of INEX – portrayed as a centre 
                                                 
46 This should not be taken to imply that ICfL was a failure; the transformation in perception of its’ success 
is clearly inter-related with a transformation of its actual success .  Others’ perceptions are obviously 
affected by the production of beneficial outcomes and successful achievement of targets; so spin-offs 
affected others’ perceptions of ICfL’s success in this way because ICfL had been successful in supporting 
and encouraging them. 
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which had produced a number of spin-off companies.  The prospectus eventually sent to 
the Treasury in 2005 made the argument that the generalisability of the 
commercialisation and translational expertise in Newcastle meant that other high quality 
science activities in the university could benefit significantly by organising using ICfL 
‘extended science park’ concept. 
This provided two things to the science city planning process.  Firstly, it ensured that 
there was a ready-made science city concept for the North East, in a similar vein to 
Manchester: Knowledge Capital or York: East Heslington, grounding the theory into the 
region in a normative way.  The idea was worked into the region, and ‘stuck’ in the 
region, in a way that had actively to be pursued because of the lack of a previous 
ready-made science city concept.  Secondly, they demonstrated that there were other 
research activities in the region which were already producing commercial benefits; the 
implication was that those benefits could be increased qualitatively with the provision of 
some supporting infrastructure provision, and reorganising that provision around the 
extended science park concept.  The North East science city concept was around 
producing a set of extended science parks in the city, which would improve overall 
regional competitiveness, and ensure that translational activities benefited from 
externalisation benefits of locating in the creative milieu offered by core cities. 
The net effect of these two outcomes ensured that the North East, where there was not 
this history of activity, was not disadvantaged with respect to Manchester and York, 
where there had been considerable previous investment in the ideas and concepts.  We 
have already highlighted that there is a tendency in the national system for science and 
technology to reward past success and investment, by equating it with the scientific 
excellence necessary to produce national rewards.  What in this sense the ICfL and INEX 
case studies did was demonstrate the existence of “excellence” in the form of a proven 
past success in commercialisation.  This meant that Manchester (and to a lesser extent 
York) were prevented from dominating the Science City discussions on the grounds that 
past investment in them had already demonstrated success, whilst Newcastle had not. 
These past investments which had gone into the Manchester and York projects were not 
insignificant.  The new University for Manchester involved a one-off HEFCE 
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restructuring grant of £25m, and this was a key part of “Manchester: Knowledge 
Capital”.  The fact that the Northern Way took place within a discourse of encouraging 
success risked producing a set of policies which rewarded any existing success in the 
North, and which as a consequence would have encouraged concentration around 
Manchester.  It might have been possible had the North East not produced a convincing 
and plausible Science City concept - that was able to catch policy-makers attention - that 
the funds would have primarily gone to York and Manchester.  The link to spin-off 
companies is admittedly somewhat tenuous, but it does appear that the success of the 
science city concept in Newcastle was based on having two very different and successful 
projects, ICfL and INEX.  We have already demonstrated (cf. 8.4) that spin-offs were an 
important component in how those two projects came to be regarded as successful, and 
featured in how North East actors argued ‘their’ science city concept would produce 
tangible economic benefits. 
Since then, the Science City policy has been further rounded and developed in ways that 
are somewhat different to the original concept, which was of three city growth poles 
based on mixed use high-technology campuses  underwritten by the university and 
hospital.  The activity has been focused on developing a single site on the location of the 
former Newcastle Breweries at Gallowgate, Newcastle to extend the benefits of the 
university westwards and to help rebuild the city as well as creating new university estate.  
What is significant in this regard is that the spin-off companies were embedded within the 
discourses that the university used to develop the idea of the Science City concept to the 
point at which it was acceptable to external investors, in this case Government Ministers. 
9.3.3 Changing the political-economy – science cities for every region? 
In 9.3.2 above, we have briefly analysed how ‘USOs’ became intertwined in a policy 
which was being developed specifically for the North East of England.  One reading of 
this situation might be that Newcastle University’s experience with USOs shaped the way 
the Science City concept was developed in Newcastle.  Certainly, the Newcastle Science 
City concept was different to that being developed in either Manchester or York.  
Moreover, one of the Newcastle University academics who was involved in developing 
the policy was himself the academic principal of a spin-off from the university of 
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Newcastle.  This meant that the university was seen to have some expertise in the 
developing of the concept rather than merely involving detached academics in developing 
theoretical concepts. However, there are a number of limitations to this analysis.   
The first is that the way that USOs have become involved is principally in a symbolic 
manner, rather than in a direct and active manner, or even an indirect manner.  None of 
the USOs had themselves been actively lobbying for the creation of these facilities or 
building of critical mass in those facilities by attracting large-scale external investments.  
Although ICfL/ the North East did win the Institute for Bioinformatics, and the bid was 
designed by SMEs, those SMEs were not themselves USOs, but rather more established 
high technology regional firms.  Indeed, the of the twelve spin-offs we interviewed, only 
two were involved directly with ICfL or INEX in any kind of way involving technology 
knowledge-exchange manner, and other spin-offs used the facilities they offered.  Where 
USOs did seem to be important was in constructing the ‘success’ of these two projects; 
the fact that some spin-offs were produced was then presented as an indicator of future 
potential, rather than the quantitative benefits that these spin-offs have brought.  Indeed, 
the fact that Lord Sainsbury cited these spin-offs as signifiers of potential future benefit 
to validate a general approach suggests that this narrative was accepted at some level by 
external actors. 
The second issue relates to the significance of the “Science City” process.  In one way, 
the process was not important; HM Treasury, for example, were clear that the “Science 
City” concept provided an organisational principle for RDAs to arrange their science 
investments (cf. 9.3.1).  Moreover, in the March 2005 budget, a further three science 
cities were announced, Birmingham, Nottingham and Bristol, in the Midlands and South 
West, diluting any potential impact of the brand in privileging particular regions to be 
recipients of particular types of government investment.  Certainly, the local actors stated 
that the Science City initiative was important to them, and USOs were used in developing 
an argument about why they had the capacity to deliver the science city concept. 
However, the evolution of the concept into something more generic and national in scope 
suggests that the fundamental structural problem remains; the Science City prospectus 
was not a way for the North East to rescale its’ achievements, to argue that there was 
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something particularly special or noteworthy about INEX or ICfL that made them of 
national significance (and hence deserving of special investment). 
This then leads to the third issue, which is that there has clearly not been a change in the 
mode of organisation at a national level of science policy assumptions and framing 
approaches.  Regional science and science city concepts emerged in the ‘north’, with the 
potential to create special territorial claims for getting double economic value out of 
investing in science, as each pound spent would create productivity benefits but also 
bring regeneration benefits.  However, through national policy processes, in which even 
northern Universities have argued against having any kind of regional consideration 
within science funding priorities, these spatially-rooted concepts have become rescaled as 
‘national’ concepts, and then reapplied to the regions in ways that allow the inherent 
spatial biases towards the south and east of the country to re-emerge. 
Although this appears somewhat pessimistic, it is possible to regard the Science City 
process as a positive outcome in one regard.  Although the region does exist in a 
subaltern relationship with the national political-economy of science and technology, the 
region itself is not a simple object, it has internal dynamics.  It is possible that internal 
changes may alter the intrinsic value of the region to others, thereby reworking it within 
that political economy.  Just as we saw in chapters 6 and 7, how the university reworked 
its internal mechanisms to improve its external impact, so the regional innovation system  
has the potential to undertake a similar programme of change.  In 8.3.1, we indicated how 
one actor argued there was a tendency in the North East to spread any resources very 
thinly.  This undoubtedly relates to the fact that much public expenditure in the region is 
redistribution and compensating for failure directed through local authorities and 
partnerships; the RDA very early on took the decision that 75% of its budget would be 
devolved downwards to sub-regional partnerships – thereby spreading those resources 
across the region.  That philosophy is at odds with contemporary thinking around science 
policy, emphasising, as we have seen, concentration through its’ equation with 
excellence, and excellence as the source of the national economic benefits. 
Previous regional science and technology investments have had a distinctly distributive 
feeling; the Three Rivers project in the 1990s was about creating technology centres in 
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each sub-region, likewise, early incarnations of Knowledge House were about creating 
regional networks and capacity, rather than investing purely in excellence.  Even in the 
initial UIC proposal in 2001, the funds were split between all five institutions, albeit 
somewhat unevenly.  However, the Science City prospectus makes two apparently 
significant steps in the direction of concentration.  Firstly, the prospectus states that 
partners recognise the reality that competing in the knowledge economy necessitates the 
centrality of urban places to knowledge production. Secondly, it privileges a single 
institution, in this case Newcastle University, as the recipient of funds to produce these 
benefits.  If the North East were to aggressively concentration its’ regional funding into 
producing a very limited number of centres of excellence, then the exemplars of INEX 
and ICfL suggest that this will yield more national and international (particularly 
European) research and experimental development funds.  Thus, although the Science 
City prospectus process was not highly significant externally, it could be regarded as a 
step to realigning regional science policy framework towards competing more 
aggressively for national spending. 
9.4 Spin-offs and the new political-economy of the North East of England 
in the knowledge age 
In this chapter, we have considered how successful commercialisation activities – in 
which USOs have comprised part of the justification of their success – have challenged 
the subaltern position of the North East in the UK’s science political-economy.  The 
political-economy is dominated by a series of discourses which are apparently spatially 
indifferent, drawing on seemingly spatially neutral ideas such as ‘excellence’, ‘quality’, 
‘efficiency’ and ‘economic value to the UK’.  Although these notions do not contain any 
inherent spatial biases, the way they have become conceptualised in the UK creates 
barriers to less successful places improving their own position.  The neutrality of these 
discourses hides the fact that UK science and technology investment is channelled into a 
relatively limited number of places, and that recent determination to concentrate 
investment is threatening to further accentuate this uneven geography.  For a region like 
the North East, it is clear that these spatial imbalances can be challenged with some 
degree of success.  Clearly, INEX has been able to establish that it is a centre of 
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excellence, and the UK interest in FP VII, for example, lies in ensuring that INEX 
receives capital investment from the European Commission.   
This raises questions about the significance of this particular change, and the extent to 
which it has made the North East better regarded as a place to do science.  It is possible to 
segment the construction and operation of the science political-economy into three levels, 
specific, general and paradigmatic, and use this segmentation to examine the extent and 
the significance of those changes.  The specific level is in particular decisions and 
outcomes, determining how particular programmes with operate and deciding which 
regions will benefit in particular projects.  The general level is the agenda for science 
policy, deciding which disciplines to fund, producing mechanisms for allocating 
resources, and implementing concepts into policy measures.  The paradigmatic level is 
the background assumptions underpinning science policy, so answering questions such as 
why publicly fund science, in whose benefit is science funded, and what benefits will 
flow out from that science. 
In this research project, looking at the territorial (regional) impacts of USOs, our view of 
significance of particular outcomes is framed as the degree to which particular 
USO-related outcomes embed particular spatial activities into regularities which lead to 
recurrent science and technology investment.  In this sense, the least significant activities 
are those which ‘bend’ particular projects and programmes towards a territory.  Although 
we have seen that investment flows tend to endure, there is also a tendency to value flows 
into the South East higher than those into the peripheral areas, often implicitly hiding 
assumptions about how the economy operates.  This is neatly illustrated by S&TC in 
arguing why they believed a national nanotechnology institution should be located in the 
core regions:- 
“The Institute of Nanotechnology-led survey for the DTI on the industrial 
nanotechnology landscape indicated that at present the geographical balance of 
companies involved in nanotechnology is tilted towards the Midlands and the 
south of the UK. There would, not unreasonably, be strong pressure from industry 
to ensure that any new facilities would be sited in this region. Indeed, there is still 
significant pressure in this respect. We were told by Patrick McDonald from the 
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DTI that ‘it is essential to build on the critical mass we have at the moment, so 
Oxford and Cambridge, London. We have to build on those’.” (S&TC 2004a, 
para. 44) 
This suggests that changes embedded at the generic and paradigmatic scales are more 
significant in determining longer-term changes to the political-economy of science and 
technology.  In science and technology policy, for example, the concepts of “excellence” 
and “quality” ensure that in many cases, ceteris paribus institutions in the Golden 
Triangle are favoured. Changing this (or any of the) paradigmatic assumption is a huge 
task, and would indeed represent a real change in the UK’s political-economy of science 
and technology.  At a more generic level, for example, Warwick University has managed 
to build a generic advantage in manufacturing technologies, ensuring that researchers 
close to the Warwick Manufacturing Group are able to draw on some of the esteem of 
that research group. 
In the case of Newcastle, there appears to be evidence that changes have been achieved at 
the level of the specific; INEX and the life science research around ICfL have been able 
to attract particular flagship government projects in nanotechnology and biotechnology 
respectively.  Indeed, DTI expenditure on nanotechnology R&D is heavily geared 
towards the northern regions, and the North East achieves the greatest share of any single 
region (some feat given that it is the smallest of all the English regions in terms of 
population, workforce and economy).  This situation arises as a consequence of INEX 
being built up by a core team within the university, and gradually expanding its’ reach 
outwards as it became more plausible and worthy as an investment proposition.  Thus, it 
could be said that the creation of INEX as a multi-scalar asset network has resulted in the 
North East being made into a place to do nanotechnology manufacturing research.  This 
construction has been achieved in part through the success of INEX, which did drew on 
success with USOs to validate its’ approach to commercialisation. 
The evidence is less convincing at the level of the generic; what is clear is that there was 
a change to the science agenda around the year 2000, what Perry (2003) calls a 
switch-point, associated with the Daresbury closure announcement.  This allowed two 
regional science issues to be placed on the agenda, regional science funding, and 
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peripheral technopoles.  In each case, these items came onto the agenda, but it was not 
possible to legitimate those ideas within the current paradigm of UK science policy.  
With regional science councils, the idea was first proposed in the North West, and 
transferred to the North East via consultants Arthur D. Little.  By 2003, however, in 
response to a Lords Inquiry into science and regional development, the Government had 
decided that all regions would establish such councils, ensuring that there was no 
possibility for these institutions to undertake special interest pleading.  One of the next 
wave of science councils to form was in the South East (SESTAC), who developed a set 
of model guidelines for science councils at the behest of the RDAs and Research 
Councils.  Thus, an idea which was heavily contextualised when initially developed was 
rescaled away from the region into something acceptable to the UK science and 
technology paradigm.  Likewise, this appears to have happened with the case of the 
“science cities”, with a concept designed to use science to deal with problems of 
dereliction and housing market collapse in northern cities being extended to cities in the 
Midlands with much less need for regeneration (but with arguably stronger science 
bases). 
Clearly, then, these changes have had almost no impact on the paradigmatic structure of 
science and technology in the UK; had regional science established itself at the generic 
level, with the emergence of particular dedicated regional science funds, then that might 
have been followed by a switch at the paradigmatic level.  Regional science remains 
almost anathemic as an organisational principle in the UK science and technology 
economy, suggesting inefficiency, waste, and interference, and obliterating the potential 
it has (and has elsewhere been demonstrated to have) to improve national productivity by 
relieving congestion pressures in the core at the same time as promoting high-technology 
economic growth in the periphery.  Research Councils UK, in its evidence to the Lords 
Inquiry, demonstrated how the science paradigm actively undermines the embedding of 
regional approaches to science, creating and insisting on a tension between excellence 
and regional policy goals. 
“There is a natural tension between the Research Councils and RDAs in terms of 
remit. Research Councils are committed to supporting excellent research to meet 
national needs and do not have a regional funding policy. The regional focus of 
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RDAs can provide specific and targeted opportunities for joint working and 
exploitation of the Research Councils research.” (LS&TC, 2003, p. 303). 
In the introduction to this chapter, we raised the idea that challenging the 
political-economy of science and technology required a rescaling of activities, making 
local successes of the equivalent scale to national interests.  At a very specific level, some 
upscaling has taken place, with INEX and ICfL regarded as centres of national 
excellence, and hence strategic national importance.  However, it has not been possible 
thus far for these very specific improvements to produce more general changes.  It could 
be that the North East could develop sufficient of these successes in ways that led 
Newcastle more generally to be regarded as an institution in the national interest, which 
in turn led to a favourable presumption towards the region.  And whilst the evidence in 
this chapter suggests that this outcome is possible, it also suggests the magnitude of the 
task necessary to achieve those changes.  It has taken concerted effort from within the 
university for ten years to achieve those successes.  Admittedly, some of that concerted 
effort was about removing internal barriers and problems, and creating a more 
excellence- and growth-driven university, and that effort should not have to be fully 
repeated in the future.  Some of that effort was about creating and restoring an aura of 
plausibility to Newcastle’s reputation as a university undertaking commercially valuable 
science.  However, making the change from to being an institution of strategic national 
importance appears to be a long way in the future, requiring considerable further effort 
and success from within the university. 
In the previous paragraph, there is a suggestion that some particular one-off changes 
within the university can produce recurrent benefits in terms of portraying the institution 
as one of national significance.  The question is the extent to which USOs are recurrent 
benefits for portraying the university as successful.  Clearly, in the case of Newcastle, its 
cultural transformation was assisted by the sale of Novocastra, and the failure to extract 
value from Mindware.  It could be that creating a stream of successful spin-off companies 
in fields in which the university has technological strengths will help in the creation of 
these large and nationally remarkable projects.  It could be that the Stephenson Centre, 
for the sake of argument, was able to attract significant external funding justified in terms 
of its capacity to deal no only with existing local firms but also to create new spin-outs 
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itself from the research capacity within the university.  The Institute for Ageing and 
Health mooted under the Science City project likewise needs to demonstrate commercial 
benefits, and a mix of emergent and existing USOs may enable this institute in the future 
to establish its’ national strategic importance.  Obviously, this is something which we are 
not in a position to currently answer, but it raises issues for the comparative analysis – we 
have observed that in some cases, spin-offs have come out of big, eye-catching projects, 
but this suggests the converse might also be true, that spin-offs might make it easier in the 
future to legitimate such flagship activities. 
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10 Concluding discussion 
This report has been prepared as part of a comparative project looking at two less 
successful regions, to explore the extent to which spin-off companies have played an role 
in changing the economic status of the region.  In one sense, it is hard to draw firm 
conclusions from the single case study which allow the more general development of 
theory, because our generalisation is based on drawing across multiple case studies.  
However, the case study does appear to suggest that spin-offs have played a role in the 
economic impacts of the university in the region.  There appears to be some evidence – as 
with the case of Twente – that these impacts have been achieved through upscaling 
particular regional activities and giving them a wider economic significance.  USOs have 
in turn been embedded in those activities, and been an important manner of the way that 
those activities have been upscaled, often through their discursive powers and capacities 
to be valued by external agents because of their fulfilment of ‘commercialisation’ and 
their promise of future ‘entrepreneurship’. 
The Newcastle story appears remarkable because a series of unremarkable activities seem 
to have given rise to a fundamentally successful outcome.  Taking any five year period in 
the recent history of Newcastle University, it would appear that the importance of 
commercialisation ebbed and flowed without leaving a significant impact.  However, 
what can be seen is that a series of activities have gradually accreted that appear to have 
culminated in a shift in the way that the region is regarded by one section of external 
investors in science and technology, namely the UK government, and that that could 
potentially presage a shift in the position of the region in the political-economy of science 
and technology.  In this final concluding discussion, we produce a revised narrative of the 
key events and their outcomes in which their significance is embedded within a narrative 
of how Newcastle became important to the UK government in achieving some parts of 
their policy programme which could not be achieved within the extant policy paradigm 
(referred to in the previous chapter as lacking spatial nuance).  From that synthetic 
narrative which begins to establish the wider significance of the university and 
USO-centred events, it then becomes possible to hint at a broader story for the 
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relationship between universities, USOs and the territorial economic development of their 
host regions. 
10.1 Spin-offs and the rescaling of economic activities in the periphery 
The recent history of the latest phase regional economic engagement at Newcastle 
University begins in the early 1980s, with the creation of the Newcastle Technology 
Centre as well as the inauguration of HESIN as an organ for inter-university 
collaboration.  In this period, the university stated its commitment to creating spin-off 
activities and commercialisation activity.  At the same time as this, a number of spin-off 
activities emerged.  The North East at the time was a very hostile economic environment, 
the manufacturing economy was imploding under Thatcherite monetarism, and there 
were very few endogenous or exogenous resources which could be used to build 
sustainable firms.  Within this, the university played a role as a safe haven from the 
hostile environment, and a number of early spin-out companies emerged as annexes to 
research groups, with the university’s benign indifference allowing professors and 
research staff to anchor themselves using the university’s cachet and resources to build up 
companies. Newcastle Technology Centre was not particularly helpful in this regard, but 
it did provide some technology services for some of these starting companies, in a 
number of cases around writing business plans and other activities which could help win 
further finance. 
The next phase of the university’s activities was the phase of greater support under 
NUVentures, in which the university sought to more pro-actively identify investment 
opportunities within academic research groups and encourage the formation of 
companies.  This increased openness to entrepreneurship – in the early and mid 1990s – 
was as vital to allowing some of the first wave of spin-offs to remain within the 
university as it was to promoting the second wave of spin-offs identified in Chapter 5.  A 
number of the companies which were to grow to be the largest were those which formed 
earliest but then stayed for a long period of time within the university.  The problem 
during this phase was that there was some uncertainty over the value of spin-off policy, 
and in particular the lack of a large demonstration effect that spin-offs could help to 
support the core missions of the university.  In tandem with this continued benign 
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indifference, the university embarked upon the International Centre for Life investment 
which provided some incubation space for high-technology companies.  So, in this 
second phase, important seeds were sown for the third phase of spin-offs, covering the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. 
In this third phase, the university began to realise that spin-offs had territorial benefits, 
but also that USOs could be instrumentally useful as part of developing arguments for 
larger scale investments.  With respect to the former, in chapter 8 we have seen how the 
university activities helped to shape and embed a particular regional sequence of 
innovation, and take what was hitherto a low science content activity, and create a 
network of activities oriented towards high science content activities (those activities 
which are themselves most groundbreaking and form part of the stories of ‘totemic sites’ 
averred to in Chapter 2).  With respect to the latter, the university began using their 
success with USOs to win more regional development funds that could be spent in such a 
way that they were invested in “second stream” scientific research (i.e. core mission).  
These expenditures in turn helped to win bigger projects and activities.  With the case of 
INEX in chapter 9, we have seen that USOs were continually used as a way of 
demonstrating in a very practical way the potential economic value of further investment 
in the research base alongside a commercialisation infrastructure.  Thus, the ‘building up’ 
of the justification for, and the reality of, ICfL and INEX has involved several waves of 
reference to USOs, generic spin-off successes indicating a demand for incubators, the 
success of biotech spin-outs of the potential for a strong regional biotech industry, the 
emergence of nanotechnology spin-offs justifying the new pedagogic approach taken by 
INEX through the so-called Newcastle approach. 
The enhanced value of these activities is further validated through the Science City 
discussions and policy which emerged from November 2004.  By early 2004, INEX and 
ICfL were in effect two freestanding nodes strongly connected into global networks of 
scientific production and weakly connected to the corporate development of Newcastle 
University.  Through the Science City process, these two examples were used to illustrate 
to policy-makers what could be achieved with the Newcastle approach, particularly in 
terms of creating high-technology growth poles to close the regional productivity gap 
with the south of England (a core concern of DTI and ODPM through their Public 
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Service Agreements with the Treasury).  Even within this attempt to change or influence 
national policy, USOs were a visible part of the discussions and presentation from the 
Newcastle Science City Partnership (2005).  According to a Newcastle University Press 
release in September 2005, the UK Minister for Science, Lord Sainsbury argued  
“UK science and innovation are key to meeting the challenges of an increasingly 
competitive global knowledge economy. Science Cities will be one of the focal 
points for transforming the best of British ideas and discoveries into new products 
and services.” (Newcastle University Press Release 23rd September 2005, 
available online at  
www.ncl.ac.uk/press.office/press.release/content.phtml?ref=1127321865  
This then suggests an outline model for the upscaling process, by which spin-offs, the 
result of a variety of Newcastle University policies, were embedded within these larger 
outcomes.  The first is that the university created itself as a ‘point of stability’ within an 
adverse, sparse or hostile regional economic environment for entrepreneurship and 
innovation.  The second is that the university built up a community within that point of 
stability, that drew sufficient innovative and entrepreneurial elements from outside the 
university into this space of stability that it behaved as an effective micro-regional 
innovation system.  This micro-RIS behaviour was in turn taken forward by a number of 
industrial sectors, such as elements of biotechnology and nanotechnology, which 
demonstrated particular elements of success.  In parallel with this, the university 
continued to invest in these areas, thus particular key nodes within this micro-RIS built 
up to be more resistant to the corrosive powers of the external environment in their own 
right. 
The success and stability of these key nodes, such as INEX and ICfL in turn allowed the 
university to convince policy-makers and investors that investing in Newcastle or the 
North East of England would help them meet their own needs.  However, the way that the 
institutional space was configured meant that these investments helped to reinforce the 
micro-RIS, and so helped to increase its scope of activity and hence its regional footprint.  
Most recently, this micro-RIS appears to have been upscaled to the urban scale, or at least 
to have that potential, as represented within the Science City policy, which may create a 
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recurrent funding stream to invest in science in the North East of England.  This would 
represent a(-n arguably beneficial) shift of the North East’s position within the political-
economy of science and technology, which (and this is where the narratives lacks any 
more substance than pure conjecture).  This rescaling is represented diagrammatically in 
figure 14 below. 
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Figure 17 The rescaling effects of Newcastle University through the regional innovation 
system, national policy paradigms and global production networks 
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10.2 Universities, their spin-offs and regional economic development in the 
periphery 
The concluding question to which we turn in this working paper is the wider paper posed 
within the literature review (p.13) 
“how can university spin-offs rework political-economic relationships in ways 
that improve the situation of their host regions in wider knowledge-based 
economies”? 
There seems to be a heuristic emerging from this single case of Newcastle University, 
and the heuristic is worth enunciating as a first step towards building a better-rounded 
conceptualisation drawing equally on the second case study, of the Twente region.  There 
does seem to be evidence that although spin-offs are ‘small’ actors, and unconvincing as 
sole agents of change in the North East, in the case of Newcastle, USOs have become 
inter-woven in bigger trajectories of activity.  It is these larger trajectories of activity 
which have developed particular types of ‘success’ and allowed them to be seen as ‘big’ 
actors within national policy discourses.  Of course, what is not clear within this heuristic 
is any kind of typology of or dynamics for the development of “trajectories of activity” 
which have the potential to challenge the scalar envelope to re-place the North East of 
England within its wider political-economic context. 
The heuristic seems to be that USOs are associated with the development of what might 
be considered as points of stability around universities.  Universities are large businesses, 
but do not necessarily have ‘space’ for spin-outs.  The policy of actively supporting 
spin-outs over twenty years at Newcastle seems to have created a protected space in 
which a number of inter-related activities have been able to slowly incubate.  Only when 
there is a genuinely world class strength in commercially exploitable research (or at least 
the imminent promise of that) has the activity or RIS been rescaled upwards to increase 
the relational value of Newcastle to other external economic actors. This does seem to fit 
neatly with the kinds of relational/ innovative thinking about old peripheral regions that is 
emerging elsewhere in the literature (inter alia Chapman et al., 2004; Bathelt & Boggs, 
2005).  This literature seems to provide the natural departure point for attempting to 
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conceptualise more generally on the nature of regional economic development in the 
periphery from the two case studies in this project. 
 
223 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
11 Bibliography 
ARC (2002) National survey of research commercialisation, Canberra: Australian 
Research Council. 
Aksoy, A. & Marshall, N. (1992) ‘The changing corporate head office and its spatial 
implications,’ Regional Studies 26 (2) pp 149-162. 
Allen, J. (1992) ‘Services and the UK space economy: regionalisation and economic 
dislocation,’ Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 17 pp 123-142. 
Angle Technology (2001) North East Bio Science cluster mapping, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, ONE. 
Amin, A. & Palan, R. (2001) “Towards a non-rationalist international political economy” 
Review of international political economy,  8 (4) pp.559-577. 
Asheim, B and Coenen, L. (2003) “What can a learning region approach offer the 
ordinary region?” paper presented to “Geography, serving society and the environment” 
RGS-IBG International Annual Conference, 3rd-5th September 2003, London. 
AUTM (2003) AUTM Licensing survey: FY 2001, Northbrook, IL: Association of 
University Technology Managers. 
Benneworth P.S. (1999), ‘The future for relations between Higher Education and RDAs,’ 
Regions 220 p 15-22  
Benneworth, P. S. (2001) “Long-term academic relationships and high-technology small 
firms” Enterprise and Innovation Management Studies 2 (2) pp 1-13. 
Benneworth, P. S. (2001) Regional Development Agencies — their early years 
1998-2001, Seaford: Regional Studies Association. 
Benneworth, P. S. (2002) “Creating new industries and service clusters on Tyneside” 
Local Economy 17 (4) pp 313-327 
Benneworth, P. S. (2004a) “Breaking the mould: new technology sectors in an old 
industrial region” International Journal of Biotechnology 5 (3/4) pp 249-264. 
Benneworth, P. (2004b) “Questioning the role of ‘culture’ in territorial innovation: 
reflections on diverse perspectives” in Sotarauta, M & Kosonoen, K. J. (eds) “The 
Invisible Dynamics of Development Processes” (in Finnish) 
Benneworth, P. S. (2004c) “In what sense ‘regional development’? entrepreneurship, 
underdevelopment and strong tradition in the periphery” Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, 16 (6) pp 437-458. 
Benneworth, P. S. & Charles, D. R. (2005) “University spin off companies and the 
territorial knowledge pool: building regional innovation competencies?” European 
Planning Studies, 13 (4) pp. 537-557. 
Benneworth, P. S. & Dawley, S. J. (2004) “The territorial development of innovation 
support assets through university / business interactions: towards a dynamic model” in R. 
224 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Wink (ed), Academia-Business Links in UK and Germany: Policy Outcomes and Lessons 
Learnt, London: Palgrave 
Benneworth, P. & Hodgson, C. (2004) “Scrutinising science policy? lessons from the 
New and Renewable Energy Centre” Report to the “Strategy for Success” scrutiny panel, 
Newcastle: CURDS. 
Benneworth, P. S. & Whitehurst, F. (2001) ‘The ‘wicked issues’ of clusters, clustering 
and cluster policy: making practical sense of diverse academic debates and discussions’ 
The Regional Review: the publication of the Yorkshire and the Humber Regional 
Research Observatory, 11 (2). 
Blair, P. (1991) ‘Trends in local autonomy and democracy: reflections from a European 
perspective’ in Batley, R. & Stoker. G (eds) Local Government in Europe: trends and 
developments, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Chapman, K. MacKinnon, D. and Cumbers, A. 2004 Adjustment or renewal in regional 
clusters? A study of diversification amongst SMEs in the Aberdeen Oil complex. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, v. 29 (3), 382-94 
Charles in Blackburn 2000 
Charles, D. R. & Benneworth, P. S. (2000) “Clustering and economic complexity — 
regional clusters of the ICT sector in the UK” paper presented to Do clusters matter in 
innovation policy? OECD Cluster Group Workshop, Utrecht, Netherlands, 8th-9th May 
2000. 
Charles, D. R. & Benneworth, P. S. (2001) ‘Are we realising our potential? — joining up 
science and technology policy in the English regions’ Regional Studies 35 (1) pp 73-79. 
Charles, D. R., Perry, B., & Benneworth, P. (2003) Regions and science policy, Seaford: 
Regional Studies Association. 
Chatterton, P (1998) “A dialogue between universities and their partners: A comparison 
between different regions in Europe”, A report to the Association of European 
Universities (CRE) and the European Commission examining the North-East Region of 
England, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
Clarysse, B., Wright, M., Lockett, A., Velde, E vd., and Vorhora, A. (2004) “Spinning 
out new ventures?: a typology of incubation strategies from European research 
institutions” University of Gent Faculty of Economics and Business Studies Working 
Paper 2004/ 228. 
Cooke, P. N. (1995a) ‘Keeping to the high-road: learning, reflexivity and associational 
governance in regional economic development’ in P. N. Cooke (ed) The rise of the 
rustbelt, London: ICL Press. 
Cooke, P. (2004) “Systemic innovation: Triple Helix,Scalar Envelope, or Knowledge 
Spirals: an overview” paper presented to “Regionalization of Innovation Policy – Options 
and Experiences” German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) 4th-5th June 
2004, Berlin (D). 
CVCP (1994) as Goddard, J B, Charles, D, Pike, A, Potts, G and Bradley, D (1994), 
Universities and Communities. London, CVCP 
225 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Dahlstrand, A.-L. (1999) “Technology-based SMEs in the Göteborg region: their origin 
and interaction with universities and large firms” Regional  Studies 33 (4) pp 379-389. 
Department of Trade and Industry (1998) Our competitive future: building the 
knowledge-driven economy, London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office. 
Department of Trade and Industry (2001) Opportunity for all — a White Paper on 
enterprise, skills and innovation, London: The Stationary Office 
Department of Trade and Industry (1999) “Biotechnology clusters” Report of a team led 
by Lord Sainsbury, Minister for Science, London: DTI. 
Available online at: http://www.dti.gov.uk/biotechclusters/  
Dubini, P. 1989 The influence of motivations and environment on business start-ups: 
some hints for public policy Journal of Business Venturing 4: 11-26. 
Van Duinen, L., (2005) Planning Imagery: the emergence and political acceptance of 
planning concepts in Dutch national planning, Ph.D. thesis.  
Elbaum, B., & Lazonick, W. (1986) ‘An institutional perspective on British decline’ in B. 
Elbaum, & W. Lazonick, (eds) The decline of the British economy, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Elgen, J., Gottschalk, S., & Rammer, C. (2004) “Location decisions of spin-offs from 
public research institutions” Industry and innovation 11 (3) pp. 207-223. 
Fawcett, C. B. (1919) Provinces of England – a study of some geographical aspects of 
devolution (rev ed 1961) London: Hutchinson. 
Freeman T W 1959 The c Fraser, D. (1999) “Universities and communities: cases from 
North East of England” in H. Gray (ed) Universities and the creation of wealth, 
Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Freeman, C. (1995) ‘The National System of Innovation in a historic perspective’ 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 18 (1) pp 5-24. 
Fontes, M. & Coombs, R. (2001) ‘Contribution of new technology based firms to the 
strengthening of technological capabilities in intermediate economies’ Research policy 30 
pp 79-97 
Goddard, J. B. (2004) “Science/Industry Partnerships and Regional Development” paper 
presented to “Knowledge based regional development and innovation” The transition 
towards a knowledge based economy, European Regions Knowledge Based Innovation 
Network Conference, Florence, Italy, November 25th-26th 2004 
Greene, F. G., Mole, K. F., & Storey, D. S. (2004) "Does more mean worse? Three 
decades of enterprise policy in the Tees valley", Urban Studies, 41(7) pp. 1207-1228 
T. M. Greenhow (1831) “The expediency of establishing an academic institution, of the nature of a college 
or university, for the promotion of literature and science, more especially amongst the middle classes of the 
community, briefly considered”, Paper read to the Literature and Philosophical Society of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, April 5 1831, 13pp.  Available in Newcastle University Library Archive. 
Greco, L. (2002) Industrial restructuring, London: Ashgate 
Hansson, F. Husted, K. & Vestergaard, J. (2004) Rethinking science parks – from 
structural holes jockeys to social capital catalysts, Technovation (25), 1039-1049..  
226 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Hassink, R. (1992) ‘Regional innovation policy: case studies from the Ruhr Area, 
Baden-Württemburg and the North East of England’ Netherlands Geographical Studies, 
Utrecht: Utrecht University Press. 
Hassink, R, Lagendijk, A. (2001) ‘The dilemma of inter-regional institutional learning’ 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 19: 65-84. 
Heim, C. E. (1985) ‘Interwar responses to regional decline’ in B. Elbaum & W. Lazonick 
(eds) The decline of the British economy, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Heim, C. E. (1988) ‘Government Research Establishments, state capacity and distribution 
of industrial policy in Britain’ Regional Studies 22 (5) pp. 375-386. 
HEFCE (2002) “Higher education-business interaction survey”, HEFCE Research Report 
01/68, London: HEFCE 
Heydebreck, P, Klofsten, M and Maier, J. C. (2000) ‘Innovation support for new 
technology based firms: the Swedish Teknopol approach’ R&D Management 30 (1) pp 
89-100. 
Hospers, G.J. (2004a), Regional Economic Change in Europe: A Neo-Schumpeterian 
Vision, LIT-Verlag, Münster/London 
Howells, J. (1992) ‘Patterns of research and development’ in P. Townroe & R. Martin 
(eds), Regional Development in the 1990s: The UK in Transition, London: Jessica 
Kingsley. 
Hudson R. (1989b) Wrecking a region - state policies, party politics and regional change 
in north east England, London: Pion. 
Hudson, R. (1995) ‘The role of foreign inward investment’ in L. Evans, P. Johnson & B. 
Thomas, (eds) The Northern Regional Economy:  progress and prospects in the North of 
England, London: Mansell. 
Hudson, R. (2002) Changing industrial production system industry regional development 
in the New Europe Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 27: 262-281. 
Johannisson, B. 1993 Designing supportive contexts for emerging enterprises in 
Karlsson, C., Johannisson, B. and Storey D. (eds) Small Business Dynamics, (London, 
Routledge) 117-142. 
Keck, O. (1993) ‘The National System for Technical Innovation in Germany’ in R. R. 
Nelson (ed) National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kenney, M. & Burg, U. (2000) “Paths and Regions: The Creation and Growth of Silicon 
Valley” In R. Garud and P. Karnoe (Eds.) 2000, Path Creation and Path Dependence, 
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. 
Kirby, D. (1995) ‘The development of the service sector’ in L. Evans, P. Johnson & B. 
Thomas, (eds) The Northern Regional Economy:  progress and prospects in the North of 
England, London: Mansell. 
Klein Woolthuis, R. (1999) Sleeping with the Enemy: Trust Dependence and Contract in 
Interorganisational Relationships, University of Twente Press, Enschede, the Netherlands 
227 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Klein Woolthuis, R. (2004) Developing networks and clusters in Twente and the East of 
England: towards a process model for policy implementation” in P. C. van der Sijde, A. 
Ridder & A. J. Groen (eds) Entrepreneurship and innovation: essays in honour of Win 
During, University of Twente Press, Enschede, the Netherlands. 
Klofsten, M. & Jones-Evans, D. (2000) “Comparing academic entrepreneurship in 
Europe: the case of Sweden and Ireland” Small Business Economics 14 (2) pp 299-309. 
Lagendijk, A (1999), Good practices in SME Cluster Initiatives: Lessons from the Core 
Regions and Beyond, Newcastle, CURDS.  
Lagendijk A. (2003) “Towards conceptual quality in regional studies: the need for subtle 
critique — A response to Markusen” Regional Studies, 37 (6/7) pp. 719-727.  
Lawton Smith, H., Glasson, J., Simmie, J., Chadwick, A. and Clark, G. (2003) 
Enterprising Oxford: the growth of the Oxfordshire high technology economy, Oxford: 
Oxfordshire Economic Observatory. 
Lawson, C. (1999) Towards a competence theory of the region. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 23, 151-166. 
Loebl, H. (1978) ‘Government-financed factories and the establishment of industries by 
refugees in the special areas of the north of England, 1937-1961’ Unpublished M. Phil 
thesis, Durham: University of Durham. 
Loebl, H. (2001) Outsider in: memoirs of business and public work in the North East of 
England 1951-1984, Gosforth, Newcastle: Fen Drayton Press. 
Lords Science and Technology Sub-Committee B (2003) Science and the Regional 
Development Agencies, London: The Stationary Office 
Lorenz, E. (1999) Trust, contract and economic cooperation, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 23: 301-315. 
Lovering, J. (1999) ‘Theory led by policy: the inadequacies of the ‘new regionalism’ 
(illustrated from the case of Wales)’ International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 23 (2) pp. 379-395. 
Lundvall, B.-A. (1993) ‘Explaining inter-firm co-operation and innovation – limits of the 
transaction cost approach,’ in G. Grahber (ed) The embedded firm - on the 
socio-economics of industrial networks, Routledge, London 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (1998) “Why study national systems and national styles of innovation?” 
Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 10 (4) pp. 407-421. 
McKay D. H., & Cox, A. W. (1979) The politics of urban change, London: Croom Helm. 
Markusen, A. R. (1999) ‘Fuzzy concepts, scanty evidence, policy distance: the case for 
rigour and policy relevance in critical regional studies’ Regional Studies 33 (9) pp. 
869-884. 
Marvin, S. & Cornford, J. (1993) ‘Regional policy implications of utility regionalisation’, 
Regional Studies 27 pp. 159-163. 
Maskell, P. & Malmberg, P. (1999) “Localised learning and industrial competitiveness” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23 (1) pp. 167-185.  
228 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Massey, D., Quintas, P. and Wield, D. (1992) Hi-technology fantasies, London: 
Routledge. 
Milward, B. (2003) Globalisation? Internationalisation and monopoly capitalism: 
historical processes and capitalist dynamism, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar  
Muller, E. & Zenker, A. (2001) ‘Business services as actors of knowledge 
transformation: the role of KIBS in regional and national innovation systems’ Research 
Policy, 30 (9) pp 1501-1516.  
Musson, S (2005) “‘We used to make things here’ Manufacturing in the local economy of 
Oldham” paper presented at: “The role of ‘industrial knowledges’ in economic 
development of post-industrial regions.” RSA Workshop, CURDS, University of 
Newcastle 14th – 15th February 2005 
Newcastle Science City Partnership (2005) “Newcastle Science City: Outline Concepts 
and Development” HM Treasury budget submission, prepared by Newcastle City 
Council, ONE and Newcastle University. 
Niosi, J. & Reid, S. (2004) “Biotechnology and Nanotechnology: Science-based Enabling 
Technologies as Windows of Opportunity for LDCs?” paper presented to The Second 
Globelics Conference: Innovation Systems and Development, Emerging Opportunities 
and Challenges Beijing, China, October 16th -20th   
North East Vision (2005) “The right chemistry: a North East Vision special report”, 
North East Vision March 2005, Trinity Mirror: Newcastle upon Tyne. pp 31-47. 
Northern Way (2005) Moving forward: the Northern Way: business plan 2005-2008, 
Newcastle: the Northern Way. 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2003) “Sustainable Communities: Building for the 
future”, London: ODPM. 
Pirnay, F. Surlemont, B. and Nlemvo, F. (2003) “Towards a typology of university 
spin-offs” Small Business Economics  21 pp 355-369 
Paull, R., Wolfe, J., Hébert, P. & Sinkula, M. (2003), Investing in nanotechnology, 
Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 21(10), pp. 1144 – 1147 
Perry, B. (2003) “Science and the UK Regions” seminar report, 12th May 2003, 
Manchester, Salford: The SURF Centre (accessed via SURF Web site at; 
<<http://www.surf.salford.ac.uk/documents/Science_&_UKRegions.pdf>>) 
Potts, G. (1998) Towards the embedded university? Unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Centre for 
Urban and Regional Development Studies, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne) 
Potts, Gareth, 2002, 'Regional Policy and the 'Regionalization' of University-Industry 
Links: A View from the English Regions', European Planning Studies 10 (8), December, 
p987 
Porter, M. E. (1998) On competition, Boston: Harvard Business School 
Roberts, I. (1993) Craft, class and control: the sociology of a shipbuilding community, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
229 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Rasmussen, N. (1999) Picture control — the electron microscope and the transformation 
of Biology in America 1940-1960, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press 
Richardson, R, Belt, V. & Marshall, N. (2000) “Taking calls to Newcastle: the regional 
implications of the growth in call centres” Regional Studies  34 (4) pp 357-369. 
Romer, P. M. 1994 The origins of endogenous growth Journal of Economic Perspectives 
8: 3-22. 
Saxenian, A.-L. (2000) ‘Networks of immigrant entrepreneurs’ in C. M. Lee, W. F. 
Miller, M G. Hancock and H. S. Rowen (eds) The Silicon valley edge: a habitat for 
innovation and entrepreneurship, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Schumpeter, J. A (1934) The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Science & Technology Select Committee (2000a) “Minutes of Evidence for Wednesday 
19 January 2000” The Proposed New Synchrotron Facility, London: The Stationary 
Office 
Science and Technology Select Committee (2004) Too little too late? Government 
Investment in Nanotechnology, London: The Stationary Office 
Science and Technology Select Committee (2004) Too little too late? Government 
Investment in Nanotechnology: Vol II oral and written evidence, London: The Stationary 
Office 
Scott, A. J. (2000) Economic geography: the great half century, in Clark., G.L. Feldman, 
M. P. and Gertler, M. S. (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Geography. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Solow, R. 1994 Perspectives on growth theory Journal of Economic Perspectives 8: 
45-54.  
Stehr, N. (1994) Knowledge Societies. Sage: London 
Storper, M. (1995) ‘The resurgence of regional economies ten years later: the region as a 
nexus of untraded interdependencies’, European Urban & Regional Studies 2 (3) pp. 
191-221. 
Stråth. B, (1987) The politics of de-industrialisation: the contraction of the western 
European shipbuilding industry, Beckenham: Croom Helm. 
Temple, J. (1998) “The new growth evidence” Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (1) pp. 
112-156. 
Tomaney, J., & Hayward, S., (1996) ‘Innovation systems and regional development: the 
case of North East of England,’ EUNIT Seminar Paper, 22-25th May 1996, Dortmund. 
UNICO (2002) Annual UNICO-NUBS survey of university commercialisation activity, 
Nottingham: Nottingham Business School. 
Vestegaard, J. 2004 
230 
Bringing Cambridge to Consett? Building university-centred networks in peripheral regions  
Watts, H. H. (1992) ‘Corporate reorganisation in the manufacturing sector’ in P. Townroe 
& R. Martin (eds) Regional development in the 1990s: the British Isles in transition, 
London: Jessica Kingsley. 
Webster, A.J., Rappert, B. and Charles, D.R. 'Controlling intellectual property across the 
high-tech frontier: university spin-offs, SMEs, and the science base'. In: Blackburn, R., 
ed. Intellectual property and Innovation Management in Small Firms. London: Routledge, 
2003.  
Wicksteed, B. (2000) The Cambridge Phenomenon revisited, Cambridge, UK: Segal 
Quince Wicksteed 
Wood, P. (2002) ‘Innovation and the growth of business consultancy: parallel but 
associated trends’ in P. Wood (ed) Consultancy and Innovation: the business service 
revolution in Europe London: Routledge 
Yeung, H.W. (2000) Organising ‘the firm’ in industrial geography I: networks, 
institutions and regional development, Progress in Human Geography, 24, 301-15. 
Yin, R. (1994) Case study research: design and methods, Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
 
231 
